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I. INTRODUCTION: TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY
The first principle of federal Indian law is the sovereign status of the
Indian tribes. Since the Cherokee cases, the Supreme Court has classified
tribes as "domestic dependent nations,"' exercising sovereignty over their
territories. While the precise nature of that sovereignty may be indeterminate
and subject to historic revisionism, sovereign status has nonetheless been
recognized throughout the course of dealings between the United States and
the Indian tribes. Tribal sovereignty, whatever its precise contours, has been
a cornerstone of federal Indian law since its inception.
Indian tribes, however, are not sovereign in the international sense; they
are not nation-states.2 One of the sovereign powers denied to tribes is the
ability to enter into foreign relations, to deal directly with any nation-state
other than the United States,' and tribes thus lack one of the defining
characteristics of states at international law.4 Moreover, Indian tribes do not
possess absolute authority within their jurisdictions, but rather are subject to
the overarching authority and jurisdiction of the federal government.5
Nonetheless, within the constraints of that federal power, tribes exercise
"domestic dependent" sovereignty within tribal territories.
Sovereignty is inextricably tied to territory. Governments may exist in
exile during times of political upheaval and cultures may survive for
1. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
2. Id. At international law, sovereignty is the defining characteristic of states, and only states are
sovereign. See HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE
ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 15 (1990). For discussions of the Indian tribes' fights to self-
determination under international law, however, see S. James Anaya, The Capacity of International Law
to Advance Ethnic or Nationality Rights Claims, 75 IOwA L. REV. 837 (1990); Robert A. Williams, Jr.,
Encounters on the Frontier of International Human Rights Law: Redefining the Terms of Indigenous
Peoples' Survival in the World, 1990 DUKE L.J. 660.
3. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
4. Most tribes, however, do meet the remaining central qualifications: a defined territory, a
population, and a government See Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26,
1933, art. 1, 165 L.N.T.S. 19, 25 (noting that a state should possess "(a) a permanent population; (b) a
defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other States").
5. The classic work in the area is Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources,
Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195 (1984). For additional criticisms of the legitimacy of
federal authority in Indian country, see Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 1; Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for a
Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46 ARK. L. REV. 77 (1993); Steven P. McSloy, Back to the Future:
Native American Sovereignty in the 21st Century, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 217 (1993); Robert
A. Williams, Jr., Documents of Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy of European Racism and
Colonialism in the Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARiz. L. REV. 237 (1989); Robert A.
Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing
the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 219. Despite its misbegotten origins, however,
federal power over tribes is recognized and enforced by federal courts.
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centuries dispersed across nations, but sovereignty demands a territory over
which the governmental authority of the sovereign extends. Control over
territory is the most essential element of sovereignty. 6  Sovereignty
necessitates a government with legislative, executive, and judicial powers
over all persons and property within the territory, exercised free of foreign
interference.7 Territory thus represents both the encompassing limits of a
state's jurisdiction over its resident populations and the barriers to outside
jurisdiction.
Indian tribes have territories.8 For most tribes, the major territory is the
reservation, but tribal territories are more accurately determined as the Indian
country, encompassing not only the entirety of the reservations, but certain
lands outside reservation boundaries.9 The primary statutory definition of
Indian country as all lands within the limits of Indian reservations
demonstrates that "Indian country" encompasses not property, but territory.
Indian country is determined not by ownership of the soil, but by the
territorial bounds of the sovereign tribe. Without that territory, without
territorial sovereignty, tribes are too easily reduced to little more than
"private, voluntary organizations."1
Nonetheless, tribal territorial sovereignty has come under increasing and
increasingly virulent attack. In the early nineteenth century, Chief Justice
6. See, e.g., INGRID D. DE Lupis, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE INDEPENDENT STATE 4-5 (2d ed.
1987).
7. Id. at 21. "Foreign" interference, in the context of tribal territories, means interference by the
states. The modem battleground over tribal territorial sovereignty involves attempts by the states to
exercise governmental authority and control within Indian country. As already noted, this article will
assume the fact, if not the legitimacy, of federal power in Indian country. See supra note 4 and
accompanying text.
8. On the importance of territory, see generally Frank Pommersheim, The Reservation as Place:
A South Dakota Essay, 34 S.D. L. REv. 246 (1989).
9. Indian country is defined at 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988) as:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United
States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and including rights-of-way
running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities . . . and (c) all Indian
allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way
running through the same.
The meaning of "reservation" in § 1151(a) encompasses lands set aside under federal protection for tribal
use, whether those lands are formally designated as reservations or not. So-called "informal"
reservations-tribal trust lands not necessarily within the formal boundaries of a reservation-qualify as
Indian country under § 1151(a). Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 113 S. Ct. 1985, 1991,
1993 (1993).
10. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975); see generally Joseph W. Singer,
Sovereignty and Property, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1991) (arguing that the Supreme Court ignores territorial
sovereignty and treats tribes as mere private associations in cases where tribes would benefit from the
recognition of their sovereign status).
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John Marshall proffered a vision of great "conceptual clarity."" In
Worcester v. Georgia, he held that the State of Georgia had no authority to
extend its laws into Cherokee country, even though Cherokee territory was
encompassed within the boundaries of the state and even though Georgia was
attempting to apply its laws to non-Indians entering the Cherokee country. 2
For Marshall, Cherokee country was under the sovereign control of the
Cherokee Nation, subject only to the exercise of federal power.' 3 The
territorial sovereignty of the tribes was complete, and inviolate against
attempted incursions by the states.
By the late twentieth century, however, the Supreme Court was
dismissively referring to "platonic notions" of tribal sovereignty that ought
not bind the Court to Marshall's vision.' 4  By 1980, the Court was
comfortable in positing that: "Long ago the Court departed from Mr. Chief
Justice Marshall's view that 'the laws of [a State] can have no force' within
reservation boundaries."' 5 Nonetheless, Worcester has never been overruled
11. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973).
12. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561.
13. Id. Even Marshall, however, recognized situations in which state authority within the Indian
territories would be permissible. But these were severely limited:
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with
boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which
the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves,
or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of Congress. The whole intercourse between
the United States and this nation is, by our Constitution and laws, vested in the government
of the United States.
Id. But see Ball, supra note 5, at 23-34. Professor Ball argues that nothing in the Marshall cases effected
legal incorporation of the tribes into the United States, but rather disclaimed incorporation, and
consequently that the Marshall cases do not serve as a basis of federal divestiture of tribal sovereign
rights.
14. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973). In McClanahan, the
Court noted "a trend away from" the Worcester ideal of tribal sovereignty as a bar to state authority and
a trend toward federal preemption of state jurisdiction. Id. The Court then engaged in an analysis of the
Navajo treaty, the Arizona Enabling Act, and other federal legislation, ultimately concluding that Arizona
had no authority to impose its income taxes on a Navajo woman who lived on and earned her income
within the Navajo reservation. Id. at 181.
15. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracket, 448 U.S. 136, 141 (1980) (quoting Worcester, 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) at 561). In Bracker, the Court most definitely departed from Marshall's view. The issue before
the Court was whether the State of Arizona could impose certain state taxes on a non-Indian logging
company for business activities which the company performed solely on the reservation under contract
with the tribal timber company. Had the Court followed Worcester, the outcome would presumptively
have been simple. Arizona was attempting to assert state authority over non-Indians within reservation
borders. The situation was directly analogous to that in Worcester, where the State of Georgia required
non-Indians to obtain state permits to enter Cherokee territory. Georgia could not assert that authority
in Cherokee country because its laws did not apply within the territorial borders of the Indian country.
If Worcester survived intact, then Arizona also could not impose its taxes even on the non-Indian
contractor because it could not extend its laws within the territorial bounds of the reservation.
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and the Court consistently notes that tribes possess sovereign rights over their
territories.'6 Thus, even as it retreats from the plain meaning of Worcester
and Marshall's declaration of tribal territorial sovereignty, the Court
continues to recognize, at least to some extent, the strong territorial
component of tribal governmental authority.
The importance of territory to tribal sovereignty is demonstrated by the
fluctuations of federal Indian policy over the last century. When the
government's attention has turned to the assimilation of Indians into the
majoritarian society and the dissolution of the tribes, tribal territory is the
focus of the attack. During the allotment era of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, the assimilationist goal rested on the allotment of
reservations in severalty and the sale of the remaining lands. During the
termination era of the 1950s, the approach was even cruder: wholesale
withdrawal of federal protection from tribal territories, forced sale of lands,
and distribution of the proceeds.
The opposite is also true. When federal Indian policy has turned to the
protection and promotion of tribal autonomy, territory is again a central
feature. At the repudiation of the allotment era, Congress ended all further
depredations on the tribal land base and provided mechanisms for the return
of unsold lands and the acquisition of "new" additional lands. With the
reversal of the termination policy came the restoration acts, generally
providing the restored tribes with some land base. Today, the recognition of
groups as federally-recognized tribes also carries with it the demand for
territory.
Instead, the Court in Bracker applied its then relatively new preemption analysis, to which tribal
sovereignty constituted merely a "backdrop." See 448 U.S. at 143. The Court analyzed the "tradition"
of tribal sovereignty, federal support for and encouragement of tribal self-government, and the pervasive
nature of federal timber management statutes and regulations. Id. at 143-48. Based on those factors, the
Court concluded that the state taxes were preempted because they would interfere with the federal
objectives and policies. Id. at 151. The bottom line was thus the same as it would have been under
Worcester: the state taxes were barred. But instead of prohibiting the state action as a plain intrusion into
the territory of the sovereign tribe, the Court introduced the idea of balancing, thus giving legitimacy to
the interests on the "other" side of the balance: those of the state. By the late 1980s, in a case similar to
Bracker, the balancing test tipped in favor of the state, a result that would have been unthinkable under
the Worcester approach. See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989). Professor
Frickey refers to Cotton Petroleum as "perhaps the Rehnquist Court's prime offender of the Marshall
legacy." Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and
Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REv. 381, 433-34 (1993).
16. In the regulatory context, the Court often states that tribes possess "attributes of sovereignty over
both their members and their territory." Mazurie, 419 U.S. at 557 (emphasis added) (quoted with
approval in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207 (1987)). More broadly,
the Court has recently recognized that "[t]ribal authority over the activities of non-Indians on reservation
lands is an important part of tribal sovereignty." Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987).
These formulations necessarily reaffirm tribal territorial sovereignty. Tribal authority is not limited to
members, but extends throughout the territorial boundaries of the Indian country.
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The greatest and most concerted attack on the territorial sovereignty of the
tribes was the allotment policy of the 1880s to the 1930s. The allotment
policy was overtly directed to the dissolution of the tribes and the
extinguishment of tribal territories. But the allotment policy was also a
failure: it did not transform the Indians into yeoman farmers, but it did wreak
destruction within tribal communities. Recognizing the atrocity of allotment,
Congress formally ended the practice in 1934 and repudiated its policy
underpinnings.
That should have been the end of allotment. But its legacy lingers on, and
in recent years has been revived by the Court in a series of cases that give
present effect to the discredited policy of allotment and assimilation. In the
process, the Court has chosen to diminish tribal territories and to restrict
tribal sovereign control over the territory that remains. By deciding cases in
accord with the assimilation policy, the Court has undercut the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of the Indian nations.
This article traces the legacy of allotment in the Court's recent opinions
and argues that the decisions giving effect to the allotment policy are
contrary to interpretive rules, precedent, and federal policy. Part II describes
the allotment policy in effect from the late 1880s until 1934, briefly tracing
its origins, its land programs, and its termination by Congress. Part II
concludes with a brief look at current federal Indian policy and the modem
legislative and executive focus on the governmental status of tribes. Part III
explores the opinion that showcases the problem: County of Yakima v.
Yakima Indian Nation,7 the Court's recent interpretation of the General
Allotment Act itself. The next two parts look at the Court's use of the
legacy of allotment in cases that do not directly interpret the allotment act.
Part IV discusses the reservation disestablishment cases, in which the Court
often has invoked the legacy of allotment to deprive tribes of lands set aside
as tribal territories, thus also robbing tribes of their sovereignty over the lost
territory. Part V explores cases in which the Court has left the territorial
boundaries intact, but used the legacy of allotment to dispossess tribes of full
sovereign authority over that territory.
Part VI then reprises the question that former Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, George Manypenny, asked at the very outset of the allotment era:
"Shall we persist in a policy that has failed?" Shall we, in other words,
continue to give effect to the policy of allotment, recognized as a failure and
a disaster for the tribes, officially repudiated by the Congress, and contrary
to every manifestation of current Indian policy? Unfortunately, the answer
from the Supreme Court appears to be yes. It not only persists in giving
17. 504 U.S. 251 (1992).
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effect to a policy that has failed, but does so in ways that disrespect the
branch of government charged with authority over Indian affairs and mock
the Court's own precedents in the field.
II. DISMANTLING THE LAND BASE, 1885-1934
The modem legacy of allotment, the late twentieth century attack on tribal
sovereignty, has its origins in the late nineteenth century federal policy
toward the Indian nations. Ushered in formally by the General Allotment
Act of 1887, the federal policy of assimilation and allotment of Indian lands
in severalty dominated the federal-tribal scene for half a century. The
allotment policy was officially repudiated in 1934, but it nonetheless
continues to influence and inform the Supreme Court's Indian law
jurisprudence today.
A. Allotment and Assimilation
Prior to the late nineteenth century, federal Indian policy was primarily
oriented towards the separation of tribes and citizens. In the early decades
of the century, removal of the tribes to "unsettled" territory west of the
Mississippi was the prefeired federal approach.'" The removed tribes were
accorded lands in the new country in exchange for their cession of aboriginal
territories in the southeast.' 9 By the end of the Civil War, however, the
focus of the separatist idea had shifted. As non-Indian settlement of the
trans-Mississippi West burgeoned, federal policy shifted from the removal of
tribes to the Indian Territory to the isolation of tribes in pockets of lands
carved out of aboriginal territories.2"
18. FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 78-79 (Rennard Strickland ed., 1982
ed.).
19. See id. at 79-92; ANGIE DEBO, AND STILL THE WATERS RUN: THE BETRAYAL OF THE FIVE
CIVILIZED TRIBES 4-5 (1940).
20. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 103-05. Indian Commissioner Charles E. Mix noted
that, in the absence of "distant and extensive sections of country which we can assign them," the
reservation system was "the only course compatible with the obligations of justice and humanity." 1858
COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFF. ANN. REP., reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY
92, 94 (Francis Paul Prucha, ed., 2d ed. 1990).
Prior to 1871, reservations were generally set aside by treaty. When treaty-making with the tribes
ended in that year, see 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1988), Congress continued to create reservations by statute, most
of which ratified agreements reached with tribes. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 127. Moreover,
numerous reservations were created by executive order between 1855 and 1919. Id. at 127-28.
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The purposes of the reservation policy were diverse. In part, like the
removal policy, the reservation policy was intended to ease hostilities and
tensions between tribes and settlers by segregating the two groups from one
another.2 Moreover, reservations were designed to preserve the tribes from
destruction and, at the same time, to provide a laboratory for teaching Indians
the virtues of agriculture and civilization.22 Indian lands set aside as
reservations were eventually recognized as being "in trust" for the tribes;2"
under that trust status the United States holds the fee while the tribes retain
beneficial ownership.
Contained within the reservation policy of the mid-to-late nineteenth
century were the origins of the allotment policy to come. Treaties concluded
in the 1850s to make way for white settlement of Kansas and Nebraska
included provisions for allotment of lands,24 as did treaties in the Pacific
Northwest.25 Throughout the reservation era, various Commissioners of
Indian Affairs advocated the allotment of the reservations as the next logical
step towards the civilization and improvement of the Indians.26
Nonetheless, widespread dissatisfaction with the reservation policy was slow
21. See, e.g., 1850 COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFF. ANN. REP., reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED
STATES INDIAN POLICY, supra note 20, at 81-82; 1869 SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR ANN. REP., reprinted
in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, supra note 20, at 129. Professor Wilkinson refers
to this as the policy of "measured separatism." CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME AND
THE LAw 16 (1987).
22. Indian Commissioner William P. Dole proclaimed that "the policy, recently adopted, of confining
the Indians to reservations ... is the best method yet devised for their reclamation and advancement in
civilization." 1862 COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFF. ANN. REP., reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED
STATES INDIAN POLICY, supra note 20, at 95; see also I FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER:
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS 463-65 (1984) (discussing
Commissioner Dole's reign); id at 439 (noting that Sioux treaties of 1851 contained "the usual
agricultural, educational, and general civilization provisions").
23. Morrison v. Work, 266 U.S. 481, 485 (1925) (noting that as to tribal property, the federal
government acts with "the powers of a guardian and of a trustee in possession"). The General Allotment
Act of 1887 represents the first time that Congress specified that Indian lands were to be held "in trust"
for the owners. For a discussion of the origins of the trust status of Indian lands and the parallels to the
development of trust status for public lands, see Russel L. Barsh & James Y. Henderson, Contrary
Jurisprudence: Tribal Interests in Navigable Waterways Before and After Montana v. United States, 56
WASH. L. REv. 627, 640-47 (1981).
24. 1856 COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFF. ANN. REP., reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES
INDIAN POLICY, supra note 20, at 89-90.
25. See, e.g., Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom County, 5 F.3d 1355 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 2727 (1994), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 136-41 (discussing Treaty of Point
Elliot (1855)).
26. See, e.g., 1862 COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFF. ANN. REP., reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED
STATES INDIAN POLICY, supra note 20, at 95; 1876 COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFF. ANN. REP., reprinted
in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, supra note 20, at 147, 149; 1880 COMMISSIONER OF
INDIAN AFF. ANN. REP., reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, supra note 20, at
153, 154-55; see also COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 98-102.
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to build. Not until the late 1880s did Congress begin actively pursuing a new
approach.
The 1880s witnessed the fundamental shift in federal policy from
separatism within reservations to assimilation. And yet the goals of the
allotment and assimilation era were in many respects continuations of the
reservation goals: agriculture, Christianity, and citizenship were to be the
ultimate outcome." Federal policy, however, was no longer content with
separating the tribes, protecting their autonomy, and providing Indian agents
as teachers of change. Instead, federal policy turned toward the assimilation
of Indians into the general body of citizens.
The primary agent of civilization and citizenship was to be private land
ownership. Despite the "flat, miserable failure" of previous experiments in
allotment,2" advocates of the policy believed that individual ownership of
property would turn the Indians from a savage, primitive, tribal way of life
to a settled, agrarian, and civilized one.29 Assimilation was viewed as both
humanitarian and inevitable.30  The cornerstone of this social engineering,
this "legal cultural genocide,"'" was the replacement of tribal communal
ownership of land with private property. In the General Allotment, or
Dawes, Act of 1887,32 Congress authorized the break up of the reservations.
Indians were to receive allotments of land in severalty, and the remaining
surplus lands were to be opened to settlement.33
27. II FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE
AMERICAN INDIANS 659 (1984).
28. HOUSE COMM. ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, MINORITY REPORT ON LAND IN SEVERALTY BILL, H.R. REP.
No. 1576, 46th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-10 (1880), reprinted in AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS:
WRITINGS BY THE "FRIENDS OF THE INDIAN" 1880-1900 121, 125 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 1973)
(describing the Catawba allotment program). Allotment had been tried on a small scale on several
occasions prior to the General Allotment Act. In almost all instances, however, the experiment was a
failure. Lands were allotted immediately into individual fee ownership, and too often the Indian owners,
unaccustomed to private property, lost their lands to white speculators, banks, or sheriffs' auctions. See,
e.g., II PRUCHA, supra note 27, at 663; COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 129-30; Paul W. Gates,
Indian Allotments Preceding the Dawes Act, reprinted in THE RAPE OF INDIAN LANDS 141 (Paul W. Gates
ed., 1979).
29. "Individual land ownership was supposed to have some magic in it to transform an Indian hunter
into a busy farmer." DELOS S. OTIS, THE DAWES ACT AND THE ALLOTMENT OF INDIAN LANDS 141
(Francis Paul Prucha ed., 1973).
30. 11 PRUCHA, supra note 27, at 625-26, 662; OTs, supra note 29, at 8-32. As one historian has
noted, "[W]hen a veritable phalanx of philanthropists turned their minds to helping the Indian in the post-
Civil War period, his fate was sealed." WILCOMB E. WASHBURN, THE ASSAULT ON INDIAN TRIBALISM:
THE GENERAL ALLOTMENT LAW (DAWES ACT) OF 1887 12 (1986).
31. Rennard Strickland, Genocide-at-Law: An Historic and Contemporary View of the Native
American Experience, 34 KAN. L. REV. 713, 721 (1986).
32. 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified in part at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-381 (1983)). The General Allotment
Act is also known as the Dawes Act after its sponsor.
33. Under the authority of the General Allotment Act, 118 reservations were allotted and 44 of those
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1. Allotments and Fee Patents
The central feature of the General Allotment Act was the allotment of the
reservations in severalty. Under the Act, individual Indians received a certain
number of acres of reservation land.34 In recognition of prior failed
attempts to allot Indian lands in fee, however, Congress provided that allotted
lands would be held in trust for the individual allottee for a period of twenty-
five years.35 During that time, the allottee was expected to assimilate to
agriculture, to Christianity, and to citizenship. At the end of the twenty-five
year transition period, the individual would receive a patent in fee, free of
encumbrance and fully alienable.36 With the acquisition of a fee patent, the
allottee would also be subject to the civil and criminal laws of the state.37
The twenty-five year trust period came under attack, however, by those
who viewed the continued federal guardianship as an obstacle to the goal of
assimilation.3" As a result, Congress amended the General Allotment Act
in 1906 to authorize the early issuance of fee patents. 39  The Burke Act
were opened to non-Indian homesteading. I AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, FINAL
REPORT 309 (1977).
34. The exact size of allotments varied over time. As originally enacted, the General Allotment Act
varied the size of the allotment by the status of the individual. Each head of family received 160 acres;
single adults received 80 acres; and orphans and other single persons received even less. General
Allotment Act, ch. 119, § 1, 24 Stat. 388 (1887). The Act was amended in 1891 to equalize the size of
allotments: "each Indian" was now entitled to 80 acres. Act of Feb. 28, 1891, ch. 383, § 1, 26 Stat. 794.
The Act was amended again in 1910 to differentiate the size of allotments depending upon the type of
land. After 1910, allotments of agricultural land remained at 80 acres, while allotments of grazing land
were increased to 160 acres. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 431, § 17, 36 Stat. 859; see 25 U.S.C. § 331.
35. General Allotment Act, ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. 389 (1887); see 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1983); see OTs,
supra note 29, at 50.
36. General Allotment Act, ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. 389 (1887); see 25 U.S.C. § 348.
37. 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1983). The original language of the Act provided that those to whom
allotments had been made "shall ... be subject to the laws, both civil and criminal, of the State or
Territory in which they reside." General Allotment Act, ch. 119, § 6, 24 Stat. 390 (1887). In 1905, the
Supreme Court determined that this language subjected allottees to state civil and criminal jurisdiction
upon the issuance of a trust patent. In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 502-03 (1905). Congress promptly
amended the Act to provide that state jurisdiction would only take effect "[a]t the expiration of the trust
period and when the lands have been conveyed to the Indians by patent in fee ...." Burke Act of 1906,
34 Stat. 182. The Court later clarified that the issuance of a fee patent did not subject the owner to all
state laws, but only those consistent with the Constitution and acts of Congress. United States v. Nice,
241 U.S. 591, 600 (1916).
38. FREDERICK E. HOXIE, A FINAL PROMISE: THE CAMPAIGN TO ASSIMILATE THE INDIANS, 1880-
1920 165 (1984). The allotment program was proceeding apace during the early years. Between 1887
and 1900, nearly 5 million acres were allotted to more than 53,000 individuals. OTIS, supra note 29, at
87. Under the General Allotment Act of 1887, however, none of these lands would pass into fee status
until 1912 at the earliest.
39. Burke Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 182 (amending § 6 of the General Allotment Act) (codified at 25
U.S.C. § 349).
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authorized the Secretary of the Interior to issue a fee patent to an allottee at
any time, upon a determination that the individual was "competent and
capable of managing his or her affairs."40  Upon the issuance of one of
these premature patents, the land was expressly subject to alienation,
encumbrance, and taxation.4
The effect of the Burke Act was immediate and substantial. In the three
years following the passage of the 1906 act, patents were issued upon the
recommendation of the Indian superintendent.42 Of the 2744 applications
made during those years, all but 68 were granted.43 Surveys in 1908
showed that more than 60 percent of the premature patentees lost their
lands.44  In 1909, an alarmed Commissioner of Indian Affairs began
requiring a more detailed showing that the allottee was competent, and the
approval rate dropped to approximately seventy percent of all applicants.45
That relief was short-lived. In 1913, a new Commissioner of Indian
Affairs not only reinstated the liberalized policy, but expanded upon it.46
Initially, the Indian superintendents were ordered to submit the names of
competent Indians, but that procedure was soon replaced by "competency
commissions," charged with roaming the reservations in search of allottees
who could be issued premature patents.47 Under pressure to liberate the
Indians from federal guardianship, the Indian Office issued patents to
unqualified allottees and, in many cases, to allottees who neither applied for
nor wanted to accept them.48 Despite reports showing that in many cases
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 136.
43. Id. The Commissioner of Indian Affairs announced a policy of considering all applications with
a view toward recommending issuance of a patent, in order to free Indians from the "shackles of
wardship." 1906 COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFF. ANN. REP., reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES
INDIAN POLICY, supra note 20, at 208, 209.
44. JANET A. McDONNELL, THE DISPOSSESSION OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN, 1887-1934 89 (1991).
45. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 136.
46. Id. at 138.
47. MCDONNELL, supra note 44, at 91, 93-94.
48. Id. at 98. In fact, allottees issued premature patents against their will could not avoid the patents
by refusing to accept them. The Interior Department would mail the patent to the allottee and inform the
tax collector, who was then authorized to collect the taxes authorized by the Burke Act. Id. at 99. The
Department would also mail the patent to the superintendent of the reservation, with instructions to record
the patent and then send it to the allottee by registered mail if the allottee refused to accept it. See Glacier
County v. United States, 99 F.2d 733, 734 (9th Cir. 1938) (describing practices on the Blackfeet
Reservation). By the 1920s, however, the Ninth Circuit held that a forced-fee patent, which the allottee
had neither applied for nor accepted, did not transfer fee title. United States v. Benewah County, 290 F.
628, 630-31 (9th Cir. 1923).
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90 percent or more of premature and forced-fee allottees lost their lands,49
the liberalized policy was formalized and further expanded in 1917.5 o
In that year, Indian Commissioner Sells announced that fee patents would
simply be issued to all allottees of less than one-half Indian ancestry, while
competency determinations would still be required for those of one-half or
more Indian blood.51  The effects were again devastating. In the eighteen
months following Sells' policy announcement, the Indian Office issued
premature patents for approximately one million acres, more than had been
patented in the previous ten years. 2 Similarly, between 1917 and 1920,
more than 17,000 patents were issued, twice as many as were issued in the
previous ten years. 3 The havoc caused by Sells' policy resulted in a loss
of support for liberalized patenting, and in 1920 a new Commissioner
abolished the competency commissions and declared that no fee patents
would issue without a determination of competency regardless of blood
quantum. "
Between the two methods-expiration of the trust period and premature
patents-thousands of patents in fee were issued, often amounting to several
thousand in a single year.55 Once a patent in fee was issued, the land could
be alienated, encumbered, and at least as to Burke Act patents, taxed.56
Thousands of Indian owners disposed of their lands by voluntary or
fraudulent sales; many others lost their lands at sheriffs' sales for
nonpayment of taxes or other liens.5" By the end of the allotment era, two-
thirds of all the land allotted-approximately 27 million acres-had passed
into non-Indian ownership.58
49. McDONNELL, supra note 44, at 100.
50. 1917 COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFF. ANN. REP. , reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES
INDIAN POLICY, supra note 20, at 213-14 (announcing a policy of "greater liberalism" in the issuance of
early fee patents).
51. Id. at 214.
52. McDONNELL, supra note 44, at 107.
53. Id. at 110.
54. Id.
55. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 136-37.
56. County of Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 254 (1992). This issue of the
taxability of lands patented in fee at the expiration of the twenty-five year trust period was the central
question in County of Yakima. Id. The Court determined that all fee patents issued under the General
Allotment Act, whether patented early or not, are subject to state property taxes. Id. The County of
Yakima decision is discussed infra at part IlI.
57. MCDONNELL, supra note 44, at 100-01, 106-07.
58. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 138.
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2. Surplus Lands
Despite the devastating effect of fee patents, the 27 million patented acres
lost to non-Indians represented only about one-third of the tribal losses during
the allotment era.59 More than twice as much land-some 60 million
acres-was lost under the surplus lands program. 6' The General Allotment
Act provided that, once reservation lands were allotted in severalty, the
remaining "surplus" lands could, at the discretion of the President, be opened
to non-Indian settlement. 61 Non-Indian settlement interspersed with Indian
allotments, assimilation advocates believed, would promote interaction
between citizens and Indians and encourage the allottees to adopt white ways.
Allotment would remove the "dead weight" of communal tribal lands that
kept the Indians from full participatory citizenship.
62
As enacted, the General Allotment Act called for tribal consent to cession
of the surplus lands. 63  Although multiple cession agreements were
negotiated with tribes, many of the early efforts were thwarted by the tribes'
refusal to sell or their demand of a high price.64 In 1903, however, the
59. Between fee patents and the surplus lands acts, tribes lost approximately 90 million acres of
tribal trust lands between the onset of the allotment policy in 1887 and its official repudiation in 1934.
COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 138.
60. Id Of those, approximately 38 million acres were ceded outright to the United States, and
another 22 million were opened to homesteading after allotments were made. I AMERICAN INDIAN
POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, supra note 33, at 309.
61. General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, 389-90 (1887).
62.
[W]e need now to face the fact, and deal with it, that the surplus of the reservation after
allotment is a danger that threatens much, and a dead weight that hangs heavily about the
newly made citizen's neck. The wise disposal and conversion of this value, if rightly
used,-crushing burden, if not so disposed of,-is the next most difficult problem and pressing
duty before us.
Charles C. Painter, The Indian and His Property in Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Meeting of the
Lake Mohonk Conference of Friends of the Indian 84-89 (1889), reprinted in AMERICANIZING THE
AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 28, at 114, 116; see also WASHBURN, supra note 30, at 30.
Support for the surplus lands program, like support for allotment in severalty, was widespread. One
of the few dissenting voices came from the minority report in the House of Representatives:
The main object of the bill is in the last sections of it, not in the first. The sting of this animal
is in its tail. When the Indian has got his allotments, the rest of his land is to be put up to the
highest bidder, and he is to be surrounded in his allotments with a wall of fire, a cordon of
white settlements, which will gradually but surely hem him in, circumscribe him, ind
eventually crowd him out.
HOUSE COMM. ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, MINORITY REPORT ON LAND IN SEVERALTY BILL, H. REP. NO. 1576,
46th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-10 (1880), reprinted in AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 28,
at 121, 128.
63. General Allotment Act, ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §
331 (1988)).
64. HOXIE, supra note 38, at 156.
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Supreme Court held in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock that tribal consent to the loss
of surplus lands was not required, notwithstanding either the General
Allotment Act or a specific treaty provision requiring written consent to any
cession agreement.65 Thereafter, Congress unilaterally enacted surplus lands
acts, contending that rapid disposal of the surplus lands would increase the
value of Indian allotments, give the Indian allottees role models to emulate,
and generally "be a great improvement upon their present condition."66 The
Commissioner of Indian Affairs concurred, noting that if Congress waited for
tribal consent, "it will be fifty years before you can do away with the
reservations." '67  Within two years of the Lone Wolf decision, Congress
enacted six surplus lands acts without tribal consent or negotiation, and in
1905 four of the affected reservations were opened to white settlement.6"
The post-Lone Wolf surplus lands acts followed a pattern. "They were
proposed by western politicians, approved by a voice vote in Congress, and
greeted with cheers from local settlers and businessmen. 6 9  Tribal
advocates were reduced to campaigning for adequate compensation for the
homesteaded lands.7" Once tribal consent was no longer at issue, the focus
of the surplus lands program had shifted from assimilation of the Indians to
the development and white settlement of the western states.7 '
65. 187 U.S. 553, 567 (1903). The federal government entered into a cession agreement with the
Kiowa and Comanche Tribes pursuant to the General Allotment Act and a treaty provision requiring the
written consent of three-quarters of the adult males of the combined tribes. Id. at 554. The government
obtained 456 signatures, and in 1900 Congress enacted the cession agreement into law. Id. at 554-55.
Lone Wolf challenged the action, claiming that the number of signatures represented less than three-
quarters of the adult males, and that many of the signatures had been obtained by fraud. Id. at 556. The
Court refused to address Lone Wolf's arguments, holding that the statutory cession was within the plenary
power of Congress over Indian affairs, and beyond the power of the courts to review. Id. at 567-68.
66. II PRUCHA, supra note 27, at 868 (quoting the House Committee on Indian Affairs, reporting
on the 1904 Rosebud Sioux Surplus Lands Act).
67. Id (quoting testimony before the House Committee on Indian Affairs by Commissioner William
A. Jones). Jones expressly rejected the notion of seeking tribal consent where a treaty provision so
required, rhetorically questioning whether the Congress would ask consent from "a child 8 or 10 years
of age." Id.
The meaning of Jones's phrase "do away with the reservations" is debatable. Compare John T.
Hughes & Tom Tobin, Comment, New Town et al.: The Future of an Illusion, 18 S.D. L. REV. 85, 103
(1973) ("In 1904, to 'do away with the reservation,' was also to do away with the boundaries of the
reservation.") with Susan D. Campbell, Note, Reservations: The Surplus Lands Acts and the Question of
Reservation Disestablishment, 12 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 57, 85 (1984) (arguing that "at no point" do the
acts or their legislative histories "mention a dismantling of the reservation system or termination of federal
jurisdiction or guardianship").
68. HOXIE, supra note 38, at 157.
69. Id. at 165.
70. Id; II PRUCHA, supra note 27, at 869.
71. HOXIE, supra note 38, at 158.
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B. Repudiation of Allotment
The 1920s represented a decade of transition from the devastation of the
allotment years to a formal change in federal policy in the early 1930s. In
1921, the liberal policy of granting forced-fee and other premature patents
was officially abandoned,72 and the number of premature pktents steadily
declined throughout the 1920s. By the early 1930s, the Indian Office
rejected more than 50 percent of patent applications, and issued fewer than
300 patents in a two-year period.73 Nonetheless, patentees continued to lose
their lands in "staggering" numbers.74 As a result, the Indian Office began
to urge legislation that would permit the cancellation of forced-fee patents,
a proposal that received considerable impetus from a Ninth Circuit decision
holding that fee title did not pass to the allottee under a forced-fee patent.75
Congress responded in 1927, authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to
cancel forced-fee patents.76 The effect of the legislation was limited,
however; patents could be canceled only if the patent was issued without the
application or consent of the allottee and if the owner had not sold or
mortgaged the land. 77 Because of those limitations, the Interior Department
72. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 137.
73. McDONNELL, supra note 44, at 120.
74. Id. at 113 ("A staggering number of Indians lost their land and became paupers, as many as 75
to 100 percent of the patentees on most reservations."); see also AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW
COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, supra note 33, at 309 ("By 1934, 3 percent of the allotted land converted
to fee patents remained in Indian ownership.").
75. United States v. Benewah County, 290 F. 628, 630-31 (9th Cir. 1923). The court noted that the
allottee had neither applied for the patent nor accepted it when it was issued. While the Burke Act
authorized premature patents, the court found it must "be held to mean that such action by the Secretary
can be had only upon the application of the allottee or with his consent." Id. at 63 1. On the issue of
forced-fee patents generally, and attempts to redress the problem through the federal courts, see LeAnn
L. LaFave, South Dakota's Forced Fee Indian Land Claims: Will Landowners Be Liable for Government's
Wrongdoing?, 30 S.D. L. REv. 59 (1984).
76. Act of February 26, 1927, ch. 215, §§ 1-2, 44 Stat. 1247 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 352a-352b
(1988)).
77. The law was amended in 1931 to permit the cancellation of a forced-fee patent on land
remaining to the patentee where only part of the land had been lost. Act of Feb. 21, 1931, ch. 271, 46
Stat. 1205 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 352b (1988)).
One of the effects of cancellation was that the property was not subject to taxes during the years the
forced-fee patent was in effect. See, e.g., Glacier County v. United States, 99 F.2d 733, 734-35 (9th Cir.
1938); see also Benewah County, 290 F. at 630-32 (holding likewise for forced-fee patents canceled by
the Secretary prior to the 1927 Act). Both Glacier County and Benewah County involved forced-fee
patents that had been canceled by the Secretary of the Interior before the land had passed out of the
allottees' hands. Accordingly, no court held that a forced-fee patent was inadequate to vest fee title in
a subsequent non-Indian purchaser of the allotment. That result, of course, is curious: a forced-fee patent
was inadequate to pass fee title to the allottee, see Benewah County, 290 F. at 630-31, but adequate to
pass fee title to a subsequent non-Indian purchaser.
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ultimately canceled only some 470 forced-fee patents out of approximately
10,000 that were issued.7
The decade culminated with the issuance of the Meriam Report in 1928. 79
The report, a nongovernmental study undertaken at the request of the
Secretary of the Interior, investigated Indian policy and administration and
their impacts on Indian life. The destructive effects of the allotment policy
documented in the Meriam Report----effects on the economic, social, cultural,
and physical well-being of the tribes-generated sympathy and popular
support for a change in the federal approach. The report also called for
greater respect for Indian culture, an attitude that reflects what historian
Frederick Hoxie has termed the early twentieth-century "redefinition of
Indian assimilation" to accommodate cultural diversity."0 Publication of the
Meriam Report was closely followed by appointment of a new Commissioner
of Indian Affairs, who had some success in implementing the
recommendations of the report.8'
The appointment of John Collier as Commissioner in 1933, however, set
the stage for wide-ranging reform of federal Indian policy and programs.
Within four months of taking office, Collier effectively put an end to
allotment and the practice of issuing fee patents by directing the
superintendents not to submit either certificates of competency or fee
patents."2  The following year, Collier's goal of legislation to reverse
allotment was realized when Congress enacted the Indian Reorganization Act
of 1934.83
With the Indian Reorganization Act ("IRA"), Congress put an official end
to the allotment program and formally repudiated the assimilation policy. 4
78. McDONNELL, supra note 44, at 118.
79. INSTITUTE FOR GOVERNMENT RESEARCH, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION (L. Meriam
ed., 1928). See generally COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 14445. Brief excerpts from the
Meriarn Report are reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, supra note 20, at 219-21.
80. HOXIE, supra note 38, at 241. For a discussion of other social and political factors that
contributed to the demise of the allotment policy, see John W. Ragsdale, Jr., The Movement to Assimilate
the American Indians: A Jurisprudential Study, 57 UMKC L. REv. 399, 421-23 (1989).
81. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 145. Reform efforts during these years were primarily
limited by the Great Depression. GRAHAM D. TAYLOR, THE NEW DEAL AND AMERICAN INDIAN
TRIBALISM: THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT, 193445 16 (1980).
82. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 146; 11 PRUCHA, supra note 27, at 951.
83. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461495
(1988)).
84. In addition to the provisions relating to land discussed here, a central feature of the IRA was the
authorization for tribes to organize governments and obtain charters. Ch. 576, §§ 16-17, 48 Stat. 984
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 476477 (1988)). The IRA's focus on tribal self-government represented a
significant break with the assimilation policy in effect for the previous half-century. See generally
TAYLOR, supra note 81; BRIAN W. DIPPIE, THE VANISHING AMERICAN: WHITE ArrTUDEs AND U.S.
INDIAN POLICY 297-321 (1982).
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The first sections of the IRA contained what Collier called the "repair work"
regarding tribal lands.85 Section 1 of the IRA prohibited any further
allotment of tribal land. 6 Section 2 provided that any allotments then held
in trust status would continue in trust until Congress provided otherwise.87
Section 3 authorized the Secretary of the Interior to restore any remaining
surplus lands to tribal ownership,8" and the Secretary subsequently halted
any disposition of surplus lands on thirty reservations pending the
implementation of § 3.89 Finally, § 5 authorized the Secretary to take new
lands into trust and to add those lands to reservations.90
In effect, Congress halted the allotment program where it stood in 1934,
and provided that certain ravages of the policy could be in part ameliorated.
What Congress did not do, however, was restore fee patented or homesteaded
lands to tribal ownership. 9' Although the Secretary was authorized to
acquire fee lands and return them to trust status and tribal ownership, these
provisions affected only a fraction of the millions of acres lost to fee
ownership. The vast majority of lands that had passed into fee during the
85. 1934 COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFF. ANN. REP., reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES
INDIAN POLICY, supra note 20, at 225. Many of Collier's envisioned repairs, unfortunately, never
materialized.
86. Ch. 576, § 1, 48 Stat. 984 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 461 (1988)).
87. Ch. 576, § 2, 48 Stat. 984 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 462 (1988)). Today, an allottee can petition
the Secretary of the Interior to remove the trust restrictions and issue a fee patent. See 25 C.F.R. §§
152.4-.5 (1993).
88. Ch. 576, § 3, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 463 (1988)).
89. 54 Interior Dec. 559 (1934). Section 3 of the IRA authorized the Secretary "to restore to tribal
ownership the remaining surplus lands of any Indian reservation .. " The Secretary interpreted this to
mean that he was authorized to restore any undisposed-of surplus lands that remained within reservation
boundaries as of 1934, but not surplus lands that had been disestablished from the reservations. See
generally infra part IV. Accordingly, the Secretary limited the temporary withdrawal of surplus lands
from disposition to those reservations where the surplus lands were not ceded outright to the United States
for a sum certain payment, but rather opened to homesteading with the federal government acting as
realtor for the lands and trustee for the proceeds of the sales. 54 Interior Dec. at 560. The Commissioner
of Indian Affairs identified thirty reservations in thirteen states as eligible for this temporary withdrawal.
Id. at 561-62, 564.
90. Ch. 576, § 5, 48 Stat. 984 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 465 (1988)). The BIA was initially
aggressive in seeking funds to implement the § 5 purchase program, but appropriations steadily declined.
Between 1936 and 1974, some 595,157 acres were restored to tribal ownership, but more than three times
that many acres of existing tribal lands, a total of 1,811,010, were condemned for other purposes. Close
to half a million of those acres were taken for federal water projects alone. I AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY
REVIEW COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, supra note 33, at 309-10.
91. As the Supreme Court noted recently, for the most part "Congress made no attempt to undo the
dramatic effects of the allotment years on the ownership of former Indian lands." County of Yakima, 502
U.S. at 255. Nonetheless, as Indian Commissioner Collier noted, "While Congress did not specifically
direct the consolidation of Indian lands broken up and checkerboarded with white holdings in the
allotment process, it authorized such consolidation and set up the machinery for it." 1934 COMMISSIONER
OF INDIAN AFF. ANN. REP., reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, supra note 20,
at 225-26.
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allotment years remains in fee today: the legacy of allotment that gives rise
to the modem Court decisions divesting tribes of both territory and
sovereignty.
C. The Modern Policy Era
The reorganization era was short-lived. Criticism of the IRA began
immediately92 and, coupled with pro-assimilationist social forces revived
after World War II, led to the termination era of the 1940s and 1950s.93
Termination was assimilation with a vengeance. Congress withdrew federal
recognition, liquidated tribal assets, including the land base, and transferred
jurisdiction over Indians to the states. 94  The loss of tribal territory and
sovereignty was immediate and complete. In that sense, termination was if
anything more brutal than allotment, but it affected, by comparison, few
people and little land. 9
Like the reorganization era that it replaced, the termination era also was
short-lived. Even as the final termination plans were developed and
implemented in the late 1950s and early 1960s, federal policy turned against
the forced termination of tribes. 96 The swing in federal policy back to the
protection and promotion of tribal autonomy was ushered in by President
Johnson, who called in 1968 for a policy of "self-help, self-development, and
self-determination" for Indians. 97  Two years later, President Nixon
92. See generally Laurence M. Hauptman, The Indian Reorganization Act, in THE AGGRESSIONS OF
CIVILIZATION: FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY SINCE THE 18805 131, 139-43 (Sandra L. Cadwalader & Vine
Deloria, Jr., eds., 1984).
93. On the forces leading to the demise of the reorganization era, see TAYLOR, supra note 81, at
139-49. On the termination era, see generally DONALD L. FiXCo, TERMINATION AND RELOCATION:
FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY, 1945-1960 (1986); Charles F. Wilkinson & Eric R. Biggs, Evolution of the
Termination Policy, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 139 (1977).
94. Many tribes that were not terminated were nonetheless subjected to state jurisdiction under the
major piece of general legislation to come out of the termination years. Public Law 280, enacted in 1953,
subjected tribes in a number of states to full state civil and criminal jurisdiction and made it possible for
other states to assume the same jurisdiction. Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1988)(criminal) and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1988)(civil)). See generally Carole
Goldberg-Ambrose, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA
L. REV. 535 (1975).
95. More than 100 tribes were terminated. Most of the terminated tribes were small in population
and territory, so that termination ultimately affected some 11,466 people and about 1.3 million acres of
land. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 181-82.
96. One of the outcomes of the policy change was a series of restoration acts for the terminated
tribes. The restoration movement began with the Menominee Restoration Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 770
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 903-903f (1988)), and by the 1990s virtually all 109 terminated tribes were
restored to federal recognition.
97. "The Forgotten American": The President's Message to the Congress on Goals and Programs
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inaugurated the modem federal Indian policy of self-determination, proposing
federal promotion of tribal self-determination, sovereignty, and control over
Indian country.9" In line with the executive branch, Congress shortly
embarked on a legislative agenda designed to carry the self-determination
policy into effect.99
Subsequent administrations have continued and expanded the basic self-
determination policy announced by Nixon. In 1983, President Reagan
proclaimed a "government-to-government" relationship between the tribes
and the United States.' The government-to-government policy was
reaffirmed by President Bush'0 ' and most recently by President
Clinton,0 2  who promised as well "to honor and respect tribal
sovereignty.' 1 3  Congress also has continued to legislate for tribal control
over Indian country. 104
The cornerstones of modem federal Indian policy-tribal control over the
Indian country and the government-to-government relationship-are
diametrically opposed to the tenets of the assimilation policy. Instead of the
assimilation-era goal of breaking up tribal territories into allotments and fee
lands, modem policy promotes and protects tribal control over Indian
country. Far from contemplating the dissolution of the tribes, modem policy
rests on an intergovernmental relationship between the federal government
for the American Indians, PUB. PAPERS 335 (1968-69).
98. Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, PUB. PAPERS 564 (1970). Nixon is generally
credited as the architect of the federal policy of tribal self-determination.
99. See, e.g, Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. § 1451 (1988) (promoting tribal responsibility
"for the utilization and management of their own resources"); Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C. § 450a(b)(1988) (declaring Congress's "commitment to ... the
establishment of a meaningful Indian self-determination policy").
100. Statement on Indian Policy, I PUB. PAPERS 96, 99 (1983). President Reagan stated: "Our policy
is to reaffirm dealing with Indian tribes on a government-to-government basis and to pursue the policy
of self-government for Indian tribes without threatening termination." Id at 96.
101. Statement Reaffirming the Government-to-Government Relationship Between the Federal
Government and Indian Tribal Governments, 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 783 (June 14, 1991).
102. Memorandum on Government-to-Government Relations with Native American Tribal
Governments, 30 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 936 (Apr. 28, 1994).
103. Remarks to American Indian and Alaska Native Tribal Leaders, 30 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
941 (Apr. 29, 1994). See also Memorandum, supra note 102, at 936 (pledging that federal activities
affecting tribes will be undertaken in a manner "respectful of tribal sovereignty").
104. A prime example is the Tribal Self-Governance Demonstration Project Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-84, 105 Stat. 1278 (amending provisions of the Indian Self-Determination Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-
450n(1988)). The Act provides a small number of tribes with block grant moneys that the tribes use as
tribal, rather than federal, priorities dictate. See Clinton, supra note 5, at 138. Other examples of recent
congressional solicitude for tribal control include the American Indian Agricultural Resource Management
Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-177, 107 Stat. 2011 (intended to increase tribal control over agricultural
lands management) and the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 7602 (authorizing tribal
implementation plans for reservation air quality standards, under which tribal authority will extend to all
lands within the reservation, notwithstanding the issuance of fee patents).
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and the Indian nations. Respect for tribal sovereignty is the stated aim of the
current administration.
Federal Indian policy is set by Congress and the President; those branches
of government determine the tenor of federal relations with the tribes during
any given policy era. But full implementation of federal policy requires the
cooperation of the judicial branch. Despite disingenuous statements that the
Court does not make policy, °5 the Court certainly furthers or impedes
policy in the course of its decisions. And the difficulty in federal Indian law
today, in cases implicating the allotment policy or its lingering effects, is the
Court's insistence upon rendering decisions consistent not with the modem
policy of self-determination, but rather with the allotment policy of the
assimilation years. The Court has determined upon a path of effectuating the
allotment policy, to the detriment of the tribes and the schizophrenia of
federal interactions with the Indian nations.
The next three parts explore the Court's approach in three sets of cases.
Part III looks at the Court's recent interpretation of the General Allotment
Act itself in County of Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation. Part IV examines
the Court's decisions in the reservation disestablishment cases, those
involving the allotment-era surplus lands acts. And part V critiques the
Court's decisions in the regulatory jurisdiction cases, those involving the
nexus between tribal sovereignty and fee lands within tribal territorial
borders.
III. THE DAwES ACT RIDES AGAIN: COUNTY OF YAKIMA V. YAKIMA
INDIAN NATION
The allotment policy is reminiscent of a horror movie villain, defeated in
the final scenes and officially dead. But as the closing credits roll, the faint
continuing throb of a heartbeat can be detected, and soon sequel after sequel
resurrects the villain to continue its course of destruction. Like the villain,
allotment was pronounced dead in 1934 with the passage of the Indian
Reorganization Act. But like the villain, the allotment policy lurked on
below the surface, waiting to break free. Over the last two decades, under
the activating hand of the Supreme Court, the policy has sprung back to life.
If the Court continues on its present course of giving effect where possible
to statutes and policies of the allotment era, tribal sovereignty-tribal
territorial sovereignty-is at risk.
105. See, e.g., Justice Scalia's statement to that effect in County of Yakima, 502 U.S. at 265-66.
[Ariz. St. L.J.
LEGACY OF ALLOTMENT
The Court's recent interpretation of the General Allotment Act itself is in
many ways the paradigm illustration of the problem. In County of Yakima
v. Yakima Indian Nation,'°6 the Court was asked to determine whether the
General Allotment Act permitted state property taxation of former allotments
now held in fee by Indian owners. Despite conflicting plausible
interpretations of the statute, and despite being squarely presented with the
inconsistency between the policy of allotment and the present policy of self-
determination, the Court chose to read the General Allotment Act in light of
its assimilationist underpinnings. In holding that the Act permitted state real
property taxes, the Court construed the Act to further the goals of the
allotment policy, notwithstanding the congressional repudiation of both the
policy and its underlying doctrine of assimilation.
County of Yakima concerned the interpretation of §§ 5 and 6 of the
General Allotment Act. Section 5 addressed the issuance and expiration of
trust patents. 107  It authorized the Secretary of the Interior to issue trust
patents to Indian allottees for a period of twenty-five years. At the expiration
of the trust period, the allottee would receive a patent in fee, "discharged of
said trust and free of all charge or incumbrance whatsoever." Any attempted
conveyance of the allotment during the trust period was void. Upon the
issuance of a fee patent at the expiration of the twenty-five year trust period,
therefore, allotted land became alienable and subject to encumbrance. 18
The issue before the Court in County of Yakima was whether that fee-
patented land also became taxable.
In large part, the issue arose because § 6 of the General Allotment Act
expressly permits state taxation of certain fee-patented lands.0 9 As initially
106. 502 U.S. 251 (1992). For commentary on the case, see Christopher A. Kams, Note, County of
Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation: State Taxation as a Means of
Diminishing the Tribal Land Base, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1213 (1993); Deborah Jo Borrero, Note, They
Never Kept But One Promise, 67 WASH. L. REV. 937 (1992).
107. 25 U.S.C. § 348 (West 1983). Section 5 provides in relevant part:
Upon the approval of the allotments provided for in this Act by the Secretary of the Interior,
he shall cause patents to issue therefor in the name of the allottees, which patents shall be of
the legal effect, and declare that the United States does and will hold the land thus allotted, for
the period of twenty-five years, in trust for the sole use and benefit of the Indian to whom such
allotment shall have been made ... and that at the expiration of said period the United States
will convey the same by patent to said Indian ... discharged of said trust and free of all
charge or incumbrance whatsoever .... And if any conveyance shall be made of the lands
set apart and allotted as herein provided, or any contract made touching the same, before the
expiration of the time above mentioned, such conveyance or contract shall be absolutely null
and void ....
108. The Court noted in County of Yakima that alienability of the fee-patented land is the "negative
implication" of § 5's prohibition on alienation during the trust period. 502 U.S. at 264 n.3.
109. 25 U.S.C.A. § 349 (West 1983). Section 6 provides in relevant part:
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enacted, § 6 provided that those to whom allotments had been made "shall
have the benefit of and be subject to the laws, both civil and criminal, of the
State or Territory in which they may reside."" In 1905, the Supreme
Court held that this language subjected allottees, immediately upon the
issuance of a trust patent, to the full jurisdictional authority of the state.",
Congress responded quickly with the Burke Act of 1906, amending § 6 of
the General Allotment Act to clarify that state law was inapplicable to
allottees until the issuance of a patent in fee." 2
In addition to clarifying congressional intent regarding state jurisdiction
during the trust period, the Burke Act added a proviso to § 6. The proviso
authorized the Secretary of the Interior to issue fee patents upon a finding
that the allottee was "competent and capable of managing his or her affairs,"
and expressly stated that these fee lands would then be free from "all
restrictions as to sale, incumbrance, or taxation of said land.""' 3 Under the
Burke Act amendment, then, Congress expressly authorized state property
taxation of allotments patented in fee under the premature-patent system.
In County of Yakima, the Court folded the Burke Act proviso of § 6 into
§ 5 of the General Allotment Act. Under § 5, fee-patented land-that is,
land patented in fee at the expiration of the twenty-five year trust
period-was subject to alienation and encumbrance. Section 5 was silent on
the question of taxation of fee-patented land. Nonetheless, the Court held
that "when § 5 rendered the allotted lands alienable and encumberable, it also
rendered them subject to assessment and forced sale for taxes.""' 4
Interpreting § 5 by its express terms-that is, that the land was alienable and
encumberable only-the Court said, would "seem strange.""' 5  As if
At the expiration of the trust period and when the lands have been conveyed to the Indians by
patent in fee, as provided in section 348 [section 5] of this title, then each and every allottee
shall have the benefit of and be subject to the laws, both civil and criminal, of the State or
Territory in which they may reside ... Provided, That the Secretary of the Interior may, in
his discretion, and he is authorized, whenever he shall be satisfied that any Indian allottee is
competent and capable of managing his or her affairs at any time to cause to be issued to such
allottee a patent in fee simple, and thereafter all restrictions as to sale, incumbrance, or taxation
of said land shall be removed ....
110. General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, § 6, 24 Stat. 390.
Ill. In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 502-03 (1905).
112. Burke Act, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182 (1906). The Supreme Court also expressly overruled In re
Heff a decade later. United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 601 (1916). In Nice, the Court noted that the
provision for state civil and criminal laws to apply to fee owners was "to be taken with some implied
limitations, and not literally." Id. at 600. Only those state laws which "could be applied to tribal Indians
consistently with the Constitution and the legislation of Congress" were encompassed within the language
of the Burke Act. Id.
113. 25 U.S.C. § 349 (West 1983). The proviso is reprinted in its entirety supra at note 109.
114. 502 U.S. at 263-64.
115. Id. at 263.
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recognizing that oddity alone is hardly a clear manifestation of congressional
consent, the Court then turned to the Burke Act and its proviso in § 6.
Although the Burke Act, by its express terms, applied only to premature
patents, the Court determined that the Burke Act made explicit what was
already implicit in § 5: that taxation follows upon alienation and
encumbrance." 6
In so holding, the Court discarded two principles of interpretation of
Indian statutes" 17 that are crucial to the protection of tribal autonomy. The
first of these is the long-standing rule that state taxation of Indian lands is
barred unless Congress has made its intent to authorize that taxation
"unmistakably clear.""' 8  Since at least the mid-nineteenth century, the
Court has consistently refused to permit state taxation of Indians, Indian
interests, and particularly Indian lands within Indian country absent
congressional consent." 9  Whatever congressional approval of state
property taxation may be inferred from § 5 of the General Allotment Act, it
falls far short of the requisite "unmistakably clear" direction of Congress. "'
In the Burke Act, applicable only to prematurely patented lands, Congress
clearly and unmistakably authorized state property taxation. No such
manifestation of intent appears in § 5, applicable to lands patented in fee at
the end of the twenty-five year trust period. Indeed, the fact that § 5
addresses only alienability and encumbrance while § 6, the Burke Act,
addresses alienability, encumbrance, and taxation, leads inevitably to the
conclusion that § 5 patents are not subject to taxation. In the Burke Act,
Congress appears to have treated taxation as a category apart from
encumbrance; otherwise the express authority for states to tax prematurely
patented lands is mere surplusage because that authority would be embraced
within the grant of the ability to encumber. Moreover, the use of the term
116. Id. at 264. "In other words, the proviso reaffirmed for such 'prematurely' patented land what
§ 5 of the General Allotment Act implied with respect to patented land generally: subjection to state real
estate taxes."
117. The interpretation of Indian law statutes has received considerable scholarly attention in recent
years. See David Williams, Legitimation and Statutory Interpretation: Conquest, Consent, and Community
in Federal Indian Law, 80 VA. L. REV. 403 (1994); Frickey, supra note 15; Philip P. Frickey,
Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL. L.
REV. 1137 (1990); Richard B. Collins, Indian Consent to American Government, 31 ARIz. L. REV. 365,
378-81 (1989).
118. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 764-65 (1985); see also Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v.
Sac and Fox Nation, 113 S. Ct. 1985, 1993 (1993) ("Absent explicit congressional direction to the
contrary, we presume against a State's having the jurisdiction to tax within Indian country ....").
119. See, e.g., Sac and Fox Nation, 113 S. Ct. at 1993; McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n,
411 U.S. 164 (1973); The New York Indians, 72 U.S. 761 (1866); The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. 737
(1866).
120. County of Yakima, 502 U.S. at 273 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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"taxation" in the Burke Act is evidence of Congress's ability to expressly
authorize taxation when it intends to do so. Had Congress intended
prematurely patented lands to be subject to the same requirements as other
fee-patented lands, it would have used the same language. By adding the
term "taxation," not included within § 5, Congress must have meant
something different for prematurely patented lands than for other fee-patented
lands.
And yet the Court found that § 5, by authorizing encumbrance of fee
lands, impliedly authorized taxation: an implication which it said the Burke
Act makes clear. To find an implication from the absence of explicit
language in the relevant statute, and the presence of that language in a statute
applicable to other lands, eviscerates the long-standing requirement of
"unmistakably clear" congressional intent to permit state taxation in Indian
country.
The second interpretive principle neglected by the Court is the canons of
construction designed to interpret legislation enacted for the benefit of the
tribes. 2 ' Originally developed for the interpretation of treaties, the canons
provide that statutes are to be construed, and that ambiguities are to be
resolved, in favor of the tribes. 22  In essence, the canons call for courts to
121. The Court, in fact, went beyond neglect of the Indian law canons. It chose instead to use
statutory interpretation rules from other fields, in particular the rule that implications by repeal are not
favored. Id. at 262. By invoking that principle rather than the Indian law canons, the Court was able to
avoid issues of legislative intent and policy inherent in the Indian Reorganization Act's repudiation of the
allotment program. See generally Williams, supra note 117, at 429-36 (noting that Justice Scalia's
majority opinion in County of Yakima was consistent with his approach to statutory interpretation
generally, and arguing that consequently "Scalia is implicitly claiming that the legitimate basis of
Congress's authority over the Indians is the same as that which justifies Congress's general authority over
non-Indians.").
122. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 221-24. Professor Frickey has argued that the
canons are "hopelessly inapplicable" to assimilationist legislation because that type of legislation was not
enacted for the benefit of the tribes (although he would not disagree with the outcome). Frickey, supra
note 15, at 430 & n.204. The canons, however, should be applicable even to such assimilationist
legislation as the General Allotment Act. While it is true that the traditional formulation applies the
canons to statutes enacted for the benefit of the tribes, from the viewpoint of 1887, the General Allotment
Act was enacted for the benefit of the tribes. Certainly most of its supporters believed that it was
favorable to Indian interests. See supra notes 29-30. It is legitimate to apply the canons today to statutes
that Congress believed at the time were enacted for the benefit of the tribes. Moreover, it may be that
the old-fashioned phrasing "for the benefit of" the tribes obscures the true scope of the canons. In theory,
because Congress acts as a trustee, all congressional action toward the tribes should be taken for their
benefit. As a result, the canons should apply to any statute enacted specifically regarding Indian tribes,
regardless of whether we would today interpret the statute as beneficial or adverse. And finally, there is
a third approach suggested infra at text accompanying notes 123-24. One purpose of the canons is to
ensure that Congress intrudes on tribal rights only when Congress clearly intends to do so. Accordingly,
beneficial statutes are interpreted broadly in favor of the tribes and non-beneficial statutes (such as the
General Allotment Act) are interpreted narrowly against the government. In either case, doubts and
ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the tribes. And also, in either case, applying the canons of
LEGACY OF ALLOTMENT
construe statutes broadly when Indian rights are recognized or established,
and narrowly when those rights are limited or abrogated.1 3  The canons
thus act as "the tribes' tenth amendment,"'' 24  ensuring that powers and
authority remain with the tribes unless ceded by treaty or agreement with the
tribes' clear consent and understanding, or plainly and deliberately
appropriated by Congress.
Application of the canons of construction to § 5 of the General Allotment
Act would require the narrow interpretation of that section, construed
liberally in favor of the tribes.2 5  At the outside, as the Court itself was
forced to concede, § 5 merely implies that state taxation of fee-patented lands
is permissible. If it was necessary for the Court to infer congressional intent
from some interweaving of § 6 into § 5, then § 5 itself must be ambiguous.
And if it is ambiguous, then the canons call for that ambiguity to be resolved
in favor of the tribes: in favor of rejecting congressional authorization of state
property taxes.1 6  The Burke Act proviso of § 6, by contrast, was not
ambiguous; it expressly authorized state taxation of prematurely fee patented
lands. When the Court folded the Burke Act's express authorization into the
silence of § 5, and arrived at a "clear" congressional intent to tax § 5 lands,
it stood the canons of construction on their head. The Court construed § 5
not in favor of, but to the detriment of, the tribes, and resolved any ambiguity
in its language not in favor of the tribes, but in favor of state taxation. 127
In addition to this wholesale rejection of long-standing principles of
statutory interpretation in federal Indian law, 2' the Court declined to
construction to all Indian legislation is legitimate in light of the purposes of those canons.
123. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 225.
124. Barsh & Henderson, supra note 23, at 654.
125. As already noted, § 5 did not unambiguously authorize state taxation of Indian lands. 1
consequently do not find § 5 to be ambiguous: it did not clearly authorize state real property taxes and,
therefore, those taxes should be barred. If the Court had used the proper state taxation analysis,
application of the canons would not have been necessary. Nonetheless, the canons argument further
highlights the flaws in the Court's reading of the General Allotment Act.
126. "This principle of statutory construction has particular force in the face of claims that ambiguous
statutes abolish by implication Indian tax immunities." Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976).
127. One of the odder features of the County of Yakima decision was the fact that the Court invoked
the canons of construction for one aspect of the case. Having neglected the canons in its interpretation
of the General Allotment Act, and having found that the Act authorized state taxation of real property,
the Court turned to the second issue presented by the parties: whether the Act also authorized an excise
tax on sales of Indian-owned fee lands. Noting that the Burke Act proviso in § 6 only authorized
"taxation of said land," the Court applied the canons of construction to determine that the excise tax was
prohibited. 502 U.S. at 269. An excise tax on the sale of land, the Court held, is a tax upon the Indian's
activity of selling the land, and not a tax on the land itself. Interpreting the Burke Act liberally in favor
of the tribes, and resolving any ambiguity in favor of the Indians, the Court held that the Burke Act
authorized only taxation of land, and not taxation of activities concerning land. Id.
128. County of Yakima is only one of the most recent examples of the Court's rejection of the canons.
Professors Clinton, Newton, and Price note that "recent cases arguably support the view that the Court
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consider Congress's express repudiation of allotment and its supporting
policy of assimilation. The Yakima Nation argued that the termination of the
allotment program in 1934, Congress's express rejection of the assimilation
policy in the Indian Reorganization Act, and the present federal policies of
tribal self-government and self-determination blocked state jurisdiction over
land in Indian country. The Court dismissed that argument as "a great
exaggeration," stating that "the mere power to assess and collect a tax on
certain real estate" would not significantly disrupt tribal self-government. 129
That statement has potentially nasty implications for tribal sovereignty.
The real estate subject to state property taxes will be former allotments now
owned in fee by members of the Yakima Nation. By even the broadest
reading of the regulatory jurisdiction cases discussed in part V, the Court has
deprived tribes only of authority over fee lands owned by nonmembers of the
tribe. 130  Tribal authority over trust lands is exclusive of the states. While
the Court has never directly addressed tribal versus state authority over lands
owned in fee by members of the tribe, none of the arguments advanced for
depriving tribes of jurisdiction would apply.' 31  The Court's reiterated
finding that tribes retain sovereignty over their members 132 should support
exclusive tribal jurisdiction over fee lands owned by members of the tribe.
And yet the Court in County of Yakima found that state power to tax fee
lands owned by members of the tribe, lands which should be within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the tribe, has no significant impact on tribal self-
government. The County of Yakima decision thus illustrates the need for the
Court to return to a jurisprudence of territorial sovereignty, which should lead
to the clear understanding that taxation by the state government in the
territory of the tribal government is an unwarranted intrusion on the
sovereign prerogatives of the tribe. 133 The Court's refusal to see the issue
as one of territorial sovereignty, however, meant that it could cavalierly
dismiss the Yakima Nation's argument that state taxation is "manifestly
has become less willing to apply canons favoring Indians." ROBERT N. CLINTON, ET AL., AMERICAN
INDIAN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 232 (3d ed. 1991). The decision in County of Yakima confirms that
trend. For an exploration of the Marshallian origins of the canons and their fate at the hands of
subsequent Courts, see Frickey, supra at note 15.
129. 502 U.S. at 277.
130. As part V should make clear, I neither advocate nor agree with such a broad reading of the
regulatory jurisdiction cases. The interpretation is used here only for purposes of illustration.
131. These arguments often focus on the perceived horrors of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians or
nonmembers, who cannot become tribal citizens and have no voice in tribal government. See infra text
accompanying notes 383-91.
132. See, e.g., California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207 (1987); United
States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975).
133. Unfortunately, as discussed in more detail in part VI, the Court is unlikely to return to a
territorial sovereignty approach to Indian law.
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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inconsistent" with tribal autonomy. 34 Moreover, the Court disavowed the
federal courts as the proper forum for such a policy-based argument. '35 If
the argument had merit, the Court said, then it should be made to Congress.
The Court's decision in County of Yakima is thus a paradigm of the legacy
of allotment in Indian law. Faced with conflicting plausible interpretations
of the General Allotment Act regarding state taxation of fee lands, the Court
chose to manipulate its rule concerning congressional authorization of state
taxes, to ignore the canons of construction, and to construe the Act to carry
forward the policies of allotment and assimilation.
The real danger of the Court's interpretation is obvious in the subsequent
use of County of Yakima as precedent. In Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom
County,136 the Ninth Circuit ruled that lands allotted under the 1855 Treaty
of Point Elliott and subsequently patented in fee were subject to state
property taxes. The court's reasoning was simple: when the Lummi allottees
received their fee patents, their land became alienable. When land is
134. See County of Yakima, 502 U.S. at 265 (Blackmun, J.); see also Borrero, supra note 106, at 953-
54.
135. The Court noted that §§ 5 and 6 of the General Allotment Act are, despite the repudiation of the
allotment policy and program, still on the books. "Judges 'are not at liberty to pick and choose among
congressional enactments, and when two [or more] statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of
the courts absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective."'
502 U.S. at 265 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)). Of course, Mancari dealt not
with statutory remnants of repudiated policies, but with whether the Indian employment preference of the
Indian Reorganization Act survived the 1972 amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e(17)(1972)). The
Court held that the employment preference was not repealed by the 1972 amendments, since the two
statutes were "capable of co-existence." 417 U.S. at 551.
Here, however, the Court was not considering whether a later statute of general applicability repealed
an earlier statute enacted for the benefit of the tribes. In County of Yakima, rather, the Court interpreted
the General Allotment Act, both the programs and policies of which were expressly repudiated by
Congress in 1934. The question for the Court should not have been whether the General Allotment Act
and the self-government policies of the Indian Reorganization Act were "capable of co-existence," but
rather whether, in light of the IRA and the modem federal policy of self-determination, the General
Allotment Act unmistakably authorized state property taxation of fee-patented lands.
Moreover, the Court itself has noted that "'we are not obliged in ambiguous circumstances to strain
to implement [an assimilationist] policy Congress has now rejected, particularly where to do so will
interfere with the present congressional approach to what is, after all, an ongoing relationship."' Bryan
v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 388 n.14 (1976) (quoting Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County,
532 F.2d 655, 663 (9th Cir. 1975)). Both courts were referring to Public Law 280, the cornerstone
legislation of the termination era, the mid-twentieth century attempt to revive assimilation. Id. The Court
further noted in Bryan that "we previously have construed the effect of legislation affecting reservation
Indians in light of 'intervening' legislative enactments." 426 U.S. at 386. What was needed in County
of Yakima was the judicial courage displayed by the Court in Bryan: the courage to reject a strained
interpretation that would promote assimilation and to adopt instead a rational interpretation that would
promote tribal autonomy. For a discussion of the decision in Bryan as consistent with the Marshallian
approach, see Frickey, supra note 15, at 429-32.
136. 5 F.3d 1355 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2727 (1994).
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alienable, it is also taxable.'37 The dissenting judge was stunned. He
noted, correctly, that the court engaged in absolutely no analysis of the
Treaty of Point Elliott and whether that treaty and its allotment provisions
included any manifestation of congressional intent to permit state taxation of
treaty-patented land. 3" The Court in County of Yakima had directed
specific analysis of allotment instruments other than the General Allotment
Act,"'39 and where that analysis has been done, the taxability of fee lands
is not a foregone conclusion. 4 But the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
chose instead to employ a simplistic misinterpretation of the Court's opinion.
As the dissenting judge noted, however, simplicity has never been a hallmark
of federal Indian law.' 4 ' Attempts to draw easy, bright-line rules require
a court to forego the difficult and detailed analysis that the issues deserve.
One of the most destructive legacies left by the Court in County of Yakima
may be this apparent permission for the lower courts to further the
137. Id. at 1358. The court found that conclusion made "virtually inescapable" by the County of
Yakima decision. Id. But see Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Board of County Commissioners, 855 F.
Supp. 1194, 1200 (D. Colo. 1994) (alienability "was important only as an indicator of congressional intent
to permit taxation" but "was not an independent justification for taxation."); Pease v. Yellowstone County,
21 Indian L. Rep. 6109 (Crow Ct. App. 1994) (rejecting the alienability-equals-taxability approach).
138. Whatcom County, 5 F.3d at 1360 (Beezer, J., dissenting).
139.
The Yakima Nation contends it is not clear whether the parcels at issue in this case were
patented under the General Allotment Act, rather than under some other statutes in force prior
to the Indian Reorganization Act. We leave for resolution on remand that factual point, and
the prior legal question whether it makes any difference.
502 U.S. at 270 (citation omitted). In the hands of the Ninth Circuit, it will make no difference. Had the
court reached that conclusion after careful analysis of the allotment provisions of the Treaty of Point
Elliott, its stance might conceivably be defensible. But in the Whatcom County decision as it stands, there
is nothing to defend; there is nothing other than a bright-line legacy of allotment based on faulty
reasoning and bad precedent.
140. Southern Ute, 855 F. Supp. at 1200-02. The district court carefully analyzed the relevant statute,
the Act of June 15, 1880, ch. 223, 21 Stat. 199, and applied the interpretative rule requiring "unmistakably
clear" congressional intent to tax Indian lands. Based on that, the court refused to find that certain tribal
lands within the reservation originally allotted under the 1880 act and subsequently reacquired from
Conoco, Inc., were taxable by the state.
[U]nder the [allotment] statutes applicable to the Utes, taxation of individual Indian allotments
(and taxation of subsequent Indian transferees of those allotments, if any) was only to occur
if the President issued a timely proclamation, which he did not, and after expiration of the trust
period and presidential action to lift the restriction on alienation and taxation. There is no
indication, clear or opaque, in the record that any of these prerequisites occurred.
Id. at 1202; see also Pease, 21 Indian L. Rep. at 6110 (holding that an allotment owned in fee by a
member of the tribe pursuant to the Crow Allotment Act of 1920 was not taxable by the state).
141. Judge Beezer wrote: "There is an appealing simplicity to the proposition that alienable land is
taxable land. Unfortunately, federal Indian law does not have a simple history; no amount of wishing will
give it a simple future." Whatcom County, 5 F.3d at 1360; see also Joseph W. Singer, Remembering
What Hurts Us Most: A Critique of the American Indian Law Deskbook, 24 N.M. L. REv. 315, 316 (1994)
(criticizing the Deskbook in part for its oversimplification and consequent distortion of the complicated
field of federal Indian law).
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assimilationist policies of the past with casual indifference to history, policy,
and precedent.'42
IV. ALLOTMENT AND TERRITORY: THE RESERVATION
DISESTABLISHMENT CASES
While County of Yakima represents the Court's interpretation of the
General Allotment Act itself, most of the Court's legacy of allotment derives
from the present effects of the allotment program. In particular, the Court
has focused on non-Indian fee ownership within Indian country, a direct
outgrowth of the allotment years, as a justification for divesting tribes of
territorial sovereignty. The cases terminating territorial sovereignty have
fallen into two general categories: first, the reservation disestablishment
cases, which concern the loss of territory itself with the concomitant loss of
sovereignty; and second, the decisions, generally in regulatory jurisdiction
cases, that abrogate full tribal sovereign authority over the territory that
remains. This part, on allotment and territory, looks at the disestablishment
cases and the legacy of allotment. The next part, then, takes up the
jurisdictional decisions on allotment and sovereignty.
The reservation disestablishment cases, those that look at the loss of tribal
territory, arise out of the surplus lands acts of the allotment years. 143 The
General Allotment Act ("GAA") provided for the surplus lands of allotted
reservations to be opened to non-Indian homesteading. 144 While the GAA
authorized the sale and homesteading of the surplus lands, the program was
implemented through specific surplus lands acts for particular reservations.
All told, the surplus lands acts accounted for two-thirds of the tribal lands
142. The Court itself has not been immune to the urge to simplify the complex and complicated issues
of Indian law, with devastating consequences. See the discussion of South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S.
Ct. 2309 (1993), infra at text accompanying notes 323-29.
143. The surplus lands program is discussed supra in part II.A.2.
144. General Allotment Act, ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. 388, 389-90 (1887):
That at any time after lands have been allotted to all the Indians of any tribe as herein
provided, or sooner if in the opinion of the President it shall be for the best interests of said
tribe, it shall be lawful for the Secretary of the Interior to negotiate with such Indian tribe for
the purchase and release by said tribe, in conformity with the treaty or statute under which
such reservation is held, of such portions of its reservation not allotted as such tribe shall, from
time to time, consent to sell, on such terms and conditions as shall be considered just and
equitable between the United States and said tribe of Indians, which purchase shall not be
complete until ratified by Congress, and the form and manner of executing such release shall
also be prescribed by Congress ....
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lost to non-Indian ownership during the allotment era.45 Although the
Indian Reorganization Act ended the process and authorized the Secretary to
restore the remaining surplus lands to tribal ownership,'46 millions of acres
taken for homesteading during the allotment era remain in non-Indian fee
status today.
A generation after the tribes lost ownership of the surplus lands to non-
Indian homesteaders, the Supreme Court took up the issue of whether the
tribes had also lost territorial sovereignty. Over the next two decades, the
Court developed an obscure and essentially ad hoc approach to determining
whether individual surplus lands acts terminated the reservation status of the
surplus lands.
The early reservation disestablishment cases appeared to establish a
relatively workable test based largely on the language and intent of the
particular surplus lands act. In the first of the disestablishment cases,
Seymour v. Superintendent of Washington State Penitentiary,'47 the Court
distinguished between surplus lands acts that merely opened the reservation
to non-Indian ownership of parcels of land, and those acts that severed tracts
from the reservation and then opened the severed lands to settlers.
48
Fundamentally, the question was whether the surplus lands had been ceded
outright to the United States, or whether those lands had merely been made
available to those who wished to settle in Indian country.
Initially, the Court grounded the distinction in the language of the surplus
lands acts themselves. Where Congress used language expressly terminating
reservation status, 149 particularly if it coupled the terminating language with
145. Approximately 60 million acres were taken during the allotment years as surplus lands. COHEN'S
HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 138.
146. Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, § 3, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 463
(1988)).
147. 368 U.S. 351 (1962). It may be significant that Seymour was decided as the ravages of the
termination era were becoming evident and public policy was beginning to shift again to protecting tribal
autonomy. A Court faced with immediate evidence of the failure of an assimilationist policy was unlikely
to strain to give effect to a similar policy from an earlier era. A contemporaneous commentator, however,
posited that the outcome in Seymour was consistent with assimilation because "the Indians who remain
ignorant of the modem world, living on the reservations and therefore apart from that world, do still
require protection." The "mantle of federal protection" should not be entirely discarded until the assimi-
lation process is "relatively complete." Osborne M. Reynolds, Note, Indians-Reservations-Federal
Jurisdiction Ended Only by Express Provision of Congress, 5 ARIz. L. REv. 131, 135 (1963-64).
148. Seymour, 368 U.S. 351. This distinction did not originate with the Court. The Interior
Department drew the same line in determining which surplus lands it was authorized to restore to tribal
ownership under § 3 of the Indian Reorganization Act. 54 Interior Dec. 559, 560 (1934).
149. In Seymour, the Court referred to language in the surplus lands act for the North Half of the
Colville Reservation that the land was to be "vacated and restored to the public domain" as sufficient to
show disestablishment. 368 U.S. at 354. Other examples of disestablishment language subsequently cited
by the Court included "the Smith River reservation is hereby discontinued" and "the reservation lines of
the said ... Indian reservations be, and the same are hereby, abolished." Mattz v. Amett, 412 U.S. 481,
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full payment to the tribe of a sum certain for the ceded lands, the
combination created "an almost insurmountable presumption" of reservation
disestablishment.' Essentially, the Court viewed this type of surplus lands
act as no different than any land cession prior to the allotment era.' By
contrast, if Congress merely opened the existing reservation lands to
settlement, with the proceeds of individual sales deposited in the Treasury for
the benefit of the tribe, no disestablishment occurred. 15 2
Where the language of the surplus lands act did not so expressly provide
for termination of the reservation status, the Court turned to the intent of both
Congress and the tribes as indicated by tribal "consent" to the loss of the
lands. In DeCoteau v. District County Court, the Court found that the
language of the Sisseton and Wahpeton surplus lands act was ambiguous.'53
Unlike surplus lands acts which unambiguously "abolished" or
"discontinued" the reservation status of the lands or expressly "vacated and
restored [the lands] to the public domain,"' 54 the Sisseton-Wahpeton act
ratified an agreement by which the tribes agreed to "cede, sell, relinquish,
and convey to the United States all their claim, right, title, and interest in and
to all the unallotted lands" of the reservation."' While the act clearly
divested the tribes of title to the unallotted lands, the language did not
expressly "abolish" or "discontinue" or "vacate" the reservation itself.56
Nonetheless, the Court found that congressional intent to disestablish the
504 n.22 (1973).
150. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470 (1984); see also DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420
U.S. 425, 445-46 (1975). But see Campbell, supra note 67, at 73 (arguing that distinctions among surplus
lands acts make "little sense" because the acts were "designed only to accomplish a transfer of lands to
individuals").
151. But see Richard A. Smith, New Town et al.: A Reply, 18 S.D. L. REv. 327, 328-30 (1973)
(arguing that even the cession-type surplus lands acts are at most a hybrid of acts opening Indian lands
to settlement and the "cession and removal" acts or treaties of the pre-allotment era).
152. See Mattz, 412 U.S. at 496-97 (1973). The Klamath River surplus lands act, which the Court
held did not disestablish the reservation, provided that the lands "are hereby declared to be subject to
settlement, entry, and purchase" and that the "proceeds arising from the sale of said lands shall constitute
a fund to be used ... for the maintenance and education of the Indians . See also Seymour, 368 U.S.
at 355-56.
153. 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
154. Mattz, 412 U.S. at 504 n.22.
155. DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 445.
156. In fact, "[tihere is not a word to suggest that the boundaries of the reservation were altered."
Id. at 461 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Professor Frickey calls the argument based on cession language a
"non sequitur," because cession may divest the tribe of title, but says nothing about divesting the tribe
of jurisdiction. Frickey, supra note 117, at 1149-50. Professor Clinton observes that it was "at best
misguided and at worst an outright misuse of Native American legal history" to use congressional intent
regarding land titles to infer intent regarding the disestablishment of tribal jurisdiction. Robert N. Clinton,
The Curse of Relevance: An Essay on the Relationship of Historical Research to Federal Indian
Litigation, 28 AIZ. L. REv. 29, 42 (1986).
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reservation could be found "unmistakably" both on the face of the surplus
lands act and from the surrounding circumstances and legislative history.' 57
Untroubled by the lack of plain language terminating the reservation,"'
the Court discovered disestablishment in the factors constituting the
"surrounding circumstances and legislative history."'5  First, the Court
found it significant that the tribe had consented, in negotiations leading to an
agreement that was then ratified by Congress, to convey "all" its interest to
the government for a sum certain: in other words, that the tribe ceded the
land in exchange for payment in full from the government. 6 ° Second, the
Court noted that the language of the Sisseton-Wahpeton act paralleled that
of other contemporaneous acts which all parties agreed terminated portions
of the affected reservations.' 6 ' Third, the sponsors of the ratifying
legislation had "stated repeatedly" that the Sisseton-Wahpeton lands would
157. DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 444-45. The idea that Congress's intent to diminish a particular
reservation could "be expressed on the face of the Act or be clear from the surrounding circumstances
and legislative history" was first introduced by the Court in Mattz. 412 U.S. at 505. In Maltz, however,
the statement was essentially dictum. The Court found no clear language of termination in the Klamath
River surplus lands act of 1892, and therefore refused to "infer an intent to terminate the reservation."
Id. at 504. The Court then noted that its conclusion, already arrived at on the basis of the statutory
language itself, was "reinforced" by the circumstances that both Congress and the Interior Department
continued to treat the Klamath River Reservation as a reservation. Id. at 505. The Court's decision in
DeCoteau two years later represented the first time the Court ignored the lack of express statutory
language in favor of inferring intent from extraneous factors.
158. As noted, the test articulated in dictum in Mattz called for congressional intent to disestablish
to be "expressed on the face of the Act." 412 U.S. at 505 (quoted in DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 444). The
Court in DeCoteau found the Sisseton-Wahpeton act language "precisely suited" to termination, but did
so based not on the face of that act but on the surrounding circumstance of the similarity in language
between the Sisseton-Wahpeton act and other acts which the parties apparently agreed resulted in
disestablishment. 420 U.S. at 445.
159. Id. at 445.
160. Id. at 445, 448.
161. Id. at 439. The language of the contemporaneous acts was virtually identical to the Sisseton-
Wahpeton act, providing that the tribes would "cede, sell, relinquish, and convey to the United States all
their claim, right, title, and interest in and to" the lands. Id. at n.22. In each of the other cases, however,
the tribe was specifically ceding a described tract of land, a particular portion of the reservation. Id. at
439. By contrast, the Sisseton-Wahpeton were selling only the unallotted lands of their reservation
remaining after allotment to members of the tribe. Id. at n.22. If a tribe cedes all title to a tract of land,
the presumption arguably may be that the tract is no longer part of the reservation. But the cession of
title to particular scattered parcels within the reservation-despite the identity of language-should carry
no similar presumption. See id. at 466 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Congress itself has provided that Indian
country encompasses all lands within reservation boundaries, "notwithstanding the issuance of any patent,"
18 U.S.C. § 1151, in an attempt to avoid the checkerboard jurisdiction condemned by the Court in
Seymour, 368 U.S. at 358. The DeCoteau outcome, however, creates that checkerboard because the
Sisseton-Wahpeton allotments would remain Indian country under 18 U.S.C. § 1151(c). In light of§ 1151
and the policies and practicalities opposing checkerboarding, the mere cession of unallotted parcels-as
opposed to the outright cession of portions of the reservation itself-should not diminish the status of the
lands as Indian country.
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be returned to the public domain. 162 Hitching the language of the act to the
statements of the congressional sponsors, the Court held that the act
disestablished the entire Sisseton-Wahpeton Reservation.
The decision in DeCoteau represented a significant and troubling departure
from the Court's previous disestablishment analysis.'63 Most disturbing
was the retreat from the express language of the act. In both of its prior
disestablishment cases, the Court had based its ultimate holding squarely on
the language of the act. In neither case did the act expressly authorize
termination of the surplus lands from the reservation, and the Court
consequently refused to infer any congressional intent to do what the act did
not provide. 64  In DeCoteau, by contrast, the Court said it found an
unmistakable intent to terminate on the face of the act, but its analysis relied
solely on the circumstances surrounding the act's passage. 65  The language
of the Sisseton-Wahpeton act was relevant only in passing. Moreover, to the
extent that the language of the act at issue in DeCoteau was ambiguous, the
canons of construction 66 would call for the language to be interpreted to
the benefit of the tribe. Given that the act did not expressly terminate the
162. Decoteau, 420 U.S. at 446. Express language in a surplus lands act providing that the lands
were to be "vacated and restored to the public domain" would constitute disestablishment of the restored
lands. See Seymour, 368 U.S. at 354. In DeCoteau, however, the "public domain" language was found
not in the act itself, but only in remarks by the sponsors of the legislation. 420 U.S. at 441. There was
no evidence of similar language in the negotiations leading to the agreement, and consequently no
evidence that the tribe understood that the ceded lands would be deleted from the reservation.
As a side note, the notion that tribal lands could be "restored" or returned to the public domain is one
of those fictions that permeate Indian law. Tribal lands could only be restored to the public domain if
they had previously been a part of the public domain, and they had not. (At least, reservations created
by treaties or statutorily-ratified agreements had not; executive order reservations were created out of the
public domain. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 127.) Public domain lands are generally
defined as those which are open to sale or disposal under the laws of the United States. See Maria E.
Mansfield, A Primer of Public Land Law, 68 WASH. L. REV. 801, 821 (1993). Lands could only be open
to disposal if Congress had first extinguished Indian title. But most reservations represented exactly the
opposite: congressional recognition of Indian title, transforming that title into a recognized property right.
See, eg., United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980). In other words, reservations
created by treaty or agreement passed from Indian title to recognized title status, without ever becoming
part of the public domain.
163. As one commentator noted: "DeCoteau has clearly shown that to determine the effect a particular
statute had on reservation boundaries, the courts must not rely on general principles of Indian law in
ascertaining congressional intent." James M. Bekken, Comment, Indians-Reservations-Jurisdictional
Effect of Surplus Land Statute Upon Traditional Boundaries of an Indian Reservation, 52 N.D. L. REV.
411, 418 (1975).
164. "Congress has used clear language of express termination when that result is desired." Mattz,
412 U.S. at 504 n.22.
165. 420 U.S. at 445-49.
166. The Court did articulate the canons in DeCoteau. 420 U.S. at 444. The case thus represents one
of the group of decisions in which the Court recognizes that the canons apply and reproduces them in the
opinion, but then fails to employ them in reaching its conclusions.
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reservation, that Congress is capable of making its intent to terminate plain
when it wishes to do so,' 67 and that disestablishment is detrimental to the
tribe, application of the canons should have led the Court to determine that
the act did not terminate the Sisseton-Wahpeton Reservation.
As troubling as the analysis in Decoteau was, however, the subsequent
cases ultimately proved even more troubling for tribes subject to the surplus
lands program. Within two years of its decision in DeCoteau, the Court
declared that many of the factors it found relevant to diminishment in that
case-a sum-certain payment for the ceded lands and tribal consent to the
cession as shown through a negotiated agreement preceding the surplus lands
act-were in fact not dispositive. In Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 16 1 the
Court stated that the only truly relevant factor in its prior cases had been
congressional intent. 169 Circumstances such as tribal consent and provision
for a sum-certain payment were mere aids to the determination of
congressional intent, but were not in themselves dispositive one way or the
other.
This reformulation of the prior case law was necessary to the Court's
chosen resolution of Rosebud Sioux, however, because the Court's previous
decisions had rested on factors not present in the Rosebud Sioux situation.
In Seymour 7°  and Mattz v. Arnett, 7 ' the cases in which no
disestablishment was found, the Court relied on the facts of unilateral
congressional action, the lack of any sum-certain payment, and the lack of
any express language of cession to hold that the reservations had not been
diminished. In the first of the cases to find disestablishment, DeCoteau, the
Court distinguished Seymour and Mattz by pointing to tribal "consent" to the
cession, to the presence of a sum-certain payment, and to language which
was at least arguably language of cession.' 72 In Rosebud Sioux, only the
last factor was present: the Rosebud surplus lands acts'73 contained
167. For a list of examples see Mattz, 412 U.S. at 504 n.22.
168. 430 U.S. 584 (1977).
169. Id. at 598 n.20.
170. 368 U.S. 351 (1962).
171. 412 U.S. 481 (1973).
172. 420 U.S. at 425.
173. The case involved three surplus lands acts for the Rosebud Reservation enacted between 1904
and 1910, each dealing with the surplus lands in different counties of South Dakota. See 430 U.S. at 586.
The Court focused its analysis on the 1904 Act, noting that "[n]one of the parties really disputes that the
intent of the three Acts was the same." Id. at 606. The intent may arguably have been the same, but the
language of the latter two acts was substantially different. Neither the 1907 nor the 1910 Act contained
any express language of cession. Instead, those acts merely authorized the Secretary of the Interior to
"sell and dispose of' the unallotted lands in certain counties. See id. at 612-13. Pointing out the disparity
to the Court may ultimately have made no difference, however, because the Court refused to accept a
similar argument nearly two decades later in Hagen v. Utah, 114 S. Ct. 958 (1994). See infra text
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language of cession virtually identical to the language at issue in
DeCoteau.74 The Rosebud acts, however, did not provide for a sum
certain payment for the ceded lands, but rather called for the United States
to act only as a trustee with regard to disposal of the land and receipt of
payment.175  In addition, the Rosebud acts did not merely ratify negotiated
agreements reached with the tribe.' 76 The 1904 Rosebud Act, instead, was
"the first attempt under the Lone Wolf decision to steal Indian lands,"' 177
enacted rapidly by Congress without tribal consent. 178
Nonetheless, the Court found that the Rosebud Sioux surplus lands acts
disestablished the reservation. Ignoring the absence of other relevant factors
from its prior cases, the Court focused instead on the language of cession"'
and snippets of legislative history.80 Moreover, the Court relied upon a
accompanying notes 202-14.
174. The 1904 act called for the tribe to "cede, surrender, grant, and convey to the United States all
their claim, right, title, and interest in and to all that part of the Rosebud Indian Reservation now
remaining unallotted" in Gregory County, South Dakota. Act of Apr. 23, 1904, 33 Stat. 254, 256 (quoted
in Rosebud Sioux, 430 U.S. at 597). As in DeCoteau, there was no express language terminating or
abolishing the reservation, although that factor no longer appeared to concern the Court. See Rosebud
Sioux, 430 U.S. at 618-19 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
175. Rosebud Sioux, 430 U.S. at 609. The lack of a sum certain payment was a deliberate attempt to
avoid an appropriation of compensation for the lands taken. II PRUCHA, supra note 27, at 867. In prior
cases, the Court found it crucial whether Congress had paid outright for the lands ceded by the tribes.
An exchange of land for payment is certainly more indicative of an intent to terminate the lands from the
reservation than is an exchange of lands for a promise to pass compensation along to the tribes if and
when the lands are actually sold.
176. The tribe and the United States had negotiated an agreement in 1901 in which the tribe agreed
to sell 416,000 acres for $2.50 an acre. Rosebud Sioux, 430 U.S. at 591; HOxIE, supra note 38, at 156.
Congress refused to ratify that agreement, however, because it did not want to pay a sum certain for the
surplus lands. 38 Cong. Rec. 1423 (1904) (remarks of Rep. Burke) (quoted in Rosebud Sioux, 430 U.S.
at 591). Moreover, although Congress spoke in the 1904 Act of "ratifying" the 1901 agreement with the
tribe, it made substantial and unilateral changes to the agreement before enacting it into law. See Rosebud
Sioux, 430 U.S. at 619 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
177. HOXIE, supra note 38, at 157 (quoting Herbert Welsh, founder of the Indian Rights Association).
In Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903), the Court held that plenary power authorized Congress
to unilaterally take surplus lands in violation of provisions of both treaties and the General Allotment Act
requiring tribal consent. See the discussion of the effects of Lone Wolf on Congress, supra at text
accompanying notes 65-70.
178. See generally II PRUCHA, supra note 27, at 867-69; HOXIE, supra note 38, at 156-57.
179. The Court noted that cession language was present not only in the surplus lands act of 1904, but
also in the presidential Rosebud Proclamation of May 13, 1904, 33 Stat. 2354, which declared the lands
open to settlement. Rosebud Sioux, 430 U.S. at 602. The Proclamation, however, simply mirrored the
language of the act and did not expressly abolish, vacate, or terminate the Rosebud Reservation.
Another factor for the Court was that the tribe "was eventually paid for the land." Id. at 598. The
Court did not explain the exact significance of this statement, but it appears to mean that the Court sees
no difference between cessions of land for a sum certain (as in DeCoteau) and opening the land to
settlement with the government acting as paymaster, so long as the tribe ultimately received compensation
for the loss of title.
180. As the dissent noted, the Court found only five quotations relevant to the disestablishment issue,
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damaging new aspect of the disestablishment analysis. Not content with
switching the focus from the need for a negotiated cession of lands, the Court
gave significant weight to the so-called "subsequent jurisdictional history" of
the surplus lands. 8' Acknowledging that the subsequent jurisdictional
history was "not entirely clear,"'8 2 the Court nonetheless found that state
assumption of jurisdiction over the opened lands "not only demonstrates the
parties' understanding of the meaning of the Act, but has created justifiable
expectations which should not be upset by so strained a reading of the Acts
of Congress as petitioner urges." ' 3 Without discussing whether the state's
assumption of jurisdiction was proper or even legal when it was first
asserted, the Court retroactively sanctioned state jurisdiction by finding that
the surplus lands had been disestablished from the Rosebud Sioux
Reservation.
In its next foray into the disestablishment issue,, the Court attempted to
organize the chaos it had created in Rosebud Sioux. In Solem v. Bartlett,84
the Court opined that its prior disestablishment cases "have established a
fairly clean analytical structure for distinguishing those surplus land Acts that
diminished reservations from those Acts that simply offered non-Indians the
opportunity to purchase land within established reservation boundaries."'8 5
The Court then discussed a three-part approach. The first prong is the
language of the act: express termination of the reservation or "[e]xplicit
reference to cession," particularly if the ceded lands are compensated by a
sum-certain payment, demonstrates "an almost insurmountable presumption"
that Congress intended to terminate the surplus lands from the
reservation. 6 Second, even in the absence of explicit language and a sum-
only two of which pertained to the 1904 Act on which the Court based its analysis of congressional intent.
Rosebud Sioux, 430 U.S. at 627 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see id. at 595-96 (pertaining to the 1904 Act);
id. at 607-08 (pertaining to the 1907 Act); id. at 611-12 (pertaining to the 1910 Act). The remarks
relative to the 1904 Act, however, merely refer to the cession of the surplus lands and the fact that the
lands will be opened and paid for as they are homesteaded. There is, as in the Act itself, no express
reference to abolishing or terminating the reservation.
181. Rosebud Sioux, 430 U.S. at 603-05. The idea of "jurisdictional history subsequent to" the
surplus lands acts first surfaced in DeCoteau, where the Court noted that state jurisdiction over the non-
Indian lands "went virtually unquestioned" from the time of cession to the 1960s, but that during the
1960s the Sisseton-Wahpeton Tribe asserted jurisdiction throughout its original reservation boundaries.
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 44244. Despite that recitation, the DeCoteau Court does not appear to have relied
in any way on the jurisdictional history in holding that the Sisseton-Wahpeton act disestablished the
reservation. The Court, rather, depended upon the act's language of cession, the payment of a sum
certain, and the "consent" of the tribe to the loss of the lands.
182. Rosebud Sioux, 430 U.S. at 603.
183. Id. at 605.
184. 465 U.S. 463 (1984).
185. Id. at 470. The Court's opinion was not shared by others.
186. Id. at 470-71.
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certain payment, the legislative history and surrounding circumstances may
support disestablishment.1 7  And third, the Court determined that the
subsequent jurisdictional history of the surplus lands could show "de facto"
disestablishment of the reservation. 188
When the Court applied this analysis to the Cheyenne River Act of
1908,189 it handed the tribes their only victory on the disestablishment issue
in the past two decades. The language of the Cheyenne River Act authorized
the Secretary of the Interior to "sell and dispose" of the surplus lands and
deposit the proceeds in the Treasury in trust for the tribe; nowhere in the act
did Congress use any language of cession.' 90 In addition, the surrounding
circumstances did not support disestablishment: the act did not arise from a
negotiated agreement representing any tribal consent to loss of the surplus
lands'9' and the legislative history contained at most "a few isolated and
ambiguous phrases" concerning congressional intent to disestablish the
reservation. 92  Finally, the Court found the subsequent jurisdictional
history of the surplus lands "so rife with contradictions and inconsistencies"
that it could not constitute de facto disestablishment. 9  Both the federal
government and the state apparently exercised some jurisdiction over the
surplus lands, the tribal headquarters was located in the opened area, and the
majority of the tribal members lived in that area. '" Based on this analysis,
the Court found that the Cheyenne River Act met none of the conditions for
disestablishing the reservation. Instead, it had merely opened the surplus
lands to non-Indian settlement, leaving the reservation boundaries intact.
187. Id. at 471.
188. Id.
189. Ch. 218, 35 Stat. 460.
190. Id; see Solem, 465 U.S. at 472-73.
191. Solem, 465 U.S. at 476-77.
192. Id. at 478. Oddly enough, the "isolated and ambiguous" phrases cited by the Court in
Solem-references to a "reduced reservation" and to the "reservations as diminished"-are arguably more
probative of congressional intent to disestablish than the vague references to cession that the Court in
Rosebud Sioux was willing to construe as clear evidence of an intent to terminate the surplus lands.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 479-80. The extent of tribal versus non-Indian land ownership and population was crucial,
foreshadowing the importance of that issue in the regulatory jurisdiction cases. See infra part V. In
Rosebud Sioux, the Court noted that the opened area "is over 90% non-Indian, both in population and in
land use." 430 U.S. at 605. In Solem, by contrast, the population of the opened area was about half tribal
members and half non-Indians. 465 U.S. at 480. Enough Indians were left in the area that the Court
could conclude that the area retained its "Indian character." Id. That phrase, coined by Justice Marshall
as author of the unanimous Solem decision, was revived in the zoning case of Brendale v. Yakima Indian
Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989). The dissent in Brendale, in which Justice Marshall joined, then condemned
the "Indian character" analysis as stereotypical and patronizing. Id. at 464-65 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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The Court's only subsequent use of the Solem analysis, however, resulted
in the opposite conclusion. In Hagen v. Utah,'95 the Court determined that
a series of acts between 1902 and 1905, opening surplus lands on the Uintah
Reservation, terminated those lands from the reservation. As in Solem, the
Court purported to rely on the language of the surplus lands acts, the
surrounding circumstances and legislative history, and the "subsequent
demographics" of the opened area.'96
For the first part of its analysis, the Hagen Court focused on what it
termed the "operative language" of the surplus lands acts: that is, the
language of the provision which actually opened the lands.'97 In doing so,
however, the Court ignored the language of the act and the presidential
proclamation which actually did open the surplus lands of the Uintah
Reservation, and instead found termination language in a 1902 act which first
introduced the idea of allotting and homesteading the reservation. In 1902,
Congress provided that if the tribes of the Uintah Reservation consented, the
reservation would be allotted and the surplus lands "restored to the public
domain" and opened to homesteading.' 9' In Seymour v. Superintendent of
Washington State Penitentiary, the Court held that similar language-that the
surplus lands be "vacated and restored to the public domain"-would
terminate the surplus lands from the reservation. 99 The Uintah Act of
1902, however, unlike the act described in Seymour, did not expressly
"vacate" the reservation status of the lands.200 As the dissent in Hagen
noted, merely equating surplus lands with the public domain is at best an
ambiguous reference, one not inconsistent with the continued status of the
surplus lands as reservation territory.20'
Moreover, even if the 1902 Uintah Act could be interpreted as terminating
the surplus lands, the 1902 Act was never put into effect. Instead, following
the 1903 decision in Lone Wolf, Congress directed the Secretary of the
Interior to allot the lands unilaterally if the tribes continued to refuse to
consent, and extended the time for opening the surplus lands as provided for
195. 114 S. Ct. 958 (1994). Hagen was decided during Justice Ginsburg's first term on the Court.
Unfortunately, she joined the majority opinion in favor of disestablishment, and thus is likely to help carry
on the legacy of allotment. The retirement of Justice Blackmun appears to leave only the surprise of
Justice Souter, who joined Blackmun in dissent in Hagen and in South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S. Ct.
2309, 2321 (1993) (discussed infra at text accompanying notes 317-38), to support tribal territorial
sovereignty.
196. 114 S. Ct. at 965.
197. Id. at 966-67.
198. Act of May 27, 1902, ch. 888, 32 Stat. 263, discussed in Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 961-62. The
tribes did not consent. See Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 963.
199. 368 U.S. 351, 354 (1963).
200. Ch. 888, 32 Stat. 263.
201. 114 S. Ct. at 974-75 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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in the 1902 Act.202  The Uintah surplus lands were actually opened in
1905. By statute, Congress again deferred the opening until September of
that year, and provided that the surplus lands:
shall be disposed of under the general provisions of the homestead and
town-site laws of the United States, and shall be opened to settlement
and entry by proclamation of the President, which proclamation shall
prescribe the manner in which these lands may be settled upon, occupied,
and entered by persons entitled to make entry thereof."3
The 1905 Act also provided for payment in accordance with the 1902
Act.20 4  The 1902 Act had not provided for a sum certain payment for the
lands, but rather provided that settlers would pay for the lands they
homesteaded, with the proceeds held in trust for the tribes.05 In July 1905,
President Roosevelt proclaimed the opening of the Uintah surplus lands
"under the general provisions of the homestead and townsite laws of the
United States. 20 6  The 1905 Uintah Act and the proclamation thus mir-
rored the language of the Klamath River Act, which the Court held in Mattz
v. Arnett did not disestablish the reservation.207
Nonetheless, the Court focused solely on the language of the 1902 Act.
It bypassed the pesky problem of the 1905 Act's plain language by holding
that the 1905 Act was "tied together" with the 1902 Act because of the
provision regarding the fate of the proceeds. 2"8  Thus, the Court concluded,
Congress in 1905 "clearly viewed the 1902 statute as the basic legislation
upon which subsequent Acts were built."0 9 Moreover, the Court noted, the
1905 Act did not impliedly repeal the 1902 Act because the provisions
202. Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 994, 32 Stat. 998, discussed in Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 962. The
following year, Congress again deferred the opening of the surplus lands. Act of April 21, 1904, ch.
1402, 33 Stat. 207.
203. Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1479,33 Stat. 1069 (quoted in Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 963).
204. Id.
205. See Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 961-62 & n.I.
206. 34 Stat. 3119-20 (quoted in Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 963-64).
207. 412 U.S. 481, 495 (1973). The Klamath River Act declared the surplus lands "subject to
settlement, entry, and purchase under the laws of the United States granting homestead rights" and
provided that the proceeds would be held in trust for the tribe. Act of June 17, 1892, ch. 120, 27 Stat.
52.
208. Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 967. The Court's need to "tie together" two different acts in order to
effectuate the allotment policy is reminiscent of its similar approach in County of Yakima v. Yakima
Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992), in which the Court found it necessary to fold the language of § 6
of the General Allotment Act into its interpretation of § 5, rather than interpret § 5 according to its plain
language. See supra text accompanying notes 114-16. In both cases, had the Court looked only to the
language of the act or provision relevant to the issue at hand, it should have ruled against continuing the
legacy of allotment to the detriment of the tribes.
209. Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 967-68.
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regarding opening of the surplus lands were "not inconsistent" with those of
the earlier act.2"0
Contemporaneous historical evidence, the Court claimed, supported its
reading. One of the few surrounding circumstances cited by the Court was
a statement by Indian Inspector James McLaughlin, sent to negotiate for the
tribes' consent to allotment in 1903. McLaughlin told the tribes that if they
consented to the government's wishes, "after next year there will be no
outside boundary line to this reservation." 2t' Even if this constitutes clear
evidence of an intent to disestablish the surplus lands, it refers only to intent
under the 1902 Act; the 1905 Act, by contrast, changed the terms and
conditions of the disposition of the surplus lands. The Court also referenced,
oddly enough, the House version of the 1905 Act, which would have restored
the surplus lands to the public domain.2" 2 Because the Senate version that
was ultimately enacted did not contain public domain language, the simple
inference is that Congress did not intend by 1905 to restore the surplus lands
to the public domain. The Court, however, drew a different conclusion.
Admitting that "we have no way of knowing for sure" why Congress chose
to offer entry under the homestead laws rather than restore the lands to the
public domain, the Court nonetheless felt that it "seems likely" that Congress
merely intended to limit land speculation, an objective "not inconsistent with
the restoration of the unallotted lands to the public domain. 2 3  Thus,
based on no evidence other than wishful thinking, 214 the Court ignored the
plain language of the 1905 Act and instead read that Act as somehow
incorporating the language of the 1902 Act.
Finally, the Court found that the subsequent history of the opened area
supported de facto disestablishment.2 5  The population of the former
surplus lands was some 85 percent non-Indian, with the population of the
largest city more than 90 percent non-Indian. 26  Tribal headquarters were
located on trust lands, not in the opened area, and the state of Utah had
generally assumed jurisdiction over the area.217 The modem demographics
210. Id. at 968. If one act (1905) did not terminate the lands from the reservation and one act (1902)
arguably did, the inconsistency seems evident. Moreover, the Court has used the "not inconsistent"
approach in other recent cases in the same way: as a means of finding that earlier detrimental language
survives passage of later legislation that is more protective of tribal interests. See supra note 135
(discussing County of Yakima, 502 U.S. 251 (1992)).
211. Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 968.
212. Id. at 969.
213. Id. Once again, the Court reverted to the "not inconsistent with" approach. See supra note 210.
214. As the dissent noted, the Court's approach does not explain why Congress deliberately chose
not to include the public domain language in the 1905 Act. Id. at 979 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 970.
216. Id.
217. The state did so between 1905 when the surplus lands were opened to settlement and 1985, when
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of the surplus lands, along with the circumstances surrounding passage of the
surplus lands acts, the Court held, bolstered its decision that the acts
disestablished one-fifth of the Uintah Reservation." l8
The Court's reading of the 1905 Act and its history is one of the more
blatant recent examples of the Court's wilful disregard of the canons of
construction. If statutes limiting tribal rights are to be construed narrowly in
favor of the tribes, then basing a decision which divests the tribes of their
territory on the Court's inability to ascertain exact congressional intent is
worse than disingenuous. It represents what can only be described as a
deliberate decision to further the policies of the allotment era at the expense
of the tribes and the current government-to-government relationship between
the tribes and the federal government.
The ultimate aim of the allotment policy was the eventual break up of the
reservations. But in order to allow the gradual assimilation of Indians, the
allotment policy also contemplated a relatively lengthy process. Lands were
allotted with twenty-five year trust restrictions, and the surplus land was
opened so that new lands were available to settlers and so that non-Indian
neighbors were available to allottees as exemplars. Under these conditions,
Congress assumed that over time the reservations would simply disappear.
As a result, the individual surplus lands acts were seldom clear as to whether
the surplus lands were severed from the boundaries of the reservations.219
In the disestablishment cases, then, the central issue has been when a given
surplus lands act was sufficiently clear to terminate the opened lands from
the reservation.
Throughout its disestablishment cases, the Court has concentrated on
congressional intent to terminate reservation status. Arguably, this standard
would have been a reasonable approach to the surplus lands acts if the Court
had stuck with its original analysis in Seymour, focusing on the language of
the Tenth Circuit held that the Uintah Reservation had not been disestablished. Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah,
773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985) (en bane), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 (1986). Apparently the decade
between the Ute Tribe decision and Hagen did not constitute a part of the jurisdictional history of the
opened area. Moreover, there was no indication in the Hagen opinion that the lack of state jurisdiction
during that decade led to the parade of horribles apparently envisioned by the Court if the surplus lands
were found to still be within the reservation. See Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 970 (concerned that a finding of
no disestablishment "would seriously disrupt the justifiable expectations of the [non-Indian] people living
in the area," but offering no evidence that it had done so); see also Rosebud Sioux, 430 U.S. at 605.
218. The reservation was originally 2 million acres, some 400,000 of which were declared surplus
lands. Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 970.
219. See Rosebud Sioux, 430 U.S. at 629 (Marshall, I., dissenting). Nonetheless, Congress knew how
to be express about disestablishment, and where the language of the particular act was clear, the Court
was willing to find disestablishment of the surplus lands. See Mattz v. Amett, 412 U.S. 481, 504 n.22
(1973).
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the act itself.22° Thus, reservation disestablishment would perhaps be a
reasonable determination if the language of the act expressly or plainly
showed that Congress intended to terminate the reservation status of the land
and return the land to the public domain, and Congress carried out that intent
by paying the tribe a sum certain for the territory terminated as reservation
lands, and the act ratified a negotiated agreement between the tribe and the
federal government.22' But the Court faltered in its application of congres-
sional intent. First it moved away from the requirement that Congress make
its intent to disestablish plain on the face of the act, and then it introduced
the legal niceties of the "surrounding circumstances" standard and the
offensive racism of whether the surplus lands retained their Indian character
by not becoming too white.222
In implementing that approach to the disestablishment question, the Court
has given effect not to Congress's intent in the surplus lands acts, but to the
general intent of the repudiated allotment policy.223 Only where the surplus
lands act contains no language that could arguably be construed as language
of either cession or termination has the Court, in recent years, been willing
to find an absence of congressional intent to disestablish.224 Moreover, the
Court is adamant about clinging to that approach even when it concedes that
it has "no way of knowing for sure" what Congress intended in any given
act.'2 Not only is that approach fundamentally flawed under the canons
of construction, but more destructively it is designed to further the policies
of the allotment era even if the particular surplus lands act did not contem-
plate an end to the reservation status of the opened lands. The lack of clear
congressional intent, the repudiation of the allotment policy, and the modem
policy of encouraging tribal governmental status all appear irrelevant to the
Court's disestablishment analysis.
As in its interpretation of the General Allotment Act in County of
Yakima,226 the Court in the disestablishment cases could have chosen a
reasonable interpretation of the surplus lands acts that would have taken
account of those factors. Had it focused solely on congressional intent as
220. See Seymour, 368 U.S. at 354-56.
221. Professor Skibine calls this the "steal it fair and square" analysis. Alex Tallchief Skibine,
Removing Race Sensitive Issues from the Political Forum: Or Using the Judiciary to Implicitly Take
Someone's Country, 20 J. CONTEMP. L. 1, 7 (1994).
222. See Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 958. The Court has generally used these last two factors to support
the conclusion the Court has already reached based on the language of the surplus lands act at issue in
any given case. See id.
223. See Skibine, supra note 221, at 7-8.
224. See Solem, 465 U.S. at 472-73.
225. Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 969.
226. See supra part Ill.
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expressed through the plain language of the particular surplus lands act, it
could have given effect both to the express intent of Congress and to tribal
territorial sovereignty. Instead, the Court chose to further the legacy of
allotment by straining to find whenever remotely possible that the surplus
lands acts terminated the reservation status of those lands, and therefore
terminated tribal sovereignty over the disestablished lands.
V. ALLOTMENT AND SOVEREIGNTY: THE REGULATORY
JURISDICTION CASES
The reservation disestablishment cases discussed in the previous part
address the legacy of the allotment policy with regard to the territory
encompassed today by reservation borders. But even within existing and
recognized reservation boundaries, the modem legacy of allotment has
divested tribes of sovereign control over the territory. In particular, the Court
has used the effects of allotment to wrest from tribes sovereign authority over
non-Indian-owned fee lands within tribal territories.
One of the primary tenets of sovereignty is the concept that within its
territorial limits, the sovereign's power is exclusive. Since the foundations
of federal Indian law and the denomination of tribes as "domestic dependent
nations," '227 however, tribal sovereign powers have been subject to federal
control. Until the 1880s, federal authority in Indian affairs was largely
confined to the exercise of authority over relations between the tribes as
sovereigns and the American people.22 Aside from those powers of
external sovereignty, powers the Court had declared inconsistent with the
dependent status of the tribes, tribal sovereign authority within tribal territory
remained exclusive. In the 1880s, however, Congress and the Supreme Court
made significant inroads into this exclusivity.
Those nineteenth century incursions primarily focused on the application
of criminal laws in the Indian country. In 1885, Congress asserted its first
direct control over the internal affairs of the tribes. With passage of the
Major Crimes Act,229 the federal government for the first time exercised
227. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
228. The federal government, accordingly, had exclusive power to control the disposition of Indian
lands and the exclusive authority to enter into relations with the tribes. Johnson v. M'lntosh, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
229. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988 & Supp. 1994). In the decade leading to the allotment era, federal
officials favoring assimilation had proposed federal criminal jurisdiction over Indians along with the
allotment of tribal lands in severalty. See 1876 COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFF. ANN REP., reprinted in
DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, supra note 20, at 147, 150. The immediate impetus for
the Major Crimes Act, however, was the decision in Exparte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571-72 (1883),
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authority to determine the relations among tribal members within tribal
territory. In addition to that intrusion into tribal sovereignty, the Supreme
Court held in the 1881 case of United States v. McBratney230 that federal
courts were without jurisdiction to prosecute crimes between non-Indians
occurring in Indian country. While McBratney itself determined only that the
federal courts had no jurisdiction, it has come to stand for the proposition
that states, by virtue of their admission into the union, acquired criminal
jurisdiction over crimes involving only non-Indians. 23' Crimes not involv-
ing Indians, the Court determined, implicated no tribal sovereign interests
requiring federal or tribal jurisdiction.232
Despite these early inroads on tribal authority to govern all conduct within
tribal territory, arguably the most serious and far-reaching curtailment of
tribal power occurred in 1978 with the decision in Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe.233 In Oliphant, the Court resurrected the notion that tribes
were, upon their incorporation within the United States,234 impliedly
in which the Court held that federal courts were without jurisdiction to prosecute a Brule Sioux for the
murder of another member of the tribe. Although Crow Dog led to widespread support for extending
federal jurisdiction to major intratribal crimes, the decision itself merely confirmed the nineteenth century
approach to Indian country crimes. During the nineteenth century, through treaties and statutes, the
federal and territorial courts had taken jurisdiction over interracial crimes in Indian country but intratribal
crime remained the exclusive province of the tribes. See generally Robert N. Clinton, Development of
Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: The Historical Perspective, 17 ARIz. L. REv. 951, 953-62
(1975). The Major Crimes Act was thus an unprecedented interference with intratribal relations.
230. 104 U.S. 621 (1881).
231. New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496, 500 (1946); see also Draper v. United States,
164 U.S. 240, 247 (1896). For a discussion of the McBratney rule, its evolution and its application, see
Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a Jurisdictional Maze,
18 ARiz. L. REv. 503, 524-26 (1976).
232. McBratney, 104 U.S. at 624. The contention is, of course, absurd. Activities within the territory
of the sovereign, in particular criminal conduct within the territory, vitally concern sovereign interests.
Nonetheless, the Court has continued to reiterate its belief that non-Indian conduct within tribal territories
is somehow outside the ambit of the tribes. And each time it makes that finding, it erodes a bit more of
the territorial sovereignty left to the tribes. See infra text accompanying notes 233-64.
233. 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978). Oliphant was arrested during the Tribe's annual celebration and
charged with assault of a tribal police officer and resisting arrest. Id. at 194. Because the victim of the
crime was Indian, the McBratney rule for state jurisdiction of crimes involving non-Indians was not
relevant. See supra text accompanying notes 230-32.
The Oliphant decision has been well and thoroughly criticized. See, e.g., Russel L. Barsh & James
Y. Henderson, The Betrayal: Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe and the Hunting of the Snark, 63 MINN.
L. REv. 609 (1979); Peter C. Maxfield, Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe: The Whole is Greater than the Sum
of the Parts, 19 J. CONTEMP. L. 391 (1993); Williams, supra note 5, at 267-274.
234. 435 U.S. at 209. But see Ball, supra note 5, at 36-38. Professor Ball argues convincingly that
the Oliphant decision itself was the event that accomplished the legal incorporation of the tribes into the
United States. He demonstrates that the Court's prior case law, and in particular the Marshall cases on
which Oliphant relied, disclaimed rather than established the tribes' incorporation within the Republic.
See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 209,
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divested of all powers "inconsistent with their status." '235 Those powers
inconsistent with tribal status, the Court determined, were not limited to the
powers of external sovereignty,236 but encompassed all powers other than
the right to govern relations internal to the tribe.237 Accordingly, the Court
held, Indian tribes were divested of any sovereign power to criminally
prosecute non-Indians.
23 s
While Oliphant did not directly implicate the allotment program, the Court
made a point of noting the effects of allotment on the Suquamish Indian
Reservation. Nearly two-thirds of the reservation land was held in fee by
non-Indians, and most of the trust land was "unimproved acreage upon which
no persons reside." Out of a total population of nearly 3000, only about fifty
persons were members of the Suquamish Tribe.23 9 While these facts were
technically irrelevant to the holding, their influence on the Court's decision
is suspect.240 Underlying the Court's decision is a clear sense of unease in
permitting tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, particular-
235. 435 U.S. at 208. The phrase was coined by the court of appeals in Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d
1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 1976), and was quoted by the Court with approval.
236. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. at 209. That is, the powers implicitly lost were
not restricted to those identified by Chief Justice John Marshall in the early decades of the nineteenth
century, which dealt with the relations between the tribes and other sovereign nations. Id.; see supra text
accompanying notes 2-4.
237. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 209-10. The Court quoted for this proposition a concurring opinion from
an 1810 case, arguing that the tribes were divested of "the right of governing every person within their
limits except themselves." Id. at 209 (quoting Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 147 (1810) (Johnson, J.,
concurring)) (emphasis added by the Oliphant Court). But see Ball, supra note 5, at 39 n. 171 (contending
that what Johnson meant in 1810 was significantly different from Rehnquist's use of the phrase nearly
170 years later).
238. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210. The issue in Oliphant was the authority of the tribes to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. In a companion case, however, the Court spoke in terms of tribal
authority over nonmembers rather than non-Indians. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978).
In Wheeler, the Court stated in dicta that tribal powers of self-government involve "only the relations
among members of a tribe." Id. at 326. That left an opening for a nonmember Indian defendant to assert
that a tribe had no more jurisdiction over him than it would have over a non-Indian. In Duro v. Reina,
the Supreme Court agreed, restricting tribal criminal jurisdiction to members of the prosecuting tribe. 495
U.S. 676 (1990). Within months, Congress overturned the Duro decision, providing expressly that tribal
powers of self-government include "the inherent power of an Indian tribe, hereby recognized and
affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians." 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (1988). On the Duro
decision and the congressional "fix," see Nell Jessup Newton, Permanent Legislation to Correct Duro v.
Reina, 17 AMER. INDIAN L. REv. 109 (1992); Alex Tallchief Skibine, Duro v. Reina and the Legislation
that Overturned It: A Power Play of Constitutional Dimensions, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 767 (1993); Kenneth
Factor, Comment, Tightening the Noose on Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction, 27 TULSA L.J. 225 (1991).
239. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 193 n.l.
240. The unanswerable but intriguing question is whether the Court would have held differently had
it been presented with "good" facts: a similar crime occurring on a reservation that was virtually all trust
land and with an overwhelmingly Indian population. Given the racist basis of the decision in Oliphant,
it is likely the Court would have ruled against tribal jurisdiction in any case, but it would have had a
harder time justifying its decision without the effects of allotment on the Suquamish Reservation.
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ly in situations where the tribe is vastly outnumbered in land ownership and
population.241
What may have been merely an influence in Oliphant, however, became
the dominant factor in Montana v. United States,242 where the Court
divested the tribe of sovereign powers on the basis of the effects of
allotment. Like most tribes, the Crow Tribe of Montana had been subject to
the allotment program: 241 tribal lands had been allotted; surplus lands had
been sold; and considerable land had passed into non-Indian ownership,
leading inevitably to a significant non-Indian presence within the Crow
Reservation. As a result of the allotment years, by 1981 more than one-
quarter of the Crow Reservation was held in fee by non-Indians. While more
than two-thirds of the Crow territory continued in trust, most of the
remaining trust lands were held as trust allotments.244
In 1974, the Crow Tribal Council adopted a resolution prohibiting all
hunting and fishing within the reservation by anyone not a member of the
Crow Tribe. The prohibition extended throughout the territorial boundaries
of the reservation, and consequently barred non-Indians from hunting and
fishing even on fee-owned lands. In Montana, the Supreme Court struck
down the resolution as beyond the sovereign powers of the Tribe to regulate
that legacy of allotment: non-Indians on non-Indian fee land. 245  The Court
held that the effects of allotment in Crow country divested the tribe of both
its treaty-recognized and its inherent rights to territorial sovereignty. 
2 46
241. For example, the Court noted that while the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-
41, extends most of the constitutional due process guarantees to tribal prosecutions, non-Indians could not,
under tribal law, serve on Suquamish juries. The Court was quite openly disturbed at the idea of
subjecting non-Indians to trial by Indian juries in Indian courts. It quoted language from nearly a century
earlier, rejecting federal jurisdiction over crimes committed by Indians. "It tries them, not by their peers,
nor by the customs of their people, nor the law of their lands, but by ... a different race, according to
the law of a social state of which they have an imperfect conception .... " Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 211
(quoting Exparte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571 (1883)). The Court chose, in this context, to ignore not
only the due process guarantees of the Indian Civil Rights Act, but also the facts that the Suquamish
maintained a Law and Order Code covering the offenses in question and that assault on a law enforcement
officer and resisting arrest are hardly crimes of "a different race" of which non-Indians could have but
"an imperfect conception."
242. 450 U.S. 544, 564-67 (1981).
243. The General Allotment Act of 1887 was put into effect in Crow territory by the Crow Allotment
Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 751.
244. Montana, 450 U.S. at 548. Tribal trust land represented only 17 percent of the Crow
Reservation. Trust allotments accounted for 52 percent, non-Indian fee lands for 28 percent, state-owned
fee lands for two percent, and federal lands for one percent. Id.
245. Id. at 564-65.
246. Id. at 548. The Court also rejected an argument that the Crow Tribe held title to the bed of the
Big Horn River and could therefore prohibit non-Indian use on the basis of ownership. Id. at 550-57.
For a critique of that aspect of the decision, see Barsh & Henderson, supra note 23.
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The 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie established the Crow Reservation as land
"set apart for the absolute and undisturbed use and occupation" of the tribe,
and obligated the United States to prevent non-Indians from passing through
or residing in the Crow territory.24 7 While these treaty provisions arguably
recognized a right of the Crow Tribe to control hunting and fishing, the Court
said, they did so only as to those lands over which the Tribe retained its
"absolute and undisturbed use and occupation." 4 ' Lands now held in fee
by non-Indians as a result of the allotment policy, the Court then held, are
not lands over which the Tribe now exercises exclusive use and occupa-
tion.249 Allotment, in other words, divested the tribes of territorial sover-
eignty over allotted lands subsequently lost to non-Indian owners.
Moreover, the Court found that it would be inconsistent with the purposes
of the allotment policy to interpret the treaty as recognizing tribal authority
over non-Indian lands. "It defies common sense," the Court asserted, to
believe that Congress intended to subject non-Indian fee owners to tribal
jurisdiction when the ultimate purpose of the allotment policy was the
"destruction of tribal government." 250  The Court expressly rejected any
notion that it should interpret the Treaty of Fort Laramie in light of Con-
gress's repudiation of the allotment policy in 1934. On the contrary, the
Court insisted, the only "relevant" inquiry was the effect of allotment on land
ownership within the Crow Reservation. 1
Having eliminated the treaty as a source of tribal rights over non-Indian
fee owners, the Court then turned to the inherent sovereign authority of the
Tribe. Those inherent rights, the Court held, were insufficient to support the
authority of the Crow Tribe to regulate activities on non-Indian fee land.
2 52
For support, the Court turned to its decision three years earlier in
Oliphant.253 The Court reiterated the doctrine underlying Oliphant: that
Indian tribes, by virtue of their dependent status, have been implicitly
247. 15 Stat. 649, quoted in Montana, 450 U.S. at 558.
248. Montana, 450 U.S. at 558-59.
249. Id. at 559.
250. Id. at 559 n.9.
251. Id.
The policy of allotment and sale of surplus reservation land was, of course, repudiated in 1934
by the Indian Reorganization Act. But what is relevant in this case is the effect of the land
alienation occasioned by that policy on Indian treaty rights tied to Indian use and occupation
of reservation land.
Id. (citation omitted). As noted earlier, the Court took precisely the same approach in County of Yakima
v. Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 269-70 (1992), determining that the fee status of the land, not
the repudiation of the allotment policy, was the relevant factual basis for the decision. See supra text
accompanying note 129.
252. Montana, 450 U.S. at 563.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 233-41.
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divested of all sovereign rights inconsistent with that status. In particular, the
dependent status of tribes is inconsistent with tribal control over non-Indians;
the retained sovereign powers of the tribes extend only to the relations among
the tribe and its people.254 Based on this broad sweep of the idea of
implied divestiture, the Court stated that Oliphant stands for "the general
proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not
extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe."2 55
The Court immediately, however, recognized exceptions: instances in
which tribal sovereign authority extended to non-Indian conduct within tribal
territory. First, the Court held, tribes retain inherent authority to regulate the
activities of non-Indians who enter into consensual relationships with the
tribe or its members.2 5 6  Second, even as to non-Indian activities on fee
land, tribes retain inherent authority to regulate conduct which "threatens or
has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the
health or welfare of the tribe."25 7 Despite the apparently broad sweep of
these exceptions, however, the Court held that neither was relevant to the
exercise of Crow jurisdiction over non-Indian hunting and fishing. Non-
Indians hunting and fishing on fee lands do not enter into any consensual
dealings with the Crow Tribe.2 5 Nor do their activities have any direct
effect on tribal sovereignty. 9  In particular, the Court noted that because
the State of Montana had historically regulated hunting and fishing on fee
lands and because the Crow Tribe had asserted no authority over non-Indian
hunting and fishing on the reservation at the time of the Crow Allotment
Act,260 tribal control of hunting and fishing on fee lands "bears no clear
254. Montana, 450 U.S. at 563-65 (referencing Oliphant and its companion case, United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978)).
255. Id. at 565.
256. "A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers
who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts,
leases, or other arrangements." Id. Under this type of inherent power, for example, tribes retain authority
to tax non-Indians who do business on the reservation. See Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe, 471 U.S.
195, 201 (1985).
257. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 564 n.13. There are several problems with this reasoning. First, the Court failed to
explain why the Crow Tribe, at the time of the Allotment Act-a time when there were no non-Indian
fee lands within the territory-would have nonetheless exercised jurisdiction over those non-existent lands.
The Court's construct thus would be merely silly if it did not have such an important effect. Second, the
Court's argument regarding the lack of Crow jurisdiction over non-Indians in the early twentieth century
seems to presume that if the tribe did not exercise jurisdiction in the past, it may not do so now, even if
that authority is otherwise lawful. This use-it-or-lose-it approach to tribal sovereignty could be
particularly damaging as tribes increasingly assert their sovereign powers. (As it has been in the
reservation diminishment cases, where the similar "de facto" disestablishment analysis has been used to
find that lands are no longer tribal territory. See supra text accompanying notes 215-18.) Conversely,
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relationship to tribal self-government or internal relations."26' Accordingly,
it is a power inconsistent with the dependent status of the Crow Tribe and
therefore divested.262
Montana thus directly tied tribal sovereign regulatory powers to the fee-
lands legacy of the allotment years. Whatever general regulatory powers
inhered in the tribe as a sovereign or were guaranteed to the tribe by treaty,
the Court held, those powers were abrogated by operation of the General
Allotment Act. Because of the change in title and the loss of tribal owner-
ship, the tribe also lost the sovereign authority to regulate certain conduct
within its territory. Despite the fact that fee lands within reservations are part
of Indian country263 and that Indian country generally represents the
territorial boundaries of tribal sovereignty, the Court bifurcated tribal powers
along land tenure lines. As to regulation of conduct on trust lands, including
the conduct of non-Indians, tribal power remains plenary.264 But as to
regulation of that same conduct on fee lands by non-Indians, tribal power is
divested absent some direct effect on tribal sovereignty.
2 65
The "direct effects" test that the Court constructed to provide exceptions
for conduct on fee lands begged the question. Territorial integrity-the right
of the sovereign to control persons and activities within its territory-is a
central tenet of sovereignty. Any loss of territorial integrity necessarily has
a direct effect on tribal sovereignty: it trenches upon a basic sovereign right.
To argue, as the Court did, that the loss of the power to regulate activities
within the sovereign's territorial borders "bears no close relationship" to self-
government is oxymoronic.
Despite its lack of logic, the direct effects test proved highly useful to
tribes in the years following the Montana decision. Tribes were, virtually
the Court seemed to assume that because the state exercised jurisdiction, that authority was therefore valid.
The reasoning is circular: because the state exercised jurisdiction, the tribe could not, and because the tribe
could not, the state must be entitled. In Montana, as in the reservation diminishment cases, the Court
seems willing to presume that any exercise of state jurisdiction is legitimate simply from the fact that it
exists.
261. Montana, 450 U.S. at 564. The Court refused to consider even the issues suggested by common
sense. For example, hunting generally involves the use of firearms. Non-Indian use of guns within tribal
territory is surely an activity that implicates the safety and welfare of the reservation residents. For
another example, any hunting and fishing depletes the existing stock. Preventing non-Indians from
harvesting to the point that sufficient game is not available for tribal use again seems clearly to implicate
tribal health and welfare, and in the case of commercial hunting and fishing activities, the economic
security of the tribe as well.
262. Id. at 565.
263. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (1988).
264. As the Montana Court noted: "The Court of Appeals held that the Tribe may prohibit
nonmembers from hunting or fishing on land belonging to the Tribe or held by the United States in trust
for the Tribe, and with this holding we can readily agree." 450 U.S. at 557 (citation omitted).
265. Id. at 566.
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without exception, able to convince lower federal courts and tribal courts that
a range of non-Indian conduct on fee lands would have sufficient direct
effects on tribal sovereignty to justify tribal regulation.266 For all practical
purposes, the direct effects exception swallowed the "general proposi-
tion'267 that tribes were divested of sovereign authority over non-Indian fee
lands.
Then in 1989, the Supreme Court decided the zoning case of Brendale v.
Yakima Indian Nation,16  and the direct effects test was put in jeopardy.
In the years following the Montana decision, one of the tribal powers over
non-Indian fee land most often upheld was the power to zone.269 Zon-
ing-the power of the sovereign to determine the use of its land base-is a
governmental power central to the exercise of territorial sovereignty.
270
Only by regulating the use made of its land, through the separation of
incompatible uses, the regulation of potentially harmful uses, and the
promotion of beneficial uses,27' can the sovereign fully protect and promote
the interests of its resident population.
Nonetheless, the Court in Brendale determined that the power to zone fee
lands depended upon the modem legacy of allotment. As in Montana, the
Court did not question the exclusive sovereign right of the tribe to regulate
on trust lands. As to trust lands within the Yakima Reservation, the Yakima
266. See Cardin v. De La Cruz, 671 F.2d 363, 366-67 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 967 (1982)
(tribal building, health and safety codes); Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 665 F.2d
951, 964 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 977 (1982) (tribal regulation of riparian rights); Lummi Indian
Tribe v. Hallauer, 9 Indian L. Rep. 3025, 3027-28 ('.D. Wash. 1982) (tribal sewer hook-up
requirements). In particular, courts were amenable to claims that zoning of fee lands was within inherent
tribal sovereign authority. See Knight v. Shoshone & Arapaho Indian Tribes, 670 F.2d 900, 903 (10th
Cir. 1982); Governing Council of Pinoleville Indian Community v. Mendocino County, 684 F. Supp.
1042, 1044-45 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Colville Confederated Tribes v. Cavenham Forest Indus., 14 Indian L.
Rep. 6043, 6043 (Colv. Tr. Ct. 1987).
267. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 565.
268. 492 U.S. 408 (1989). For discussions of Brendale, see Singer, supra note 10, at 7-8; Judith V.
Royster, Environmental Protection and Native American Rights: Controlling Land Use Through
Environmental Regulation, I KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 89 (1991); Thomas W. Clayton, Note, Brendale
v. Yakima Nation: A Divided Supreme Court Cannot Agree Over Who May Zone Nonmember Fee Lands
Within the Reservation, 36 S.D. L. REv. 329 (1991); Craighton Goeppele, Note, Solutions for Uneasy
Neighbors: Regulating the Reservation Environment After Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of
Yakima Indian Nation, 65 WASH. L. REv. 417 (1990).
269. See cases cited supra note 266.
270. See, e.g., Governing Council of Pinoleville Indian Community v. Mendocino County, 684 F.
Supp. 1042, 1044 (N.D. Cal. 1988). See also Brendale, 492 U.S. at 458 (Blackmun, J.) (citation omitted)
("It would be difficult to conceive of a power more central to 'the economic security, or the health or
welfare of the tribe,' than the power to zone.").
271. For these reasons, also, land use planning is particularly unamenable to checkerboard jurisdiction,
where both the tribe and the state have authority over certain lands within the Indian country.
Nonetheless, the Brendale decision creates that impractical checkerboard of zoning authority within at
least some reservations.
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Nation and only the Yakima Nation had the authority to zone.272 The issue
before the Court, rather, was the sovereign power of the Yakima Nation to
zone non-Indian fee lands within its tribal territory. 73
Once again, the outcome depended upon the legacy of allotment: in this
case, on the extent of the destruction wrought by the allotment policy. The
Court limited tribal authority to zone non-Indian fee lands to those reserva-
tions, or sections of reservations, that had survived allotment relatively intact.
Where a reservation, or part of a reservation, had suffered too greatly from
allotment, however-where there was now sufficient non-Indian land
ownership---then the tribe was divested of the sovereign power to zone fee
lands, and that authority belonged to the county.
This outcome resulted from the peculiar configuration of the Yakima
Reservation. Yakima territory is roughly divided into two sections. 74  In
the "open" northeastern section nearly half the land is owned in fee by non-
Indians, there are three incorporated towns, 275 and Yakima Nation members
make up less than twenty percent of the population. 76  The western or
"closed" two-thirds of the reservation, however, is primarily forest land and
contains only a small percentage of non-Indian land.2 77  The Brendale
decision was based on consolidated cases involving two owners of fee land,
one in the open section and one in the closed section, who wanted to develop
272. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 445 (Stevens, J.), 460 (Blackmun, J.).
273. It may perhaps be more accurate to say that the issue was tribal authority to zone lands owned
in fee by nonmembers. Justice White defined the issue as the Tribe's "authority to zone fee lands owned
by nonmembers of the Tribe . . ." Id at 414. However, it appears that the Court treated the fee owners
as jurisdictionally non-Indians. The case involved two parcels of fee land. One parcel was owned by
Stanley Wilkinson, a non-Indian. Id at 418. The other was owned by Philip Brendale, "who is part-
Indian but not a member of the Yakima Nation." Id at 417. It is not clear from that description whether
the Court was treating Brendale as a non-Indian or as a nonmember Indian, because at no point did the
Court find that Brendale was in fact an "Indian" for jurisdictional purposes as opposed to racially part-
Indian. See id (identifying Brendale as "part Indian but not a member of the Yakima Nation").
Moreover, the decision ultimately held that the county had authority to zone the fee lands only in the
"open" area of the reservation; Wilkinson's land was located in the open area, and the opinion thus upheld
county authority to zone non-Indian fee lands. See id at 428, 432. Brendale's property was in the
"closed" area over which the tribe's authority was upheld. See id. at 432. As a result, it is also not clear,
despite Justice White's statement of the issue, that the Court limited tribal authority over nonmember
Indian-owned fee lands in the same manner that it limited tribal authority over non-Indian fee lands. On
the question of who is an Indian for jurisdictional purposes, see Clinton, supra note 231, at 513-20;
Allison M. Dussias, Geographically-Based and Membership-Based Views of Indian Tribal Sovereignty:
The Supreme Court's Changing Vision, 55 U. PiT'. L. REV. 1, 79-86 (1993).
274. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 415 (White, J.).
275. Id.
276. Id at 447 (Stevens, J.).
277. Id at 415 (White, J.). Justice Stevens noted that most of the fee land was owned by lumber
companies. Excluding that land, less than one percent of the closed area was owned in fee. In addition,
there were no permanent residents in the closed area. Id. at 438.
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their parcels in accordance with county zoning policies, but in opposition to
Yakima zoning ordinances.
The nine justices were unable to find a majority for any one approach to
zoning authority. Consequently, the Court split 4-3-2: four justices argued
that the county had exclusive zoning authority over all non-Indian land within
the reservation; 278  three justices, dissenting, argued that the tribe had
exclusive zoning authority over all land within the reservation, regardless of
ownership;279 and two justices, the swing votes, found that the county's
right to zone non-Indian land depended on the extent of non-Indian land
ownership. 2
°
Justice White, writing the four-justice plurality opinion, gave the opinion
of the Court regarding the open area.28' Much of White's opinion was
ostensibly a reprise of the Court's Montana decision, but a crabbed and hard-
line reading of that analysis. White made quick work of the Yakima
Nation's arguments that its zoning authority rested either on its treaty rights
or its inherent sovereign powers. The Yakima treaty, similar to the Crow
treaty at issue in Montana, set the tribal territory aside for "the exclusive use
and benefit" of the Nation and promised that no whites other than Indian
agents would be permitted in Yakima territory without the consent of the Na-
tion. But the Yakima, again like the Crow, were subject to allotment
under the auspices of the General Allotment Act. Like Montana, White's
opinion in Brendale held that because former allotments within Yakima
country were now owned in fee by non-Indians, those fee lands were no
longer set aside for the exclusive use and benefit of the Nation. Therefore,
White held, the Nation was divested of its treaty right to regulate those fee
lands, including the right to zone them.283
278. See id. at 428 (White, J.) (the opinion of the court as to non-Indian lands located in areas of the
reservation with significant non-Indian ownership). Justice White was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Kennedy and Scalia. Id. at 414.
279. See id. at 448 (Blackmun, J.). Justice Blackmun was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall.
All three dissenting justices are now retired from the Court. The dissent did not actually recognize
unfettered territorial sovereignty. Instead, Justice Blackmun waffled on the issue, positing that there may
be "essentially self-contained, definable areas in which non-Indian fee lands so predominate that the tribe
has no significant interest in controlling land use." Id. at 447. He noted that the three incorporated towns
within the Yakima Reservation might constitute such areas, but also noted that the Yakima Nation had
never asserted zoning authority within the towns. Id. at 467 n.9.
280. Id. at 433 (Stevens, J.) (the opinion of the court as to non-Indian lands located in areas of
reservations with no significant non-Indian land ownership). Justice Stevens, who was joined by Justice
O'Connor, upheld exclusive tribal zoning authority in "closed" areas and county zoning authority in
open" areas.
281. Id. at 432.
282. 12 Stat. 951, 952 (1859) (quoted in Brendale, 492 U.S. at 422); see also Montana, 450 U.S. at
559 (explaining the Crow Treaty).
283. 492 U.S. at 422-23.
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Justice Stevens, author of the swing decision, agreed in part that the
General Allotment Act "in some respects diminished tribal authority. 284
Nonetheless, Stevens engaged in an idiosyncratic interpretation of Congress's
intent in instituting the allotment program. Based on no evidence in the
language or legislative history of the General Allotment Act, Stevens found
that while
it is inconceivable that Congress would have intended that the sale of a
few lots would divest the Tribe of the power to determine the character
of the tribal community, it is equally improbable that Congress envi-
sioned that the Tribe would retain its interest in regulating the use of
vast ranges of land sold in fee to nonmembers who lack any voice in
setting tribal policy.285
Stevens thus held that the Act divested the Yakima Nation of its authority
only in those "open" areas where the legacy of allotment, in the form of
nonmember fee lands, was sufficiently widespread.286
Only the dissenters agreed with the Yakima Nation that the congressional
intent which mattered was that contained in the Indian Reorganization Act
of 1934 and its express repudiation of allotment.28 7  But Justice
Blackmun's argument that the Nation's authority to zone should be
interpreted in light of the IRA policy of promoting tribal self-government was
unavailing. A majority of the justices believed that the ultimate aim of the
discredited allotment policy, the destruction of the tribes,28 should continue
to control tribal authority decades after the allotment program was terminat-
ed.
Justice White in his plurality opinion also rejected the argument that the
Yakima Nation retained any inherent sovereign authority to zone non-Indian
fee lands within Yakima territory. The opinion relied, as had Montana, on
the Court's criminal jurisdiction cases of 1978.29 This time, however,
White upped the ante. He found that any tribal regulation of the relations
between the tribe and nonmembers was "necessarily" inconsistent with tribal
status and therefore automatically divested.29 ° Justice Blackmun argued in
284. Id. at 436 (Stevens, J.).
285. Id. at 437.
286. See id. at 447.
287. Id. at 464 (Blackmun, J.).
288. Id. at 423 (White, J.).
289. Id. at 425-27. In particular, White relied on language in United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313
(1978), the companion case of Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). For discussion of Oliphant see supra text
accompanying notes 233-41.
290. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 427 (White, J.) (emphasis added). Justice Blackmun had argued that under
Montana tribes were implicitly divested of only those powers necessarily inconsistent with their status.
Id. at 451-52. Justice White turned that analysis on its head by holding that all relations between tribes
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dissent, to no avail, that the Court in Montana had "simply missed its usual
way" and issued an opinion inconsistent with the Court's prior decisions on
the scope of inherent tribal sovereignty.29' Blackmun, however, was unable
to enlist a majority of the justices in his admirable, if belated, attempt to
undo the damage caused by Montana.
Justice Stevens, while clearly not agreeing with Justice Blackmun, did not
fully subscribe to Justice White's view either. Rather than find that all tribal
authority was automatically divested once Indian country lands passed into
non-Indian fee status, Stevens developed a complicated and impractical
formula based on the extent of non-Indian fee lands within the tribal
territory. 92 Stevens saw a crucial and deciding difference between the
open and the closed areas of the Yakima Reservation, with the controlling
factor the "essential character" of the land.293 Where a region is "almost
entirely . . . reserved for the exclusive benefit of the Tribe,, 294 then the
tribe retains the power, through its exercise of zoning authority, to "define
the essential character of that area." '295 Thus Stevens held, for the Court,
that the Yakima Nation retained the power to zone all lands within the closed
area of the reservation."' However, where a "large percentage" of the land
is owned in fee by non-Indians, the tribe has lost its sovereign ability to
exclude those non-Indians from the territory and consequently has ceased to
be able to "establish the essential character of the region."'2 97 The region
then has lost its "Indian" character and become "an integrated portion of the
county," in which county zoning power predominates.298 Accordingly,
Stevens agreed with White that the county possessed zoning authority over
non-Indian fee lands in the open area of the Yakima territory. 299 Based,
then, on the legacy of allotment, the Court found that the Yakima Nation
and nonmembers involve powers that are, by definition, necessarily inconsistent with the dependent status
of the tribes. See id. at 427.
291. Id. at 455 (Blackmun, J.).
292. Stevens' approach did much to ameliorate the harshness of Justice White's view. Nonetheless,
despite some measure of gratitude for his failure to join White and thereby create a majority decision
totally adverse to tribal interests, his approach is virtually devoid of logic. As Justice Stevens himself
noted, in a masterpiece of understatement, he had not created "a bright-line rule." Id. at 447.
293. See id. at 441 (Stevens, J.).
294. Id. at 442. The argument could be made that Stevens' phrase is a good description of Indian
country, and therefore under his formulation the tribes should have zoning authority throughout their
territories.
295. Id. at 441.
296. See id. at 414. "In my view, the fact that a very small proportion of the closed area is owned
in fee does not deprive the Tribe of the right to ensure that this area maintains its unadulterated
character." Id.
297. Id. at 446.
298. See id. at 447.
299. See id. at 448.
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retained its inherent powers to zone non-Indian fee lands where the allotment
program had not been widespread but had lost its powers to zone non-Indian
fee lands where the allotment program had been particularly devastating.
The general authority of the county to zone in the open area, however, did
not end the Court's inquiry. Instead, the Court turned to Montana, which had
recognized the right of Indian tribes to regulate the activities of non-Indians
on non-Indian land where those activities would threaten or have some
"direct effect" on tribal sovereign interests.300  Nothing has a more direct
effect on a tribe's political integrity, economic security, or health and
welfare, the Yakima argued, than the use of the land. 3 1' Land use planning
through zoning is a fundamental method for regulating activities that may
have detrimental effects on the sovereign.30 2
Justice White, in response, blithely rewrote the Montana direct effects test
in two significant ways, all the while maintaining his fidelity to the Court's
previous decision. First, he noted that Montana said a tribe "may" retain
authority to regulate non-Indians where effects on tribal health and welfare
will result.0 3  This one word, Justice White concluded, meant that tribal
authority does not extend to all conduct that threatens or even adversely
affects tribal health and welfare. 314  Instead, the impact of the non-Indian
activity on non-Indian land "must be demonstrably serious and must imperil
the political integrity, the economic security or the health and welfare of the
tribe. 305  Only then will tribal interests prevail.30 6  In this case, however,
the district court had found that the proposed development in the open area
did not have any direct effect on the Yakima Nation, and therefore White
summarily concluded that the proposed development would "not imperil any
interest of the Yakima Nation. 30 7
300. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66.
301. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 428 (White, J.), 458 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
302. Id. at 433 (Stevens, J.).
303. Id. at 428.
304. Id. at 429.
305. Id. at 431.
306. Even then, White would not have tribal interests prevail automatically. Instead, White would
require the tribe to appear before the county zoning authority to argue the direct effects on the tribe. Id.
If the county failed to recognize the tribal interests, the tribe could then sue in federal court. Id. at 432.
As Justice Blackmun noted in his dissent, the Court divested the tribe of its sovereign right to control land
use and substituted "the opportunity to engage in protracted litigation over every proposed land use that
conflicts with tribal interests .. " Id. at 460.
307. Id. at 432. The Yakima Nation, of course, disagreed, because it had prohibited the development
which the Court found would have no effect on the Nation's interests. As Professor Singer notes:
"Assuming that the Yakima Nation prohibited the development for a reason, we can only conclude that
the interests of American Indians are simply not recognized as real." Singer, supra note 10, at 38.
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In dissent, Justice Blackmun was appalled. The word "may" in the
Montana direct effect test, he argued, was not intended to limit the applica-
tion of that test, but resulted merely from the fact that the discussion of the
Montana exceptions was dicta to the holdings of that case.308 Nonetheless,
Blackmun himself may have limited the reach of Montana's direct effects
test. He would have held that tribes retain the right to regulate non-Indians
on fee lands only when the non-Indian conduct directly affects a "significant"
tribal interest.0 9 Blackmun, however, strenuously argued that zoning, the
power to control land use, definitely and directly affects significant tribal
sovereign interests."'
The second important way in which Justice White reworked the direct
effects test is more subtle. In Montana, the question was whether the tribe
could control hunting and fishing on non-Indian fee lands because of the
effect of those activities on tribal sovereign interests.3 ' In Brendale, the
issue should have been whether the tribe could zone non-Indian fee lands
because of the effects of checkerboard zoning on tribal sovereign interests.
But only Justice Blackmun took that global view of the issue under the direct
effects analysis. In his view, the question was whether zoning of non-Indian
fee lands would significantly affect tribal interests.312 Justice White, by
contrast, trivialized the tribal concerns. Under his approach, the question was
whether a particular proposed use of a particular non-Indian parcel would
imperil tribal sovereignty." 3 If White's view prevails, then the burden on
tribes to show direct effects has increased greatly. It is a far more difficult
matter to show that the development of 20 single-family homes3"4 substan-
tially impacts tribal sovereignty than it is to show that the tribe's inability to
engage in comprehensive land use planning of its territory substantially
impacts its sovereign rights.
The decision in Brendale thus has the potential to seriously disrupt tribal
territorial sovereignty. Based on the allotment legacy of non-Indian fee
lands, the Court gave the state unprecedented authority over "open" Indian
country, constrained only by a watered-down direct effects test. The only
glimmer of optimism for the tribes comes from the schizophrenia created by
308. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 459 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
309. Id. at 457. Blackmun may have been using "significant" as a shorthand for "political integrity,
economic security, or the health and welfare" interests identified in Montana, 450 U.S. at 566.
Nonetheless, the "significant" language appears nowhere in the Montana formulation and would
potentially have provided an argument for states looking to regulate fee lands in Indian country.
310. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 458.
311. 450 U.S. at 547.
312. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 450 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
313. See id. at 428-31.
314. This was the fee owner's proposed use of his land in the open area. Id. at 418 (White, J.).
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Justice Stevens. Where a tribal territory, or a portion of a tribal territory, did
not suffer greatly from the legacy of allotment, it retains its essential Indian
character.3"5 And when the essential Indian character of the area remains,
so too does the tribe's inherent sovereign authority to regulate throughout the
area."' In those "closed" areas or reservations, the direct effects test of
Montana is irrelevant; in closed areas, tribes are not forced to meet some
standard of sufficient interests but retain their original sovereign rights to
regulate. For closed areas, then, Justice Stevens restored tribal territorial
sovereignty.
Nonetheless, given the plethora of opinions in Brendale and the lack of a
majority opinion, its effects were uncertain. Then, in 1993, the Court
decided South Dakota v. Bourland.317 Justice Thomas, in his first foray
into Indian law jurisprudence, 318 removed any lingering doubts about the
Court's approach to tribal territorial sovereignty. Writing for a majority,319
Thomas rejected both inherent and treaty-recognized tribal authority to regu-
late. Thomas disposed of inherent tribal regulatory authority in a footnote:
after Montana, he wrote, "the reality" is that "tribal sovereignty over
nonmembers 'cannot survive without express congressional delegation,' and
is therefore not inherent."320  That statement, however, is simply not true.
Under Montana and Brendale, tribes retain full inherent regulatory authority
in closed areas, as well as inherent regulatory authority in open areas where
the non-Indian conduct sufficiently impacts tribal interests. That authority is
315. See id. at 422-25. Justice Blackmun points out that this approach is racist and stereotypical,
viewing Indians as some quaint holdover from the nineteenth century. 492 U.S. at 464-65; see generally
ROBERT F. BERKHOFER, JR., WHITE MAN'S INDIAN: IMAGES OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN FROM COLUMBUS
TO THE PRESENT (1978). While that certainly seems an accurate reading of Justice Stevens' opinion,
Stevens nonetheless offered some tribes a way around state intrusion into tribal territorial jurisdiction.
316. Id.
317. 113 S. Ct. 2309 (1993). For discussions of Bourland, see Veronica L. Bowen, The Extent of
Indian Regulatory Authority Over Non-Indians: South Dakota v. Bourland, 27 CREIGHTON L. REV. 605
(1994); John H. McClanahan, Note, Indian Law-Tribal Sovereignt-Congress, Please Help Again-The
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe Cannot Regulate Hunting and Fishing Because the Non-Indian Interest
Controls. South Dakota v. Bourland, 29 LAND & WATER L. REv. 505 (1994).
318. Bourland was the first Indian law case decided by the Court after Thomas was confirmed. While
no one expected Justice Thomas to take the philosophical place of Justice Marshall, whom he replaced
on the Court, Thomas' authorship of the majority decision in Bourland seems to pile insult on top of
injury.
319. The Bourland decision was 7-2, with Justices Blackmun and Souter dissenting.
320. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2320 n.15 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 564). What the Court actually
said in Montana was that the "exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-
government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so
cannot survive without express congressional delegation." Montana, 450 U.S. at 564. The Montana
decision at no point equated "unnecessary" tribal power with tribal authority over nonmembers. The
Bourland Court's reading of Montana was vigorously disputed by Justice Blackmun in his dissent. 113
S. Ct. at 2321-23 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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not delegated; it is inherent.32" ' At most, then, the Court's statement in the
Bourland footnote applies only to inherent tribal authority to regulate the
conduct of non-Indians on fee land when that conduct is not encompassed
within either of the Montana exceptions.
Justice Thomas also refused to find any treaty-protected sovereign right to
regulate non-Indian lands. As to treaty-recognized rights, Thomas stated that:
"Montana and Brendale establish that when an Indian tribe conveys
ownership of its tribal lands to non-Indians, it loses any former right of
absolute and exclusive use and occupation of the conveyed lands. ' 322  In
so holding, the Court created a bright-line rule that the loss of title means the
loss of sovereign authority to regulate.
The Court's statement was particularly disturbing because of the context
of the fee lands at issue in Bourland. The lands at issue were not former
allotments or surplus lands from the allotment years but rather lands within
the boundaries of the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation that were taken by
the United States in 1954 for the Oahe Dam and Reservoir project.323 The
purpose of the project was flood control, not the break-up of the reservation
and the eradication of the Tribe.324  Nonetheless, without discussion of the
purposes of the congressional legislation that took the lands, the Court simply
and destructively equated the loss of title with the loss of sovereign authority,
whether or not that might actually have been Congress's intent.325 In that,
321. Moreover, the Court has consistently affirmed tribal civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over non-
Indian defendants. See, e.g., National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845
(1985) (discussed infra at note 382). Again, that authority is inherent, not delegated.
322. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2316. The Tribe, of course, did not "convey" ownership to non-Indians
in the sense of a voluntary and consensual transfer of ownership. While the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe
did agree to convey its land to the federal government, it did so after Congress had authorized the taking
of the Tribe's lands. Id. at 2313. "Consenting" to action which the federal government intends to take
in any case, perhaps for the purpose of receiving a better price or other concessions, hardly constitutes
the sort of casual transfer of land ownership that Thomas' language implies. See Singer, supra note 10,
at 22 (noting a similar problem with the Court's language in Brendale).
323. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2313-14, The Flood Control Act of 1944, ch. 665, 58 Stat. 887,
authorized comprehensive flood control along the Missouri River. Congress subsequently enacted a series
of acts taking Indian lands for those purposes. One of those acts was the Cheyenne River Act of Sept.
3, 1954, 68 Stat. 1191, which took 104,420 acres of trust lands from the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe.
The federal government also took some 18,000 acres that were owned in fee by non-Indians, although
"[t]he record does not reflect how these lands had come to be owned by non-Indians." 113 S. Ct. at 2314
n.3. The Court noted that the status of the government's title in the taken lands was not entirely clear,
but that the Court would assume the United States owned the taken trust lands in fee. Id. at 2314 n.4.
324. See Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2323 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
325. See id. at 2318. In Montana and Brendale, the Court relied on Congress's intent in the General
Allotment Act of terminating tribal governments. While the intent of Congress in the Indian
Reorganization Act would have been more pertinent, the Court at least engaged in a determination of
congressional intent based on the specific act that caused the loss of Indian title. In Bourland, the Court
does not bother. In fact, the Court stated that: "To focus on purpose is to misread Montana." 113 S. Ct.
at 2318. The Court then quotes Montana for the proposition that "'what is relevant ... is the effect of
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the Court's approach mirrors the Ninth Circuit's approach in the tax case of
Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom County.3 26  In Whatcom County, the court
relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in County of Yakima v. Yakima
Indian Nation, which held that the General Allotment Act authorized state
property taxation of allotments once fee patents were issued.3 27  The court
of appeals in Whatcom County applied that holding wholesale to fee land
originally allotted pursuant to a treaty, not the General Allotment Act, and
it did so without analysis of the treaty to determine whether the same
outcome should be reached.3 2' That is precisely what the Court in
Bourland did: it applied the analysis of Montana and Brendale, which was
based on the General Allotment Act, wholesale to a situation involving
entirely different statutes, without ever analyzing those statutes to determine
whether the same outcome should apply.3 29  The legacy of allotment has
thus spread like kudzu beyond fee lands that directly resulted from the
allotment policy, to reach all lands wrested from Indian ownership.
One ray of hope that emerges from Bourland is the Court's apparent
adoption of Justice Stevens' Brendale approach to closed areas.33 ° In
Bourland, the Court held that the abrogation of absolute and exclusive use
and occupation of the territory due to the loss of title, "at least in the context
of the type of area at issue in this case, implies the loss of regulatory
jurisdiction over the use of the land by others." '331 The italicized phrase
was footnoted, and in that footnote the Court stated that the federally-owned
the land alienation occasioned by that policy on Indian treaty rights tied to Indian use and occupation
of reservation land."' Id (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 560 n.9) (emphasis in Bourland). Apparently
in that quoted language, the Bourland Court missed the phrase "occasioned by that policy," meaning the
allotment policy. It was the effect on title of the allotment policy that was crucial to the Court's decisions
in Montana and Brendale, not merely the loss of title in a vacuum. For an incisive critique of this aspect
of the Bourland decision, see Aviam Soifer, Objects in Mirror Are Closer Than They Appear, 28 GA. L.
REv. 533, 548-49 (1994).
326. 5 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2727 (1994), discussed supra at text
accompanying notes 136-41.
327. Id (citing County of Yakima, 502 U.S. 251, 262-63 (1992)), discussed supra part III.
328. See 5 F.3d at 1357.
329. The Court did undertake an analysis of the Flood Control Act and the Cheyenne River Act for
other purposes. The Court determined that the Flood Control Act broadly opened taken lands to the
general public. It also determined that although the Cheyenne River Act reserved certain rights to the
Tribe, it nonetheless did not regrant to the Tribe the regulatory authority which the Tribe possessed under
its treaty and which it lost when the lands passed out of Indian ownership pursuant to the Act. 113 S.
Ct. at 2317. These aspects of Bourland are discussed in McClanahan, supra note 317.
330. As noted in connection with the discussion of Brendale, Justice Stevens' open-versus-closed
distinction is ultimately corrupt, based on some James Fennimore Cooper vision of "Indian" character.
See supra note 315. Nonetheless, Stevens' approach does preserve territorial sovereignty for those tribes
with reservations or areas of reservations that qualify as "closed."
331. 113 S. Ct. at 2316 (emphasis added).
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fee lands constituted an "open" area of the Cheyenne River Reservation
under the Brendale open-versus-closed analysis.332
As discussed earlier, Justice Stevens found in Brendale that as to closed
areas, tribes retain full territorial sovereignty to regulate all lands within the
area, including those owned in fee by non-Indians.333 And as to closed
areas, Stevens' opinion in Brendale represented the opinion of the Court.
Nonetheless, only one other justice joined Stevens' opinion in Brendale. In
Bourland, by contrast, the open-versus-closed dichotomy was adopted by a
majority of the justices. Or, at least, a majority adopted the Brendale
approach to open areas, which should imply that it also adopted the Stevens'
approach to closed areas. 334  Assuming that is the case, 335 the Bourland
decision offers a significant measure of territorial sovereignty for those tribes
with closed areas or closed reservations.
Nonetheless, as in Brendale, the Court gave short shrift to the tribe's
regulatory concerns in the open area.336 It noted that as to open areas, the
Montana consensual relations and direct effects tests apply: that is, the tribe
retains its sovereign rights to regulate in open areas if the non-Indians entered
into consensual relationships with the tribe or if the activities adversely affect
the tribe's sovereign interests. 337  The district court had found that neither
332. Id. at n.9. Footnote 9 reads in its entirety:
The District Court found that the taken area is not a "closed" or pristine area, and the Court
of Appeals did not disturb that finding. 949 F.2d, [sic] at 995. We agree that the area at issue
here has been broadly opened to the public. Thus, we need not reach the issue of a tribe's
regulatory authority in other contexts.
333. See supra text accompanying notes 292-98.
334. See Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2312, 2316.
335. The assumption may not hold. The Court did state that it was not determining the extent of a
"tribe's regulatory authority in other contexts." 113 S. Ct. at 2316 n.9. Given the Court's hostility to
tribal territorial sovereignty, that phrase is ominous.
336. One commentator disagreed. "The argument that the Bourland decision does not adequately
protect tribal interests is not well taken. . . . Requiring the tribe to rebut a presumption against tribal
authority in the first instance is eminently reasonable in view of the disadvantageous position non-Indians
occupy in relation to tribal government." Bowen, supra note 317, at 65 1. That statement is a remarkable
example of the non-Indian appropriation of Indian harm. See Ball, supra note 5, at 5 ("Non-Indians grab
even the Indian injury for themselves."). It also represents the ostensibly reasonable, but in fact
destructive, view that tribal sovereignty exists only up to the point where it meets non-Indian interests.
At that point, the Indian interests must of course give way to the non-Indian interests. Far from being
"reasonable," that approach in essence gives "no weight at all" to the tribal interests at stake because those
interests exist only if no competing non-Indian interests are present. See Singer, supra note 10, at 37
(referring to Justice White's opinion in Brendale).
337. 113 S. Ct. at 2320. As to the direct effects test, the Court simply quoted Montana, without the
reinterpretation engaged in by Justice White in Brendale. See supra text accompanying notes 303-307.
This may indicate a return to the test as originally formulated by the Court. On remand, the Eighth
Circuit avoided the issue by finding that the Tribe did not have regulatory authority even under the less
stringent Montana standard. South Dakota v. Bourland, 39 F.3d 868, 871-72 (8th Cir. 1994) (Heany, J.,
dissenting).
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exception applied, and the court of appeals for the most part had not
disturbed those findings.338 The Bourland Court thus left the issue of the
Montana exceptions to be resolved on remand, but with the clear impression
that it expects neither exception to apply.
The Court's decision in Bourland thus advances the legacy of allotment
traceable back to Oliphant and flowering in Montana and Brendale. With
each succeeding decision, the Court becomes more adamant about furthering
the allotment policy and less amenable to protecting, or even perceiving,
tribal interests. The Court has now declared that tribes possess no inherent
sovereignty over lands lost to non-Indians under the allotment program or
even by other means. Similarly, the Court believes that mere non-Indian title
to lands in Indian country automatically abrogates treaty rights to territorial
regulatory authority. The Court has focused not on the territory of the tribe,
but on the titles within the territory, to determine the extent of tribal
jurisdiction.339
For the most part, the Court's reasoning has been based on the ultimate
aims of the General Allotment Act. The Court has uniformly and stubbornly
refused to consider any other factor surrounding the allotment program. It
has refused to consider the historical fact that even the sponsors of the
General Allotment Act did not intend the immediate dissolution of the
reservations but foresaw an ongoing and gradual process.34 ° At no time did
Congress intend that the sale of fee patented land to non-Indians would result
in the immediate destruction of tribal authority. Clear evidence of that is
found in the statutory definition of Indian country as including all land within
reservation borders, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent. 34' More-
over, in the reservation disestablishment cases, the Court has consistently
noted that the mere sale of parcels within the tribal territory to non-Indians
338. 113 S. Ct. at 2320. The court of appeals remanded for a reanalysis of the Montana exceptions
with regard to the 18,000 acres that had once been fee land, but "it did not pass upon the District Court's
previous findings regarding the taken area as a whole." As this article went to press, the Eighth Circuit
handed down its opinion on remand. Bourland, 39 F.3d 868 (8th Cir. 1994). It affirmed the district
court's findings that non-Indian hunting and fishing on the taken lands did not meet the Montana direct
effects test. Although the non-Indian hunting interfered with tribal cattle grazing and reduced the number
of deer available to tribal members, the non-Indian conduct was merely "vexatious" and did not amount
to a direct effect on tribal interests. Id. at 870. The dissenting judge contended that the district court's
findings were based on whether the non-Indian hunting constituted a threat to tribal interests and ignored
the "direct effects" alternative of the Montana Court. Id. at 871 (Heany, J., dissenting). The dissenting
judge would have held that the grazing interference and the reduced number of deer, viewed in the context
of decades of tribal regulation of non-Indian hunting and fishing on the reservation, were direct effects
on tribal interests sufficient to satisfy the Montana exception. Id. at 872.
339. Dussias, supra note 273, at 72; see generally Singer, supra note 10.
340. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
341. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (1988).
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does not remove those lands from tribal jurisdiction.342 For the Court,
however, those factors are irrelevant; Congress in 1887 intended the ultimate
dissolution of the tribes and the Court will carry out that intent regardless.
An additional factor which the Court has failed to consider is the Indian
Reorganization Act ("IRA") of 1934. 34' Tribes and dissenting justices have
repeatedly urged the Court to look not to the long-term intent of the 1887
Congress, but to the intent of the 1934 Congress. There is simply no
question that Congress repudiated the allotment policy in the IRA and that
it did so because of the destruction wrought by allotment and related
activities. 44 The fact that it did not restore to tribal ownership lands that
had passed into non-Indian hands is irrelevant to its intent to terminate the
allotment policy. But the Court consistently has refused to consider the
purposes and intent of the IRA in dealing with the present effects of the
allotment years. Instead, the Court has fixated on the General Allotment Act
as the only relevant factor in determining tribal sovereign authority over
Indian country a full century and more later.
Similarly, the Court has refused to accord any weight to modem federal
Indian policy. For the last 25 years or more, congressional and executive
policy has pursued tribal self-determination and governmental authority over
the Indian country. And yet the Court treats this fact as cavalierly as it does
congressional policy reflected in the IRA. No expression of congressional
intent to promote tribal government is apparently sufficient, in the Court's
view, to overcome the failed, destructive intent of the General Allotment Act.
The peculiarity in all this, however, is the Court's apparent approach to
tribal governmental authority in closed areas or closed reservations. The
Court seems to have adopted Justice Stevens' open-versus-closed approach
to tribal territories. Where an area is open, the tribe is now divested of
authority over non-Indian fee lands unless it can meet one of the Montana
exceptions, and the Court has little sympathy with tribal claims of impacts
on sovereign interests. But where an area is closed, the tribe retains full
authority345 to regulate throughout the closed area, regardless of land
tenure.346 That corner of territorial sovereignty is preserved to the tribes.
342. See generally supra part IV. For that to occur, the Court still insists on a finding that Congress
intended to sever the entire area that it then opened to non-Indian ownership.
343. Ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1988)).
344. See supra part II.B.
345. Whether inherent or treaty-protected or both. Justice Stevens' opinion in Brendale indicates that
he believed both were the source of tribal sovereign authority in closed areas. 492 U.S. at 435.
346. As already noted, I am nervous about making that claim. Given the present Court's extreme




What is needed now is what the Court will not do: extend that recognition
of tribal sovereign rights to the full extent of the Indian country.
VI. "SHALL WE PERSIST IN A POLICY THAT HAS FAILED'?"
In 1885, at the dawn of the allotment era, former Commissioner of Indian
Affairs George Manypenny wrote of his disillusionment with the allotment
program.347 As Commissioner, Manypenny had negotiated a number of
treaties with western tribes to make way for the organization of the Kansas
and Nebraska territories. For the most part, those treaties called for the
Indian lands to be allotted in severalty, provisions which Manypenny
believed at the time to be "wise and judicious.""34 By 1885, Manypenny's
reaction to allotment was quite different:
When I made those treaties I was confident that good results would
follow. Had I not so believed I would not have been a party to the
transactions. Events following the execution of these treaties proved that
I had committed a grave error. I had provided for the abrogation of the
reservations, the dissolution of the tribal relation, and for lands in
severalty and citizenship; thus making the road clear for the rapacity of
the white man. I had broken down every barrier. I had committed a
grevious [sic] mistake, and entailed on the Indians a legacy of cruel
wrong and injury. Had I known then, as I now know, what would result
from those treaties, I would be compelled to admit that I had committed
a high crime.349
Manypenny's wisdom was, unfortunately, lost on Congress. Within two
years of Manypenny's article of contrition, Congress enacted the General
Allotment Act, clearing the way for widespread application of the program
that Manypenny decried. For nearly fifty years thereafter, tribes were
subjected to the "cruel wrong and injury" of the allotment policy. Although
allotment ceased in 1934 with official congressional repudiation of the policy
and program, its legacy lingers on in the Supreme Court. With decisions in
such diverse areas as taxation, reservation disestablishment, and regulation
of fee lands, the Court continues to give effect to the purposes of a long-dead
policy.
347. George W. Manypenny, Shall We Persist in a Policy That Has Failed?, II COUNCIL FIRE 153
(Nov. 1885), reprinted in WASHBURN, supra note 30, at 61-67.
348. WASHBURN, supra note 30, at 66.
349. Id. at 67.
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The political tenor of our times is no longer much amenable to arguments
that the present effects of past policies must be corrected by the legal system.
And yet that is the only approach that will work for the Indian tribes. Unless
the Court is willing to act affirmatively to halt the devastating present effects
of allotment,3 5° or Congress is willing to step in, tribal territorial sovereign-
ty is in danger of becoming a curio in the history of the Republic.
If the Court were willing to repudiate the policy of allotment, it has the
tools to do so. In none of the cases critiqued in this article was the outcome
foreclosed by treaty, by federal statute, or by precedent. Instead, in each of
the cases, the Court had one or more avenues available to reach conclusions
protective of tribal territorial sovereignty: the canons of construction, the
repudiation of allotment in the Indian Reorganization Act, and the current
federal Indian policy of tribal self-determination.
A careful application of the Indian law canons of construction would go
far towards mitigating the persistent effects of the allotment policy. First, the
General Allotment Act itself should be interpreted according to the canons.
Either the Act should be viewed in its historical context as legislation enacted
for the benefit of Indians35' and therefore interpreted liberally in favor of
the tribes, or the Act should be viewed in its post-1934 context as legislation
abrogating Indian rights and therefore interpreted narrowly to limit those
rights only where Congress was unmistakably clear. The results should be
identical either way. The Act would not, for example, authorize state
property taxes on fee-patented lands owned by Indians unless Congress said
so, and Congress did not. Similarly, the Act would not strip tribes of
sovereign rights over fee-patented lands sold to non-Indians unless Congress
clearly mandated that result in the Act, and it did not. Finally, legislation
implementing the Act would not divest reservations of homesteaded land
unless Congress and the tribes had intended an outright cession of reservation
lands, and few of the surplus lands acts evidence that plain intent.352 Had
the Court chosen to interpret the Dawes Act and its implementing legislation
liberally in favor of the tribes and to resolve all ambiguities in favor of the
tribes, the Court could have reached results consistent with both the statutes
and the preservation of tribal territorial sovereignty. However naive it may
350. The Court cannot undo allotment, but it can ameliorate its present effects. As Professor Singer
has stated:
Although it may in fact be too late to undo some past injustices, it is not too late to adjust the
legal consequences of those past events where such adjustments are warranted. Adjustment
may be appropriate where the failure to re-evaluate the significance of past events works to
perpetuate a continuing injustice.
Singer, supra note 10, at 14.
351. In the 1887 view of things. See supra note 122.
352. See supra part IV.
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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be to expect the present Court to engage in conscientious application of the
canons of construction, that interpretative approach is clearly available to the
Court.
In addition to the canons, the Court could also employ an interpretation of
the General Allotment Act and its implementing legislation that takes into
account the repudiation of the allotment policy in the 1934 Indian Reorgani-
zation Act ("IRA").353 In the IRA, Congress recognized the devastation
wrought by allotment, halted further allotments and surplus lands acts,
extended trust periods on existing trust allotments, authorized the addition of
lands to reservations, and promoted the "reorganization" of tribal govern-
ments. Congress, in simple terms, terminated the allotment policy. Given
the express terms of the IRA, the modern Court could choose to interpret the
present effects of the allotment policy not in light of the intent of the 1887
Congress, but in light of the intent of the IRA.
If the purposes of the IRA become the context, then the important factors
are the preservation of the land base and the perpetuation of tribal self-
government. When the General Allotment Act, its implementing legislation,
and its present effects are viewed against those purposes, the outcomes of the
allotment-based cases should be radically different. State taxation of Indian-
owned former allotments interferes with the tribe's ability to govern its
members within its territory, and therefore obstructs the IRA purpose of
promoting tribal government. The surplus lands acts are in direct opposition
to the purposes of the IRA regarding the preservation, consolidation, and
expansion of tribal territory, and therefore should be interpreted to diminish
reservations only when they clearly implement an agreement ceding a tract
outright to the federal government. Finally, divesting tribes of regulatory
jurisdiction over nonmember fee lands contravenes both the IRA goal of
tribal self-government and the principle of territorial integrity.
Time after time, however, the Court has flatly refused to consider the IRA
and its purposes in deciding allotment-based cases. Justice Scalia has
dismissed the importance of the IRA in this context, stating that "Congress
made no attempt to undo the dramatic effects of the allotment years on the
ownership of former Indian lands." '54  While it is true that Congress did
not, in the IRA, restore to tribal ownership lands then owned in fee by non-
Indians, the purposes and intent of the IRA clearly support tribal territorial
sovereignty. But the Court is using that one aspect of the IRA to find that
it need not consider any other aspect of the Act-in particular, the intent of
353. Ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1988)).
354. County of Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 255 (1992).
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the Congress that enacted it-in looking at the present effects of allotment-
era legislation.
Moreover, the Court takes the same approach to a consideration of modem
federal Indian policy. For 25 years, presidents have pledged to protect and
promote tribal self-determination, and for the past decade that pledge has
included a specific recognition of the "government-to-government" relation-
ship between the federal government and the Indian tribes.355 Congress has
concurred, consistently enacting legislation over the past two decades that
recognizes tribal self-government and control over tribal territory.356 But
as with the policies of the IRA, the modem policies of Congress and the
Executive are apparently irrelevant in the Court's eyes. Nowhere in its
allotment-derived cases does the Court recognize the "ongoing relation-
ship" '357 between Congress and the tribes or the importance of that relation-
ship. Indeed, the Court seems to have no compunction about interfering with
that relationship by implementing the allotment policy rather than the current
policy of tribal self-determination. If Congress is indeed the branch
responsible for federal Indian policy, as the Court repeatedly states, then the
Court should be supporting rather than undermining congressional attempts
to ameliorate the effects of the allotment era.35
It is important to bear in mind that the Court's practice of ignoring current
federal Indian policy, the intent of the IRA, and the canons of construction
is in fact a choice by the Court. When it chooses, the Court has in the past
proved willing to interpret assimilationist legislation in light of the canons of
construction and subsequent contrary federal policy toward the tribes. The
clearest illustration of the Court's choice not to effectuate the present effects
of past assimilationist policy arises in cases decided as the termination era
was drawing to a close.
The most prominent example is Bryan v. Itasca County, in which the
Court refused to find that Public Law 280 had authorized state taxation of
Indians within the Indian country.359 Public Law 280 was the centerpiece
legislation of the termination era, mandating state criminal and civil
jurisdiction over Indians in some states and authorizing all other states
355. See supra text accompanying notes 97-103.
356. See supra part II.C.
357. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 388 n.14 (1976).
358. As Professor Clinton has noted in the context of termination era legislation: "There is little
reason why a democratic society should feel bound by a much older pronouncement from a Congress in
session during a long ago abandoned federal policy, when recently Congress has fundamentally altered
its approach in ways that clearly impact on, but do not directly repeal or alter, the earlier Congressional
judgment." Clinton, supra note 156, at 43.
359. 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
[Ariz. St. L.J.
27:1] LEGACY OF ALLOTMENT
unilaterally to assume that jurisdiction. 360  The civil jurisdiction section of
Public Law 280 provided that state civil laws of general application would
apply to Indians within the Indian country, 36' and on that basis Minnesota
asserted the right to tax an Indian's personal property located on the
362reservation.
The Supreme Court rejected the state's claim. It noted that because the
purpose of Public Law 280 was primarily to ensure adequate law enforce-
ment, any congressional intent to permit broad state civil authority in the
Indian country was at best ambiguous. 363 Applying the canons of construc-
tion,364 therefore, the Court found that Public Law 280 did not manifest
clear congressional intent to permit state taxation of Indians.365 Moreover,
the Court noted that its reading of Public Law 280 was consistent with the
later-enacted Indian Civil Rights Act 36 6 and with the shift in federal Indian
360. Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1988)(crimi-
nal) and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1988) (civil)). As part of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Public Law
280 was amended to require tribal consent to state jurisdiction. See 25 U.S.C. § 1326 (1988). No tribe
has since consented.
361. Pub. L. No. 83-280, § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a), provided that:
Each of the States listed ... shall have jurisdiction over civil causes of action between
Indians or to which Indians are parties which arise in the areas of Indian country listed ... to
the same extent that such State ... has jurisdiction over other civil causes of action, and those
civil laws of such State that are of general application to private persons or private property
shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country as they have elsewhere within
the State ...
362. Bryan, 426 U.S. at 373.
363. The Court relied primarily on the lack of legislative history concerning the civil jurisdiction
provision and on the fact that Congress knew, as the contemporaneous termination acts proved, how to
authorize state jurisdiction when it intended to. Id. at 383-85.
The Court also rejected the finding of the Minnesota Supreme Court that § 4(a) authorized state
taxation based on the "negative implication" of § 4(b). Id. at 378-79. Section 4(b) proscribed state
taxation of any trust property. The state court had reasoned that there was no need for that language
unless the grant of civil jurisdiction in § 4(a) generally authorized state taxation. The Supreme Court
found that approach "foreclosed" by the legislative history of Public Law 280 and the canons of
construction. Id. at 379. But see Frickey, supra note 15, at 430-31 (contending that neither the legislative
history nor the canons of construction were the true basis of the Court's decision).
364. Bryan, 426 U.S. at 392-93.
365. Instead, the Court found that the civil section of Public Law 280 authorized only the jurisdiction
of the state courts over civil causes of action arising in the Indian country. Id. at 385. The language about
the application of state civil laws, the Court held, was intended to provide for the application of state court
rules of decision. Id. at 383-84. Consequently, Bryan stands for the proposition that Public Law 280 did
not authorize any state regulatory jurisdiction over Indians within the Indian country. See California v.
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 208 (1987).
366. Bryan, 426 U.S, at 386. The Court noted that the Indian Civil Rights Act had repealed part of
Public Law 280 and instituted a requirement of tribal consent to state jurisdiction. Thus, even though the
ICRA did not undo existing Public Law 280 jurisdiction, the Court was willing to take account of its
general repeal of the intent of Public Law 280. In the allotment-derived cases, by contrast, the Court has
not proved willing to take account of the Indian Reorganization Act's general repeal of the intent of the
General Allotment Act. The Court, rather, continues to focus on a factor apparently irrelevant to the
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policy away from assimilation and toward the preservation of tribal self-
government.367 The Court was thus willing, in order to protect tribal
sovereign rights,368 to construe assimilationist legislation in light of later
congressional action369 and subsequent policy changes.37°
Other end-of-the-termination-era decisions reflect a similar concern to
interpret assimilationist legislation so as not to saddle the tribes with the
continuing effects of an outmoded policy. In Menominee Tribe of Indians v.
United States, for example, the Court held that the Menominee Termination
Act did not abrogate the Tribe's treaty rights to hunt and fish free of state
control on the then-former Wolf River Reservation.37' The Court insisted
upon reading the Termination Act "in pari materia with" Public Law 280,
which expressly preserved tribes' treaty rights to hunt and fish. 37" Because
Public Law 280 was amended in a way that included the Menominee Tribe
during the years that a termination plan was being developed 373 and,
Court in Bryan: the fact that the later legislation did not entirely reverse the effects of the earlier
assimilationist act.
367. See Bryan, 426 U.S. at 387.
368. Professor Frickey notes that in Bryan, as in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832),
the Court "assumed a baseline of ongoing tribal sovereignty that should be judicially protected against
all but clear congressional intrusion." Frickey, supra note 15, at 432.
369. The Court stated that:
It is true, of course, that the primary interpretation of § 4 must have reference to the legislative
history of the Congress that enacted it rather than to the history of Acts of a later Congress.
Nevertheless, [the two acts are "intimately related"] ... and we previously have construed the
effect of legislation affecting reservation Indians in light of "intervening" legislative
enactments.
Bryan, 426 U.S. at 386. The General Allotment Act and its repudiation by the IRA are certainly as
"intimately related" as Public Law 280 and its partial repeal by the Indian Civil Rights Act. Under the
reasoning of Bryan, there is no reason why the Court could not construe the Dawes Act in light of the
intent and purposes of the IRA.
370. In a footnote, the Court quoted Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655, 663
(9th Cir. 1975), with approval:
Present federal policy appears to be returning to a focus upon strengthening tribal self-
government, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has expressed the view that courts
"are not obliged in ambiguous circumstances to strain to implement [an assimilationist] policy
Congress has now rejected, particularly where to do so will interfere with the present
congressional approach to what is, after all, an ongoing relationship."
Bryan, 426 U.S. at 388-89 n.14 (citations omitted). In its interpretation of the allotment-based cases,
however, the Court is doing exactly what it condemned in Bryan: straining to implement a repudiated
assimilationist policy even though that interferes with the present congressional approach.
371. 391 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1968).
372. Id. at 411.
373. See id. at 410-11. The Menominee Termination Act was enacted in 1954, but was not put into
effect until 1961. Public Law 280 was originally enacted in 1953 and, at that time, exempted the
Menominee from the grant of jurisdiction to the State of Wisconsin. Public Law 280 was amended,
however, two months after the Termination Act to include "all Indian country" in Wisconsin. Because
the Menominee Reservation had not yet been terminated, it was still "Indian country" and therefore
covered by the amended grant.
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therefore, the Menominee usufructuary rights were preserved after enactment
of the Termination Act, the Court held that those treaty rights survived the
termination of the Tribe from federal supervision.374 If Congress intended
its assimilationist legislation to deprive tribes of protected rights, it needed
to make its intent clear. The Court "decline[d] to construe the Termination
Act as a backhanded way of abrogating" those rights.
375
Similarly, in the first of the reservation disestablishment cases in 1962, the
Court refused to find a congressional intent to diminish in a surplus lands act
that did not expressly terminate the lands from the reservation. 376 The
Court contrasted the language opening the reservation to the language of
other surplus land acts explicitly vacating Indian country and returning it to
the public domain.377 Moreover, the Court interpreted the surplus lands act
in light of the subsequently enacted definition of Indian country. More than
four decades after the surplus lands act at issue, Congress statutorily defined
Indian country to include all lands within the exterior boundaries of a
reservation, "notwithstanding the issuance of any patent ... ,378 In light
of that later congressional enactment, the Court refused to find that the mere
purchase of homesteads within reservations would diminish those fee lands
from the tribal territorial boundaries. 37
9
The contrast between the Court's approach in the post-termination era
cases and in the post-allotment era cases is stark. In the former, the Court
required clear evidence of congressional intent to abrogate tribal rights,
construed statutes narrowly to limit or eliminate adverse effects on sovereign-
ty, and interpreted congressional intent in light of subsequent congressional
repudiation of the assimilationist policy that gave rise to the cases. In the
post-allotment era cases, by contrast, the Court has chosen not to give effect
to established canons of construction, to the congressional repudiation of
374. See id. at 411.
375. Id. at 412. Menominee Tribe is primarily remarkable for the Court's clear vision that
assimilationist statutes should be interpreted narrowly so as to preserve all tribal sovereign rights not
expressly abrogated by Congress.
376. Seymour v. Superintendent of Washington State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351 (1962) (discussed
supra text accompanying notes 147-49). While Seymour was interpreting allotment-era legislation rather
than termination-era legislation, it was decided when the destructive effects of the termination era were
forcing Congress and the public to reconsider a policy of assimilation. Perhaps as a result, the Court's
approach in Seymour is more consistent with its approach in cases such as Bryan and Menominee Tribe
than with its subsequent approach in the allotment-based cases. Compare Seymour, 368 U.S. 351 with
Bryan, 426 U.S. 388 and Menominee Tribe, 391 U.S. 404.
377. Seymour, 368 U.S. at 354-56.
378. Id. The surplus lands act at issue in Seymour was enacted in 1906. See id. at 354. The
definition of Indian country, 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a), was enacted in 1948. See Seymour, 368 U.S. at 357
n.15.
379. 368 U.S. at 357-58.
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assimilation, or to present federal Indian policy. Instead, the Court has
chosen to further the discredited and destructive policies of the allotment era.
The Court's reasons for its choice do not survive scrutiny. In most of the
allotment-based cases, the Court has ostensibly relied upon congressional
intent: the intent of the Congress that produced the General Allotment Act.
That begs the question, however, of why the Court is determined to follow
that assimilationist intent when it could choose, instead, to use the approach
that it followed in the termination-based cases. The Court's refusal to follow
its own lead in Bryan v. Itasca County38 and its insistence upon effectuat-
ing the allotment policy may thus be traced to a factor not present in the
termination-era cases. And that factor is the impact of non-Indian expecta-
tions.3"'
In the allotment-based cases, the Court has consistently invoked the
interests of non-Indian landowners in the Indian country.3" 2 Certainly, as
380. 426 U.S. 388 (1976).
381. That factor does not fully explain the Court's adherence to the legacy of allotment. The Court's
1992 decision in County of Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation, discussed supra in part III, for example, does
not appear to implicate any reliance interests of non-Indian property owners within the Yakima
Reservation to freedom from tribal authority.
382. The interests of non-Indians present in the Indian country for other purposes do not seem to
invoke the same protectionist instincts. The Court has long held, for example, that tribes may control the
conduct and activities of non-Indians who are present on Indian-owned lands within tribal territories. See
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 557 (1981) ("we can readily agree" with the lower court's
holding that tribes may prohibit non-Indian conduct on trust lands). The exception, of course, was
criminal jurisdiction. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (discussed supra at
text accompanying notes 233-41.) Similarly, the Court has also long upheld the authority of tribes over
non-Indians who enter the Indian country for the purpose of doing business with the tribes and their
members. See, e.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 159 (1982) (affirming the sovereign
right of tribes to tax non-Indian lessees). The Court's primary concern in the allotment-based cases has
been the interests of non-Indian landowners.
Perhaps for that reason, the Court has been remarkably protective of tribal sovereign interests in the
area of civil adjudicatory jurisdiction. In 1959, the Court determined that state court jurisdiction over a
civil cause of action arising in the Indian country against an Indian defendant would unduly infringe on
the sovereign rights of the tribe. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959). In the mid-1980s, the Court
refused to extend the principle of Oliphant to tribal jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants in civil
actions. National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 853-55 (1985). The
Court noted in a subsequent case that "[tiribal authority over the activities of non-Indians on reservation
lands is an important part of tribal sovereignty," and held, therefore, that tribes retain civil jurisdiction
over those activities "unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision or federal statute." Iowa
Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987). Non-Indian defendants in civil lawsuits who wished
to challenge tribal jurisdiction were directed first to the tribal court; only after exhausting their tribal
remedies could defendants seek review in federal court. National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856. If the
federal court upholds tribal court jurisdiction, it is "preclude[d]" from relitigating the case on the merits.
See Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 19.
The Court thus expressly recognized the inherent sovereign right of tribes to adjudicate civil causes
of action arising in their territories, even when the cause of action arose on non-Indian fee land. See
National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 847 (the cause of action arose on school grounds on land owned by the
state). Unlike criminal jurisdiction, civil adjudicatory jurisdiction was not implicitly divested because of
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a result of the allotment years, non-Indians are present in force in many tribal
territories. And as certainly, the non-Indians were invited into the Indian
country by the federal government: explicitly in the surplus lands acts and by
acquiescence, if nothing else, in the system of patenting allotments in fee.
The Court has often invoked the theory that this non-Indian presence,
originally under federal auspices, creates "justifiable expectations" which the
Court must strive to protect. 83
Whether non-Indians have any sort of vested right to be free of tribal
jurisdiction is doubtful at best. No treaty promises were made to non-Indian
settlers in the Indian country. At most, the federal government invited non-
Indians into the Indian country with the understanding that eventually the
Indians would assimilate and the tribes would disappear. That expectation
may have created a form of psychological reliance, but it should have created
no legal reliance interests. Moreover, in the Indian Reorganization Act,
Congress determined to halt the allotment and surplus lands programs.384
Congress no longer envisioned that the Indians would assimilate and the
tribes would melt into the pot; instead, the Indian country would be preserved
as intact as it was in 1934. Congress made that even more explicit in 1948
when it enacted the definition of Indian country as including all lands within
the boundaries of a reservation, regardless of ownership.385  In 1934, and
again in 1948, and yet again with the modem federal policy of promoting
the tribes' dependent sovereign status. No federal statute divests tribes of civil jurisdiction; to the
contrary, federal law and federal policy promote the development of tribal courts. And few, if any, tribes
will have treaty-based constraints on their judicial jurisdiction. The result is that tribes should have near
exclusive jurisdiction over civil adjudication, and thus should also have the power to impose tribal law
on the litigants. The substantive law developed and applied by the tribal courts will be tribal law. In
holding that the federal courts may not relitigate the merits if tribal court jurisdiction is proper, the Court
thus recognized and sanctioned the inherent right of tribes to apply their substantive civil law to non-
Indian litigants.
The oddity, then, is that the Court recognizes the rights of tribes only as to certain types of civil
authority. Under National Farmers and Iowa Mutual, tribes retain full inherent authority over non-Indians
in such areas as torts, contracts, and domestic law. See generally National Farmers, 471 U.S. 845; Iowa
Mutual, 480 U.S. 9. But under Montana and Brendale, tribes do not necessarily retain inherent authority
over non-Indians on fee lands in such areas as zoning and regulation of hunting and fishing. See generally
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544; Brendale, 492 U.S. 408. Whether those two lines of cases can
be reconciled is questionable: one line (arising from National Farmers) involves tribal adjudicatory
jurisdiction, and the other (arising from Montana) involves tribal regulatory jurisdiction, but that fact
hardly constitutes an explanation of the difference. One possible reason is a perception by the Court that
the adjudicatory cases do not implicate the interests of non-Indians as property owners within the Indian
country, while the regulatory cases clearly do. Whatever potential that explanation has, however, the fact
remains that the Court appears far more concerned with non-Indian interests when those interests derive
directly from the fee ownership of land within the Indian country.
383. See, e.g., Hagen v. Utah, 114 S. Ct. 958, 970 (1994).
384. See supra text accompanying notes 83-90.
385. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a).
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tribal government, Congress changed the rules for non-Indians resident in the
Indian country. If that constituted any sort of taking of any vested interests
of non-Indian property owners, their remedy is against the federal govern-
ment, not the tribes.
But if the federal government made no promises to non-Indian settlers that
could have ripened into vested rights, the government most assuredly did
make those promises to the tribes. In treaty after treaty, the federal
government guaranteed the tribes the right to "absolute and undisturbed use
and occupation," a promise that encompassed the right of the tribes to govern
their territory.3"6 Those treaties were abrogated by the General Allotment
Act and its implementing legislation; the government broke its "solemn
promise" to every tribe subject to allotment and homesteading.
The federal government thus has not kept its word to anyone. It broke its
treaty guarantees to the tribes when it invited white settlers into the Indian
country, and it broke its implicit contract with the settlers when it reversed
the assimilationist policy and sought to preserve tribal lands and tribal
government. Much of the argument against tribal territorial sovereignty
seems to rest on the idea that the government should now keep its "promise"
to the settlers, but not its promise to the tribes. The logic of that escapes me.
If the Court considers non-Indian expectations more important, more worthy
of protection, more "justifiable" than tribal rights, then the Court is obligated
to account for its reasons.
One of the principal arguments for non-Indian freedom from tribal
authority is that non-Indians are not and cannot become citizens of the
tribes.38 7 They have no vote in tribal matters and no role in determining
tribal law and tribal policy.38 The Court has therefore posited that it is
"improbable" that Congress intended tribal authority over non-Indians to
continue once tribal lands passed into non-Indian ownership.389
The argument that non-Indians have not consented to tribal jurisdiction is
countered by the fact that no other government is subject to a requirement
that non-citizens consent to the exercise of authority over them.39 ° If a
citizen of one state owns property in another state, for example, the property
is subject to the authority of the state in which it is located. If a citizen of
one state engages in conduct or activities within a second state, the state of
386. See, e.g., the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie, discussed supra text accompanying notes 247-48.
387. See Dussias, supra note 273, at 86.
388. See, e.g., Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of
Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 161 (1980).
389. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 437 (Stevens, J., concurring).
390. This argument has recently been fully developed by Professor Dussias. Dussias, supra note 273,
at 87-91. See also Clinton, supra note 5, at 151-52.
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locus has jurisdiction over the actor. In neither case is the host state's
jurisdiction limited by the fact that the non-citizen has no say in the host
state's government. Instead, the individual is held to consent to jurisdiction
by the fact of owning property or engaging in activity within the host state.
Nothing further is required of states, and absent congressional mandate,
nothing further should be required of tribes.
An additional concern is that the tribes will not deal fairly with non-
Indians and their property. That concern may stem from a sense of historical
guilt. If the majority society has seldom dealt fairly with the tribes, it may
expect that tribes, given the opportunity, will return the favor. Alternatively,
the concern may arise from simple colonial mistrust of the natives' ability to
get it right. To the extent that distrust of tribal authority over non-Indians is
rooted in ethnocentrism, the country simply ought to get over it. Fairness
concerns may be alleviated by the protections of the Indian Civil Rights
Act,39 ' coupled with a willingness to trust tribal lawmaking institutions.
The protection of non-Indian expectations over tribal sovereign rights may
serve as the colonialist defense of the Court's legacy of allotment, but that
defense is ultimately specious. Federal promises to the tribes are no less
sacred than federal promises made to non-Indian purchasers of property in
the Indian country. In light of congressional repudiation of allotment and the
modem federal policy of protecting and promoting tribal self-government, no
justification exists for the Court to elevate the interests of non-Indian
property owners above the inherent and treaty-guaranteed sovereignty of the
tribes.3 92
Thus, if the Court were willing, it could recognize and affirm the territorial
sovereignty of the tribes without doing violence to non-Indian rights. But the
Court has chosen instead to further the legacy of allotment. And with the
Court generally unwilling to mitigate, much less unravel, that legacy,
protecting tribes today from the ravages of past policies will fall to Congress.
In the past few years, Congress has been cautiously willing to counter-
mand Supreme Court decisions affecting tribal sovereignty that Congress
views as wrongly decided. The most dramatic of these congressional "fixes"
391. In particular, the ICRA guarantees rights of due process and equal protection. 25 U.S.C. § 1302.
Tribal court decisions reported in the INDIAN LAW REPORTER reveal judiciaries intent upon resolving
disputes fairly and evenhandedly.
392. Professor Clinton has identified one exception. A tribe should not be able to exercise its
sovereign power to exclude from the Indian country a non-Indian who owns land in fee within the tribal
territory. Clinton, supra note 5, at 153. Nonetheless, Clinton argues that "decolonizing" federal Indian
law depends upon "the return to a more territorial conception of tribal sovereignty divorced from the
overlay of racial and ethnic status of the parties and land ownership that has plagued Indian jurisdictional
cases for the past quarter century." Id. at 152.
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is the legislative reversal of Duro v. Reina.393 In Duro, the Court extended
its ruling from Oliphant94 that Indian tribes were implicitly divested of
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. The Court ruled in Duro that tribes
were also divested of criminal jurisdiction over Indians who were not
members of the prosecuting tribe. Within months of the decision, Congress
reversed it.395 Congress amended the Indian Civil Rights Act definition of
the powers of tribal self-government to provide that those powers include
"the inherent power of an Indian tribe, hereby recognized and affirmed, to
exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians."'3 96 The Duro legislation
shows in no uncertain terms that Congress can act swiftly and decisively to
bring the Court to heel when the Court has deprived the tribes of legitimate
sovereign powers.397
More recently, Congress has again indicated its willingness to reverse the
Court on issues of tribal sovereignty. In the 1989 case of Cotton Petroleum
Corporation v. New Mexico, the Court upheld concurrent state taxation of
non-Indian mineral lessees on trust lands.398 The House Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs questioned the Court's reasoning and contended
that the decision was "potentially contrary to the fundamental principles of
tribal sovereignty and the Congressional policy to create economic develop-
ment on reservations. ' 399 As a result, in the Indian Energy Resources Act
of 1992, Congress established the Indian Energy Resource Commission and
charged it, among other duties, with developing recommendations on dual
tribal-state taxation of mineral lessees.4 " If the Commission gives due
weight to tribal sovereignty and federal Indian policy, it should recommend
that concurrent state taxation of mineral lessees be abolished. The legislative
393. 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (discussed supra note 238).
394. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 191. The Oliphant decision is discussed supra text accompanying notes
233-41.
395. See generally Newton, supra note 238; Skibine, supra note 238.
396. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2).
397. A practical law enforcement reason existed for the Duro legislation as well. Under the Court's
decision, no government-tribal, state, or federal-would have had jurisdiction to prosecute non-member
Indians for minor crimes committed in the Indian country. 495 U.S. at 696-97. The Court brushed that
problem aside with the suggestion that "the proper body to address the problem is Congress." Id. at 698.
Congress did in fact address the problem, and did so in a way that expressly recognized tribal sovereignty.
25 U.S.C. § 1301(2). But cynicism might suggest that Congress might not have done so but for the gap
in law enforcement.
398. 490 U.S. 163, 163 (1989). For criticism of the case, see Judith V. Royster, Mineral Development
in Indian Country: The Evolution of Tribal Control Over Mineral Resources, 29 TULSA L.J. 541, 575-79
(1994).
399. H.R. REP. No. 474, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., pt.8, at 95-96 (1992).
400. 25 U.S.C. § 3505(k)(1). For a discussion of the Act and the Commission, see Royster, supra
note 398, at 596-601.
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history of the Indian Energy Resources Act clearly indicates that Congress
would be willing to enact such a recommendation into law.4"'
Similar congressional fixes have been proposed for some of the Court's
recent allotment-based decisions. Commentators have suggested, for
example, that Congress fix County of Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation by
expressly exempting fee-patented former allotments from state property
taxes.4 2 Although that approach would surely benefit tribes by removing
what may be a significant financial burden from their members, this type of
piecemeal approach to the legacy of allotment is ultimately unsatisfactory.
What is needed is the courage to take on allotment as a whole and to finally
effectuate its 1934 repudiation.0 3 If the Supreme Court were willing, it
could do that. But it is not, and so Congress must now act to restore tribal
territorial integrity and halt further depredations.
The difficulty is that Congress does not appear any more willing than the
Court to comprehensively address the lingering issue of allotment. Some of
the worst of the reservation disestablishment cases are now two decades old,
but no congressional legislation has ever been enacted to deal with the
diminishment issue. The Montana decision has been around for over a
decade, and even Brendale is now a few years old; but again, Congress has
shown no inclination to fix the problem of limiting tribal sovereignty to
Indian-owned lands.40 4 It may be that the cumulative weight of the recent
401. See H.R. REP. No. 474.
402. Kams, supra note 106, at 1240-41 (proposing statutory language); Borrero, supra note 106, at
956.
403. Other commentators have concurred. See, e.g., McClanahan, supra note 317, at 527 (calling,
after Bourland, for federal legislation "to restrain the Court's judicial activism in the area of tribal
sovereignty").
404. Congress has failed to step in despite some difficulty in reconciling Brendale with Congress's
treatment of tribes under the federal environmental laws. In open areas, Brendale posits a scheme of
tribal authority dependent upon land ownership. 492 U.S. 408 (1989). The environmental laws, by
contrast, often are based on tribal territorial authority throughout the Indian country, see. e.g., Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (Supp. 1992); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e)(2) (1988), and even where
they arguably are not, generally require unitary management in order for the environmental protection
schemes to be effective. See generally Judith V. Royster and Rory SnowArrow Fausett, Control of the
Reservation Environment: Tribal Primacy, Federal Delegation, and the Limits of State Intrusion, 64
WASH. L. REV. 581 (1989). For differing views of how Brendale and the environmental laws should be
reconciled, compare Royster, supra note 268 (arguing that the environmental laws offer a way around the
zoning control lost under Brendale) with Peter W. Sly, EPA and Indian Reservations: Justice Stevens'
Factual Approach, 20 ENVT'L L. REP. (ENVT'L L. INST.) 10429 (1990) (arguing that Brendale's open-
versus-closed approach to tribal authority should be applied to tribal jurisdiction under the environmental
laws). The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) compromised: it did not reject the approach in
Brendale outright, but did determine that, in virtually all instances, tribes will exercise environmental
authority under the federal statutes throughout their territories. The EPA's approach is explained at 56
Fed. Reg. 64,876 (1991).
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cases 40 5 will prompt Congress to act, but past congressional inaction is not
encouraging. Congress seems clearly more comfortable with discrete and
confined legislative fixes to particular Court decisions than it does with large-
scale policy determinations.
In short, I am not optimistic. 4 6  The optimum solution to the legacy of
allotment would be for the Court to recognize tribal territorial sovereignty.
The Court should apply the canons of construction and interpret allotment-
era-based issues in light of the Indian Reorganization Act and current federal
Indian policy. But as we used to say in the small towns, that and a dime will
get you a cup of coffee. The next best solution would be a universal fix
from Congress, reaffirming that Congress meant what it said in the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934: allotment is over and its effects on the tribes
should be relegated to history. But I strongly suspect that that and another
dime will get you a refill.
VII. CONCLUSION
The title of this article is appropriated from the title of historian Patricia
Limerick's book, The Legacy of Conquest.40 7 Professor Limerick posits
405. The Court has issued an opinion furthering the legacy of allotment in each of the last three
terms: County of Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992), South Dakota v. Bourland, 113
S. Ct. 2309 (1993), and Hagen v. Utah, 114 S. Ct. 958 (1994).
406. I am not entirely pessimistic either. Following the Court's decision in Montana, discussed supra
text accompanying notes 242-64, the lower courts engaged in considerable damage control by holding that
a range of activities resulted in sufficient impacts on tribal interests that tribes retained inherent sovereign
authority to regulate. See cases cited supra note 266. Also, in the reservation disestablishment area,
lower courts have often been scrupulous in protecting tribal rights. See, e.g., Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah,
773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985) (en bane), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 (1986), discussed supra note 217.
Also, some courts have already refused to extend the Court's decision in County of Yakima wholesale to
all alienable lands. See Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Board of County Comm'rs, 855 F. Supp. 1194 (D.
Colo. 1994); Pease v. Yellowstone County, 21 Indian L. Rep. 6109 (Crow Ct. App. 1994), discussed
supra text accompanying notes 137-40. Similarly, Congress has on occasion responded promptly and
effectively to Supreme Court derogations of tribal sovereignty. See, e.g., the legislative fix of Duro v.
Reina, discussed supra text accompanying notes 393-97.
My lack of optimism stems, rather, from the intractable nature of the Supreme Court's approach. In
every recent case that implicates the allotment program, the Court has inexorably carried forward the
legacy of the allotment years. Despite the fact that the Court's approach is contrary to modem federal
Indian policy, Congress has shown no inclination to muzzle the Court's attempt to reformulate the nation's
relationship with the Indian tribes. The lower federal courts and the tribal courts may once again engage
in damage control: they may read Supreme Court cases narrowly, confine the worst of the depredations
to the facts of the cases, and protect tribal sovereign interests wherever possible. My wish is that this
would not be necessary. My lack of optimism arises from the fact that it is.
407. PATRICIA N. LIMERICK, THE LEGACY OF CONQUEST: THE UNBROKEN PAST OF THE AMERICAN
WEST (1987).
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that the conquest of the American West, far from ending with the "closing
of the frontier" in 18 90 ,4"' remains a vital part of the modem West.
Viewing conquest only as history, she argues, blinds us to the very real
legacy of conquest in the West today:
The conquest of Western America shapes the present as dramatical-
ly-and sometimes as perilously-as the old mines shape the mountain-
sides. To live with that legacy, contemporary Americans ought to be
well informed and well warned about the connections between past and
present. But here the peculiar status of Western American history has
posed an obstacle to understanding. Americans are left to stumble
over-and sometimes into-those connections, caught off guard by the
continued vitality of issues widely believed to be dead.409
Limerick's insight is as vital for the legacy of allotment in American
Indian law as it is for the legacy of conquest in American Western history.
Allotment, widely believed to be dead, remains instead an obstacle to the
sovereignty of the Indian tribes. The policy's continued vitality in the Court
may no longer catch us off guard, we may now be well informed and well
warned, but the damage that the legacy does continues.
The policy of allotment is thus to modem Indian law what the idea of
conquest is to the modem American psyche: a concept whose time has gone,
but a concept that will not go away. Like conquest, allotment is outmoded,
a doctrine unsuited to modem life and modem sensibilities. But like
conquest in the collective psyche, allotment in Indian law seems buried too
deeply, imbedded too permanently to simply disappear of its own accord.
Only a clear recognition of its continuing presence and a deliberate choice
to renounce its present effects will rid Indian law and Indian tribes of a
policy that was officially repudiated sixty years ago.
In order to move Indian law into the twenty-first century, then, the legacy
of allotment must be excised from the canon of Indian law. The Court,
intent upon effectuating the legacy, will not do so. Congress may putter
around the edges, but thus far has shown neither the foresight nor the
gumption to end it. And that leaves Indian tribes in an increasingly
precarious position. At the turn of the last century, tribes were facing the
allotment policy itself. At the turn of the next century, tribes are still facing
allotment: no longer as a formal government policy, but rather as a lingering
408. The "closing" of the American frontier and the consequent end to the "first period" of American
history was the thesis developed by Frederick Jackson Turner in his 1893 essay, The Significance of the
Frontier in American History. Turner's thesis is discussed in LIMERICK, supra note 407, at 20-22.
409. LIMERICK, supra note 407, at 18.
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legacy eroding their sovereign rights. The twenty-first century demands that
the baggage of the nineteenth finally be discarded.
